((a))

((1)) ** .—** It is the Sense of Congress that—

((A)) the United States is committed to maintaining a safe, secure, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrent;

((B)) the United States should undertake and support an enduring stockpile stewardship program and maintain and modernize nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities to ensure the safety, security, reliability, and credibility of the United States nuclear deterrent and to meet requirements for hedging against possible international developments or technical problems;

((C)) the United States should maintain nuclear weapons laboratories and plants and preserve the intellectual infrastructure, including competencies and skill sets; and

((D)) the United States should provide the necessary resources to achieve these goals, using as a starting point the levels set forth in the President’s 10-year plan provided to Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (; ).

((2))

((A)) ** .—** During each year in which the New START Treaty is in force, if the President determines that an appropriations Act is enacted that fails to meet the resource levels set forth in the November 2010 update to the plan referred to in section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (; ) or if at any time determines that more resources are required to carry out such plan than were estimated, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees, within 60 days of making such a determination, a report detailing—

((i)) a plan to address the resource shortfall;

((ii)) if more resources are required to carry out the plan than were estimated—

((I)) the proposed level of funding required; and

((II)) an identification of the stockpile work, campaign, facility, site, asset, program, operation, activity, construction, or project for which additional funds are required;

((iii)) any effects caused by the shortfall on the safety, security, reliability, or credibility of the nuclear forces of the United States;

((iv)) whether and why, in light of the shortfall, remaining a party to the New START Treaty is still in the national interest of the United States; and

((v)) a detailed explanation of why the modernization timelines established in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review are no longer applicable.

((B)) ** .—** If the President transmits a report under subparagraph (A), the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of any determination by the President to reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads of the United States by not later than 60 days before taking any action to carry out such reduction.

((C)) ** .—** The limitation in subparagraph (B) shall not apply to—

((i)) reductions made to ensure the safety, security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile and strategic delivery systems, including activities related to surveillance, assessment, certification, testing, and maintenance of nuclear warheads and strategic delivery systems; or

((ii)) nuclear warheads that are retired or awaiting dismantlement on the date of the report under subparagraph (A).

((D)) ** .—** In this paragraph:

((i)) The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

((I)) the congressional defense committees; and

((II)) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

((ii)) The term “New START Treaty” means the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on , and entered into force on .

((b))

((1)) ** .—** It is the sense of Congress that—

((A)) sustained investments in the nuclear weapons stockpile and the nuclear security complex are needed to ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrent; and

((B)) such investments could enable additional future reductions in the hedge stockpile.

((2)) ** .—** Not later than March 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States that includes the following:

((A)) An accounting of the weapons in the stockpile as of the end of the fiscal year preceding the submission of the report that includes all weapons in the active and inactive stockpiles, both deployed and non-deployed, and all categories and readiness states of such weapons.

((B)) The planned force levels for each category of nuclear weapon over the course of the future-years defense program submitted to Congress under for the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted.

((c))

((1)) ** .—** If, during any year beginning after , the President makes a proposal described in paragraph (2)—

((A)) the Commander of United States Strategic Command shall conduct a net assessment of the current and proposed nuclear forces of the United States and of other countries that possess nuclear weapons to determine whether the nuclear forces of the United States are anticipated to be capable of meeting the objectives of the United States with respect to nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance of allies, and defense;

((B)) the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives the assessment described in subparagraph (A), unchanged, together with the explanatory views of the Secretary, as the Secretary deems appropriate; and

((C)) the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report describing the current capacities of the United States nuclear weapons infrastructure to respond to a strategic development or technical problem in the United States nuclear weapons stockpile.

((2))

((A)) ** .—** Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a proposal described in this paragraph is a proposal to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the active or inactive stockpiles of the United States to a level that is lower than the level on .

((B)) ** .—** A proposal described in this paragraph does not include—

((i)) reductions that are a direct result of activities associated with routine stockpile stewardship, including stockpile surveillance, logistics, or maintenance; or

((ii)) nuclear weapons retired or awaiting dismantlement on .

((3)) ** .—** The requirement in paragraph (1) shall terminate on .

((d))

((1)) ** .—** During any year in which the President recommends to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the active and inactive stockpiles of the United States by a number that is greater than a de minimis reduction, the President shall certify in writing to the congressional defense committees whether such reductions will cause the number of nuclear weapons in such stockpiles to be fewer than the high-confidence assessment of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 ()) with respect to the number of nuclear weapons in the active and inactive stockpiles of the Russian Federation.

((2)) ** .—** If the President certifies under paragraph (1) that the recommended number of nuclear weapons in the active and inactive stockpiles of the United States is fewer than the high-confidence assessment of the intelligence community with respect to the number of nuclear weapons in the active and inactive stockpiles of the Russian Federation, the President shall transmit to the congressional defense committees a report by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command, without change, detailing whether the recommended reduction would create a strategic imbalance or degrade deterrence and extended deterrence between the total number of nuclear weapons of the United States and the total number of nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation. The President shall transmit such report by not later than 60 days before the date on which the President carries out any such recommended reductions.

((3)) ** .—** The notification in paragraph (2) shall not apply to—

((A)) reductions made to ensure the safety, security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile and strategic delivery systems, including activities related to surveillance, assessment, certification, testing, and maintenance of nuclear warheads and strategic delivery systems; or

((B)) nuclear warheads that are retired or awaiting dismantlement on the date of the certification under paragraph (1).

((4)) ** .—** On the date on which the President transmits to the congressional defense committees a report by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command under paragraph (2), the President may transmit to such committees a report by the President with respect to whether the recommended reductions covered by the report of the Commander will impact the deterrence or extended deterrence capabilities of the United States.