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Adds a new subsection (q) to section 101 defining the term 'Derived from' for purposes of this Act.
Amends section 104(a) (contents of applications) by striking specified paragraphs, redesignating others, and by adding a new subsection (e) limiting the inclusion and use of information obtained from media sources, political campaigns, or First Amendment-protected activity and requiring disclosure and corroboration when such information is used.
Amends section 105(a) (limitations on issuance of order) by making punctuation/technical edits and by adding a new paragraph (5) imposing disclosure/corroboration requirements for applications that rely in any part on information from media sources, political campaigns, or First Amendment-protected activity.
Amends section 702(h)(2) by adding a new subparagraph (F) requiring an attestation that, to the certifier's knowledge, the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence have been apprised of information in Government possession that might call into question the accuracy or reasonableness of the certification.
Conforming/technical amendments to section 303(a) (50 U.S.C. 1823(a)): strikes specified paragraphs and removes certain subparagraphs (technical punctuation and paragraph removals as described).
Makes technical and conforming edits to section 402(c) (50 U.S.C. 1842(c)), including striking and adjusting specified paragraphs/subparagraphs.
Amends section 502(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1862(b)(2)) by adjusting subparagraph lettering (adding 'and', redesignating subparagraphs, striking and replacing text in subparagraphs, and removing a subparagraph).
Amends section 703(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1881b(b)(1)) by modifying subparagraphs (adding punctuation, striking and replacing text, and removing a listed subparagraph).
Amends section 704(b) (50 U.S.C. 1881c(b)) by adjusting paragraph punctuation and striking a listed paragraph (technical/conforming edits).
Amends section 109(a) (50 U.S.C. 1809(a)) to add new criminal prohibitions covering knowingly submitting false material declarations or material omissions to the courts established under sections 103(a) or 103(b), and knowingly disclosing the existence of an application or its contents to unauthorized persons (subject to whistleblower-authorized disclosures).
And 15 more affected sections...
Tightens how intelligence and law enforcement agencies collect, query, and use communications and commercial personal data by expanding oversight, reporting, audits, and court review. It limits warrantless access to U.S. persons’ communications, raises accuracy and disclosure requirements in FISA filings, expands the role of court-appointed amici, requires regular Inspector General audits, and restricts government purchase/use of sensitive commercial datasets from private companies.
The bill substantially strengthens privacy, oversight, and judicial review of intelligence and government access to communications and private datasets—giving Americans greater transparency and limits on warrantless access—while trading off increased costs, legal complexity, potential delays in law‑
Most Americans (U.S. persons and users of online services) gain stronger limits on warrantless government access to communications and large private datasets, making compelled purchases/searches and bulk acquisition harder without court orders or narrow exceptions.
All Americans gain substantially more transparency about surveillance through new reporting and public summaries (counts of queries, targets, selectors, retention practices, and use in prosecutions) so Congress and the public can better see how often U.S. persons are affected.
People subject to surveillance and defendants benefit from stronger judicial and civil‑liberties review: more court oversight of provider directives, clearer 'derived from' guidance, and expanded amicus access (including to classified materials) to challenge surveillance legality.
Surveillance misuse risk is reduced because the bill mandates regular audits, accuracy procedures, training, recordkeeping, and escalating personnel consequences for violations, which should lower mistaken or improper queries of communications.
Intelligence and law‑enforcement operations could be slowed or less effective because added pre‑approval steps, audits, stricter corroboration/disclosure rules, and narrower vendor access increase procedural burdens and may delay time‑sensitive foreign‑intelligence or urgent investigations.
Taxpayers, federal agencies, and private providers will face higher administrative and compliance costs to implement audits, reporting, training, security vetting, minimization/destruction, and expanded legal processes.
Expanded reporting, wider amicus and audit access, and required disclosures risk creating additional pathways that could expose sensitive methods, sources, or operational details—potentially harming counterterrorism and covert operations if classified material is mishandled.
Narrowly drawn exceptions (exigent circumstances, consent, court‑authorized measures, cybersecurity, certain employment or compliance cases) still permit some warrantless intrusions into U.S. persons' data, leaving residual domestic surveillance risk.
Require the Department of Justice to conduct an audit reviewing each "covered query" performed during each 180-day period beginning on enactment and every 180 days thereafter.
Require each 180-day audit to be completed within 90 days after the end of the 180-day period.
Require DOJ to submit complete, unredacted audit results to the appropriate congressional intelligence and Judiciary committees within 30 days after completing each audit.
Require an in-person briefing to those congressional committees if DOJ fails to complete and transmit an audit within 120 days after the 180-day period; briefing must occur not later than 127 days after the period ends.
Repeal a superseded audit requirement in section 2(c) of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act.
Primary impacts fall on federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies (especially the FBI and DOJ), FISA courts, providers of communications and data (online services, data brokers, and intermediary platforms), and individuals in the United States whose communications or data could be collected or queried. Agencies must adopt new training, auditing, approval, and compliance processes, increasing operational and administrative workload and requiring potential system upgrades or hiring. FISA court processes will change through expanded amici participation and stricter disclosure obligations, which could lengthen proceedings or increase litigation over legal standards. Private companies that sell or hold sensitive personal data face higher legal thresholds to hand over data, reporting duties before anticipated large acquisitions, and obligations to minimize or destroy data, which may change commercial practices. Individuals—particularly U.S. persons—gain stronger procedural protections, limits on warrantless access, and greater transparency about certain intelligence activities, potentially improving privacy but also possibly limiting some intelligence collection or investigative practices. Congress receives more detailed metrics and audit findings, increasing legislative oversight. The balance between strengthened civil‑liberty safeguards and potential operational constraints for national security actors could affect the speed and scope of some investigations.
Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Introduced February 23, 2026 by Mike Lee · Last progress February 23, 2026
Expand sections to see detailed analysis
Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Introduced in Senate