Sponsors (9)
The bill builds a centralized DHS effort and greater transparency to counter CCP‑linked threats and improve information‑sharing, but it raises civil‑liberties risks and modest fiscal and compliance costs that require careful oversight.
Taxpayers and local governments: DHS will create a dedicated Working Group to coordinate detection and disruption of CCP-linked terrorism, cyber intrusions, and supply‑chain threats, centralizing expertise and response.
Taxpayers: DHS must produce annual unclassified reports (with a classified annex) on CCP-related threats and DHS activities, increasing public transparency and congressional oversight.
Border communities and local partners: The Working Group's required coordination with state, local, tribal partners and fusion centers should improve information‑sharing to detect and stop smuggling, trafficking, and illicit shipments more quickly.
United States persons and local governments: Use of classified annexes and intelligence coordination increases the risk that sensitive information and government activity could impinge on privacy and free‑speech unless robust oversight is maintained.
Immigrants and cross‑border travelers: Expanded surveillance and security activities tied to detecting CCP‑linked threats could lead to increased vetting, enforcement actions, or bureaucratic burdens on travelers and immigrant communities.
Taxpayers and federal employees: Establishing and staffing the new Working Group will require DHS resources and likely additional federal spending, increasing costs borne by taxpayers and potentially shifting agency priorities.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Creates a DHS Working Group to assess, coordinate, and report on CCP-related threats across security, immigration, trade, cyber, and illicit finance domains.
Creates a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Working Group to identify, coordinate, and respond to threats tied to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Working Group must be stood up within 180 days, led by a Director who reports to the Secretary, staffed with dedicated employees (including at least one privacy compliance staffer), and may accept detailees from other agencies. It must examine a wide range of threats — terrorism, cyber, border and port security, transportation security, visa and immigration system abuses, predatory economic practices, counterfeit and forced-labor goods, fentanyl trafficking, illicit finance, and intellectual property/technology theft — and report on DHS resources, program effectiveness, and coordination efforts.
Introduced January 23, 2025 by Dale Strong · Last progress March 11, 2025