Sponsors (4)
The bill funds a rapid, evidence-based federal study to clarify national-security risks from certain foreign-linked home networking devices and inform policy, at the trade-off of government study costs, the possibility of higher procurement prices if restrictions follow, and potential gaps on privacy or supply-chain issues unless further action is taken.
Federal agencies and Congress will receive an evidence-based assessment and report (within one year) of national-security risks from consumer routers/modems linked to covered foreign countries, enabling more informed procurement, regulatory, and policy decisions.
If the study leads to guidance or restrictions, consumers and critical infrastructure could see improved security against risky devices from covered countries.
Any procurement restrictions or policy changes prompted by the report could raise costs for state and local governments and consumers if safer domestic substitutes are more expensive.
If the study focuses narrowly on national security, it may not fully address consumer privacy or broader supply‑chain risks, leaving gaps that could harm consumers and tech workers unless further analysis is done.
Conducting the study will consume Commerce Department resources and staff time and impose administrative costs on taxpayers, potentially delaying other work.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Introduced January 24, 2025 by Marsha Blackburn · Last progress January 24, 2025
Requires the Secretary of Commerce to study national security risks from consumer routers, modems, and combined modem-router devices that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by entities owned by, controlled by, or subject to influence from a “covered country.” The Secretary must consult the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information and deliver a report of the study’s findings to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation within one year of enactment. The measure is limited to conducting and reporting a study; it does not itself impose new regulations, authorize spending, or change procurement rules. The study’s findings could inform later federal policy, guidance, or legislative actions addressing supply-chain and device security risks tied to foreign actors.