Sponsors (2)
The bill funds a study that could enable stronger connectivity, economic links, and more secure communications for the USVI and U.S. interests, but those benefits may require new federal spending, risk slower or costlier deployment due to trusted‑vendor constraints, and could produce incomplete or sensitive public disclosures.
USVI residents, rural communities, and connected U.S. regions could gain improved and more resilient internet connectivity if a trans‑Atlantic cable and related buildout are feasible and built.
U.S. military and national security agencies could gain lower‑latency, more secure communications if a dedicated USVI data center and high‑security cloud are feasible and implemented.
U.S. businesses and traders could see increased economic investment and new commercial links with West Africa if the cable creates new connectivity and commercial opportunities.
Taxpayers could face significant additional federal spending if the study leads to recommendations for construction, upgrades, or security measures associated with the cable and facilities.
Project developers, contractors, and taxpayers could see higher costs and slower deployment if an emphasis on 'trusted' entities excludes some foreign companies or suppliers.
State and local governments and critical‑infrastructure operators could be put at heightened risk if sensitive vulnerabilities are disclosed in the unclassified report.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Requires the Secretary of Commerce (acting through the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information), in consultation with other federal agency heads as needed, to deliver a report within one year assessing the value, cost, and feasibility of a trans‑Atlantic submarine fiber‑optic cable linking the contiguous United States, the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), Ghana, and Nigeria to enhance U.S. national security. The report must analyze security and digital risks, USVI telecommunications readiness, economic and geopolitical benefits, the state of existing cables, and the feasibility of a USVI data center/high‑security cloud facility to support U.S. military commands and national security communications. The report must be unclassified (with an optional classified annex), may not compel private entities to provide data, and uses existing law to define which foreign or corporate entities are considered “trusted” or “not trusted.”
Introduced February 27, 2025 by Stacey E. Plaskett · Last progress June 24, 2025