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The bill opens the residency matching process to antitrust scrutiny—potentially increasing flexibility and bargaining power for programs and applicants but creating legal uncertainty, higher costs, and risks of disruption to matches that could harm training and patient care.
Hospitals and residency programs could gain ability to pursue more flexible recruitment arrangements if matching practices are subject to antitrust scrutiny, allowing alternative contracting or direct hiring.
Medical students and recent graduates could gain new negotiation options and greater bargaining power if Match rules or algorithms are changed or reviewed under antitrust law.
If the Match is altered, delayed, or suspended during legal disputes, patients and training programs could experience staffing gaps, mismatches, and delays that harm patient care and the medical training pipeline.
Medical students and residency applicants will face legal uncertainty and potential disruption to the centralized Match process they rely on, complicating career planning and increasing stress and risk of mismatches.
Residency programs and hospitals could incur increased litigation risk, regulatory scrutiny, and compliance costs if matching practices are challenged under antitrust laws.
Based on analysis of 3 sections of legislative text.
Removes the federal statutory confirmation that graduate medical resident matching programs comply with antitrust law (15 U.S.C. § 37b).
Introduced April 16, 2026 by Mike Lee · Last progress April 16, 2026
Repeals the federal statutory confirmation that graduate medical resident matching programs (the centralized “Match” and similar computerized matching systems) are consistent with federal antitrust law. It removes the specific statutory findings and legal protection that had been codified for these matching programs and takes effect on the first March 18 after the law is enacted.