The bill increases pressure on a partner country by limiting formal security ties to punish insufficient action against the Haqqani Network, but it does so at the cost of reduced diplomatic leverage, potential disruptions to military cooperation, and economic/geopolitical risks for U.S. interests.
Taxpayers and U.S. national security: the bill reduces formal security partnership (limits MNNA-style support) with countries judged not to be sufficiently combating the Haqqani Network, allowing the U.S. to withhold support and signal consequences for harboring militants.
State governments and U.S. diplomacy: removing or limiting MNNA status reduces diplomatic flexibility and tools, decreasing U.S. leverage to influence Pakistan's counterterrorism cooperation.
Military personnel and partner forces: the change may reduce military cooperation, benefits, and logistical support from the affected country, complicating U.S. operations and readiness in the region.
Taxpayers and U.S. businesses: the measure could raise geopolitical tensions and invite retaliatory measures that disrupt trade or security ties, creating potential economic costs.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Introduced January 3, 2025 by Andrew S. Biggs · Last progress January 3, 2025
Terminates the United States designation of Pakistan as a "major non‑NATO ally" on enactment and prevents the President from re‑designating Pakistan as such unless the President submits a written certification to Congress showing specific, verifiable actions by Pakistan against the Haqqani Network. The required certification must show Pakistan is disrupting Haqqani safe havens, taking steps to prevent their use of Pakistani territory, coordinating with Afghanistan to restrict militant movement, and arresting/prosecuting senior and mid‑level Haqqani operatives.