Sponsors (2)
The bill promotes interoperable, cyber-hardened unmanned-system command-and-control through clearer requirements, independent review, and defined standards—improving military effectiveness and informing civil integration—while shifting costs, imposing recurring compliance and procurement burdens, introducing information-security trade-offs, and risking slower deployments and constrained innovation because implementation must be funded largely from existing RDT&E resources.
Service members, commanders, and DoD program managers will get clearer, evidence-based open-architecture command-and-control requirements, statutory definitions, and a phased implementation roadmap so unmanned systems become more interoperable and easier to integrate across services and programs.
DoD systems and supply chains will gain stronger cybersecurity and supply-chain risk-management rules (Zero Trust/NIST alignment, red-team testing, lifecycle SRM, vendor restrictions) that reduce the chance of compromised components and mission disruption.
Citizens, Congress, and oversight bodies will have more transparency and independent technical input because of a public unclassified report, annual budget justification updates, and an independent expert review panel to improve the quality and oversight of DoD recommendations.
Taxpayers and other DoD programs may bear higher costs or see resources redirected because implementing a new integrated unmanned C2 framework requires funding, personnel, acquisition effort, and—permitted by the bill—reallocation of existing RDT&E budgets that can cut other research.
Integrating open-architecture systems with classified networks and publicly releasing unclassified report material risks exposing sensitive timelines, technical approaches, or redacted gaps that could aid adversaries or require costly mitigations.
Contractors, suppliers, and program offices will face ongoing compliance, testing, and vendor-restriction burdens—NIST CSF alignment, frequent 18-month reviews, NSA-certified red-team testing, and exclusion lists—that can raise costs, reduce supplier options, and complicate procurement.
Based on analysis of 9 sections of legislative text.
Directs DoD to assess open-architecture unmanned-system C2 frameworks, set cybersecurity/supply-chain standards for any recommended framework, create an independent advisory panel, and share findings with the FAA.
Official title: Require the Secretary of Defense to assess and report on the feasibility of incorporating open-architecture, unmanned system command and control frameworks into Department of Defense unmanned system operations across all unmanned system tiers and domains, drawing on lessons from allied and partner country systems, and for other purposes.
Introduced June 24, 2026 by David Harold McCormick · Last progress June 24, 2026
Requires the Secretary of Defense to assess open-architecture unmanned system command-and-control (C2) frameworks and produce an interim report in 180 days and a final report in one year, with public unclassified portions and a classified annex if needed. The law creates an independent advisory panel to review the assessment, sets cybersecurity and supply-chain requirements for any recommended DoD C2 framework, requires coordination with existing DoD C2 modernization programs and domestic industrial-base efforts, and directs transmission of findings to the FAA to inform civil UAS traffic management and airspace integration. The assessment must analyze allied/partner systems (explicitly mentioning Ukraine and Israel examples), evaluate interoperability, cybersecurity resilience (including electronic warfare and cyberattack scenarios), architecture and interface standards, and recommend minimum capability requirements and an implementation roadmap if feasible. Funding must come from existing DoD RDT&E appropriations; no new separate appropriation is authorized here.