((a)) ** .—** By not later than 60 days before the date on which the President implements a nuclear weapons employment strategy of the United States that differs from the nuclear weapons employment strategy of the United States then in force, the President shall submit to Congress a report setting forth the following:

((1)) A description of the modifications to the nuclear weapons employment strategy, plans, and options of the United States made by the strategy so issued.

((2)) An assessment of effects of such modification for the nuclear posture of the United States.

((3)) The implication of such changes on the flexibility and resilience of the strategic forces of the United States and the ability of such forces to support the goals of the United States with respect to nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense.

((4)) The extent to which such modifications include an increased reliance on conventional or non-nuclear global strike capabilities or missile defenses of the United States.

((b)) ** .—** Not later than March 15 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing regarding the nuclear weapons employment strategy, plans, and options of the United States.

((c)) ** .—** During each of fiscal years 2022 through 2031, not later than 60 days before the date on which the President carries out the results of the decisions made pursuant to a Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study that would alter the nuclear weapons employment strategy, guidance, plans, or options of the United States, the President shall—

((1)) ensure that the report required by is transmitted to Congress, if so required under such section;

((2)) ensure that the report required under is transmitted to Congress, if so required under such section; and

((3)) transmit to the congressional defense committees a report providing the high-, medium-, and low- confidence assessments of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 ()) as to whether the United States will have significant warning of a strategic surprise or breakout caused by foreign nuclear weapons developments.