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Creates a legal rule that, after a final court judgment finding patent infringement, a patent owner is presumptively entitled to a permanent injunction against the infringing conduct unless the infringer rebuts that presumption. The change amends the remedies statute (35 U.S.C. 283) to establish a rebuttable presumption in favor of permanent injunctive relief for patent owners following a final infringement judgment. The presumption strengthens patent owners’ ability to stop ongoing or future infringing use of their inventions, likely increasing the leverage of patentees in licensing and settlement talks and changing how courts, defendants, and plaintiffs approach patent litigation and remedy determinations.
Securing effective and reliable patent protection for new technologies is critical to maintaining the United States’ competitive advantage in the global innovation economy.
States that the Constitution empowers Congress to grant inventors rights (referred to as an "exclusive Right") to their inventions in order to 'promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.'
Defines the core of the patent right as the ability to prevent others from making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing a patented invention without the inventor’s authority, so the inventor enjoys the sole benefit of the invention for a limited time.
States that Congress and U.S. courts have long secured the constitutionally protected patent right through the traditional equitable remedy of an injunction.
Notes that because multiple acts of infringement or willful infringement cause irreparable harm, courts historically presumed an injunction should be granted for such conduct, placing the burden on defendants to rebut that presumption with standard equitable defenses.
Who is affected and how:
Patent owners and assignees: They gain stronger default access to permanent injunctions once a court issues a final infringement judgment, increasing their ability to stop infringing activity and improving leverage in licensing and settlement talks.
Accused infringers (large and small companies): Companies found to infringe face greater risk of being barred from making, using, selling, or importing products or services that practice the patent; this raises business risk and potentially increases incentives to avoid litigation or to seek early settlements or redesigns.
Small inventors/under-capitalized patentees and startups: The presumption may help these entities protect inventions against larger firms that might otherwise infringe without fear of injunctive consequences, improving their bargaining position.
“Patent assertion entities” and non-practicing patentees: These actors may see increased settlement leverage because the threat of a statutory-presumption-backed injunction can increase the cost of losing litigation for defendants.
Federal courts and judges: Courts will need to apply the new statutory presumption, evaluate rebuttal evidence, and make more detailed factual findings on remedy questions; this could change remedial briefing and the workload associated with remedy phases of patent cases.
Consumers and competition: If injunctions are issued more frequently, some products or services could be removed from the market, potentially reducing competition or creating short-term consumer harm; conversely, stronger enforcement of patent rights can incentivize investment in innovation.
Likely downstream effects:
Limitations and uncertainties:
Expand sections to see detailed analysis
Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Introduced February 25, 2025 by Christopher A. Coons · Last progress February 25, 2025
Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Introduced in Senate