Sponsors (9)
The bill centralizes and clarifies federal coordination, transparency, and technology efforts to address CCP-related threats—strengthening preparedness and interagency response—while increasing costs, information-sharing, and risks to privacy and potentially targeted communities.
Federal, state, and local partners (including federal employees and law enforcement) will have a dedicated DHS entity and Director coordinating CCP-related border, port, and transportation responses, reducing duplication and improving interagency cooperation.
Federal, state, and local governments (and their staff) will receive regular public assessments of CCP-related threats, improving transparency and situational awareness for planning and response.
Taxpayers and the public benefit from required privacy-compliance staffing and civil liberties protections intended to limit surveillance abuse and protect lawful speech.
Immigrants and broader communities face increased privacy and civil liberties risks from expanded collection and sharing of information across federal, state, local, Tribal, and fusion centers despite mandated safeguards.
Taxpayers may bear higher federal spending and administrative costs as DHS responsibilities and staffing expand to implement the new entity and programs.
Chinese nationals and U.S. persons of Chinese descent (and other Asian communities) could face profiling or discriminatory enforcement if focus on the CCP leads to biased targeting.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Introduced January 23, 2025 by Dale Strong · Last progress March 11, 2025
Creates a DHS Working Group to identify and coordinate responses to threats tied to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including terrorism, cybersecurity, border and transportation security, transnational crime, economic/technology theft, and illicit finance. The Working Group must be stood up within 180 days, staffed with DHS personnel (including a dedicated privacy-compliance employee), coordinate with federal and nonfederal partners, run R&D and operational testing where practicable, and produce an annual unclassified assessment (with a possible classified annex) for Congress for five years. The Group automatically terminates seven years after establishment.