Sponsors (4)
The bill centralizes and strengthens federal coordination, oversight, and detection to counter CCP-linked threats and illicit activity, improving security and transparency but raising surveillance and enforcement risks for immigrants and businesses and increasing federal costs.
Federal agencies (DHS and partner agencies) will have a dedicated coordinating body to identify and close gaps countering CCP-linked terrorist, cyber, and border threats, improving national threat response.
Federal, state, local, tribal partners and fusion centers will get stronger assessment and coordination to better detect illicit fentanyl, counterfeit goods, forced labor, and illicit finance, which can improve community safety and supply-chain integrity.
DHS will be required to track and report how resources are used and the effectiveness of programs, increasing transparency and oversight for Congress and the public.
Immigrants, border communities, and other populations may face increased surveillance and scrutiny because of expanded information‑sharing, intelligence detailees, and fusion-center involvement, risking mission creep despite stated privacy safeguards.
Broad definitions related to economic practices, IP/technology theft, and illicit finance could expand enforcement actions in ways that disrupt legitimate trade and impose compliance costs on businesses and financial institutions.
Increased DHS activity and hiring to implement the bill's coordination and enforcement efforts could raise federal costs and administrative burdens for taxpayers.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Requires DHS to create a Working Group (within 180 days) to assess, coordinate, and report on CCP-related threats across security, immigration, economic, and trafficking domains.
Creates a DHS Working Group to identify, coordinate, and report on threats the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) poses to U.S. homeland security. The group must be set up within 180 days, led by a Director who reports to the Secretary, staffed sufficiently (including at least one privacy compliance employee), and may include detailees from other federal agencies. The Working Group must examine a wide range of CCP-related threats — from terrorism, cybersecurity, and border/transport security to economic harms such as IP theft, forced labor, counterfeit goods, customs fraud, fentanyl trafficking, and illicit financial activity — and must account for DHS resources devoted to these efforts and evaluate their effectiveness.
Introduced May 6, 2025 by John Cornyn · Last progress May 6, 2025