Sponsor
Andrew S. Biggs
Representative · R-AZ
Representative · R-AZ
The bill trades reduced U.S.–Pakistan military cooperation and greater constraints on presidential flexibility for increased congressional oversight and leverage to pressure Pakistan to act against militants, potentially improving security at the cost of operational cooperation and diplomatic agility.
U.S. national security may improve by removing MNNA status from Pakistan until it takes concrete action against the Haqqani Network, creating pressure to reduce safe havens for militants.
Increases congressional oversight and transparency by requiring a written certification with specific benchmarks before the President can restore MNNA status.
Creates diplomatic leverage on Pakistan to cooperate with Afghanistan and prosecute militants, which could reduce cross‑border militant attacks that harm border communities.
Removing MNNA status may reduce U.S.–Pakistan military cooperation and benefits (training, licenses, loan terms) and degrade intelligence-sharing/logistics, potentially hindering counterterrorism efforts and increasing risks to U.S. forces and partners.
Stricter certification conditions concentrate complex political judgments and can constrain presidential flexibility in diplomacy and crisis response.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Ends Pakistan's U.S. "major non‑NATO ally" status immediately and bars re‑designation until the President certifies Pakistan's actions against the Haqqani Network.
Terminates the United States’ designation of Pakistan as a "major non‑NATO ally" immediately and prevents the President from restoring that status unless the President certifies that Pakistan has taken specific, measurable actions against the Haqqani Network. The required certification must show Pakistan is conducting operations that disrupt Haqqani safe havens and movement, preventing Haqqani use of Pakistani territory, coordinating with Afghanistan to limit cross‑border militant movement, and arresting and prosecuting senior and mid‑level Haqqani operatives.
Introduced January 3, 2025 by Andrew S. Biggs · Last progress January 3, 2025