Sponsors (9)
Introduced January 23, 2025 by Dale Strong · Last progress March 11, 2025
The bill strengthens DHS coordination, threat assessments, accountability, and targeted civil‑liberties safeguards to address CCP‑linked threats, but it increases federal costs and raises privacy, immigration‑screening, and commerce‑disruption risks while creating potential instability with a seven‑year sunset.
Federal, state, and local partners will receive coordinated, regular DHS assessments of CCP-linked threats, improving situational awareness and enabling better threat response planning.
Border, port, and transportation security authorities (and the communities and workers they serve) will gain a focused DHS body to improve cross-component coordination, which can reduce illicit trafficking and supply-chain vulnerabilities.
Taxpayers and managers will benefit from DHS tracking and reporting on program resources and efficacy, which can improve resource allocation, reduce waste, and increase accountability.
Taxpayers will face higher federal costs to establish and staff a new DHS Working Group without specified budget offsets.
Immigrants, visa applicants, and lawful travelers may experience increased scrutiny and processing delays because of expanded investigative attention tied to CCP‑linked activity.
Broad emphasis on CCP involvement across many crime types risks conflating state‑sponsored threats with private-sector or lawful activity, which could prompt more aggressive enforcement actions that disrupt trade, remittances, and legitimate commerce.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Requires DHS to create a working group within 180 days to assess and coordinate responses to CCP‑linked threats across security, trade, trafficking, and finance domains.
Creates a Department of Homeland Security working group that must be set up within 180 days to assess and coordinate DHS activities addressing threats tied to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The working group will be led by a Director who reports to the Secretary, must be staffed with sufficient employees (including at least one privacy‑compliance staffer), may accept detailees, and must examine CCP-related threats across terrorism, cybersecurity, border and port security, transportation security, illicit trade and forced labor, fentanyl and other trafficking, and illicit finance, while identifying gaps and avoiding duplication.