Sponsors (3)
The bill tightens controls and coordination to reduce foreign-adversary access to undersea cable equipment and improve national security and allied alignment, but does so at the risk of higher costs, supply constraints for infrastructure projects, potential trade friction, and reduced public visibility into some details.
Taxpayers and critical-infrastructure operators (e.g., utilities and undersea cable firms): reduces foreign-adversary access to equipment used to build and operate undersea cables and directs Commerce to evaluate adding sensitive items to the Commerce Control List, lowering the risk of adversary exploitation of U.S. communications infrastructure.
State governments and U.S. foreign policy apparatus: requires the President to seek bilateral and multilateral agreements and pursue unified export controls within one year, improving coordination with allies to close policy and technical gaps.
The public and Congress: increases transparency by requiring unclassified reports to Congress and public posting of the strategy (with optional classified annexes), improving oversight and public awareness of the U.S. approach to undersea cable security.
Utilities, energy companies, financial institutions, and consumers: restrictions on exports or tighter controls could limit the supply of undersea cable components, delaying projects and raising costs for operators and end users.
State governments and U.S. suppliers: pursuing multilateral controls and penalties may strain trade relations with allied countries whose firms supply components, complicating procurement and sourcing decisions.
Exporters, importers, and small businesses: tighter export controls and new requirements could increase compliance burdens and administrative costs for firms engaged in cross-border trade of covered items.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Requires a government strategy and export-control actions to prevent foreign adversaries from accessing items needed for undersea cable construction, maintenance, and operation.
Requires the President, through the Secretary of Commerce and coordinated with the Secretary of State, to produce and report a strategy to prevent foreign adversaries from obtaining items needed to build, maintain, or operate undersea cable projects. The strategy must identify relevant items and supply chains, review U.S. and multilateral export controls, identify allies and partners, and propose negotiations and actions to unify controls and restrict access. It also directs Commerce to evaluate and, if appropriate, add identified items to the Export Administration Regulations and Commerce Control List, and it sets deadlines for reports, bilateral/multilateral agreements, committee briefings, and public posting (with possible classified annexes).
Introduced March 31, 2025 by Thomas Kean · Last progress September 3, 2025