Sponsors (2)
Official title: To impose sanctions with respect to Rosatom, and for other purposes.
Introduced March 26, 2026 by Thomas Kean · Last progress March 26, 2026
The bill strengthens U.S. and allied security and nonproliferation by decoupling from Russia's nuclear industry and tightening financial and enforcement tools, but it does so at the cost of higher economic and administrative burdens, potential diplomatic friction, and operational challenges for utilities, partners, and agencies.
U.S. and allied governments and taxpayers: tighter sanctions and blocking of Russian government-linked nuclear entities reduces Russia's commercial revenues and constrains funds that could support the war in Ukraine.
Utilities, reactor operators, and partner countries: planning alternatives, support for the IAEA low‑enriched uranium bank, and coordinated assistance help reduce dependence on Rosatom and improve long‑term energy security and reactor safety during supplier transitions.
U.S. policymakers and Congress: mandated reporting, timely determinations, and a required assessment of the 2011 123 Agreement provide clearer oversight and faster, better-informed decisionmaking on nuclear cooperation, sanctions, and nonproliferation risks.
Utilities, reactor operators, and electricity consumers: replacing Russian suppliers and complying with sanctions is likely to raise costs and cause supply or project delays, with potential downstream effects on rates and timelines.
U.S. diplomatic relations and allied civilian nuclear cooperation: sanctions, blocking actions, and stricter export controls may strain ties with partner countries relying on Rosatom, complicating coordination and risking political or commercial fallout.
National security and intelligence sensitivity: public disclosures, statutory deadlines, and reports could reveal sensitive enforcement or foreign‑policy information or provoke Russian retaliation, potentially complicating broader negotiations and operations.
Based on analysis of 7 sections of legislative text.
Directs a presidential strategy to decouple from Rosatom, orders a State Department review of the 2011 nuclear cooperation agreement, and authorizes IEEPA blocking sanctions and correspondent-account restrictions on foreign actors tied to Rosatom.
Creates a U.S. strategy and new sanctions tools to end reliance on Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom, push partners to replace Russian nuclear suppliers, and block transactions by foreign actors that facilitate Russia’s nuclear industry. It requires near-term reports and certifications, a State Department review of the 2011 U.S.–Russia nuclear cooperation agreement, and gives the President authority to impose IEEPA blocking sanctions and restrictions on correspondent banking for targeted foreign persons. Sets timelines for an initial multi-year decoupling strategy and repeated annual updates, directs the Secretary of State to assess the 123 agreement’s national-security value, and requires the President to respond quickly to congressional requests about whether specific entities meet sanction criteria. Some sanctions and reporting duties take effect within 30–180 days of enactment and can be lifted only after the President certifies specific nonproliferation and security conditions.