((a)) ** In general** If—
((1)) necessary information is not available on the record, or
((2)) an interested party or any other person—
((A)) withholds information that has been requested by the administering authority or the Commission under this subtitle,
((B)) fails to provide such information by the deadlines for submission of the information or in the form and manner requested, subject to subsections (c)(1) and (e) of ,
((C)) significantly impedes a proceeding under this subtitle, or
((D)) provides such information but the information cannot be verified as provided in ,
((b)) ** Adverse inferences**
((1)) ** In general** If the administering authority or the Commission (as the case may be) finds that an interested party has failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with a request for information from the administering authority or the Commission, the administering authority or the Commission (as the case may be), in reaching the applicable determination under this subtitle—
((A)) may use an inference that is adverse to the interests of that party in selecting from among the facts otherwise available; and
((B)) is not required to determine, or make any adjustments to, a countervailable subsidy rate or weighted average dumping margin based on any assumptions about information the interested party would have provided if the interested party had complied with the request for information.
((2)) ** Potential sources of information for adverse inferences** An adverse inference under paragraph (1)(A) may include reliance on information derived from—
((A)) the petition,
((B)) a final determination in the investigation under this subtitle,
((C)) any previous review under or determination under , or
((D)) any other information placed on the record.
((c)) ** Corroboration of secondary information**
((1)) ** In general** Except as provided in paragraph (2), when the administering authority or the Commission relies on secondary information rather than on information obtained in the course of an investigation or review, the administering authority or the Commission, as the case may be, shall, to the extent practicable, corroborate that information from independent sources that are reasonably at their disposal.
((2)) ** Exception** The administrative authority and the Commission shall not be required to corroborate any dumping margin or countervailing duty applied in a separate segment of the same proceeding.
((d)) ** Subsidy rates and dumping margins in adverse inference determinations**
((1)) ** In general** If the administering authority uses an inference that is adverse to the interests of a party under subsection (b)(1)(A) in selecting among the facts otherwise available, the administering authority may—
((A)) in the case of a countervailing duty proceeding—
((i)) use a countervailable subsidy rate applied for the same or similar program in a countervailing duty proceeding involving the same country; or
((ii)) if there is no same or similar program, use a countervailable subsidy rate for a subsidy program from a proceeding that the administering authority considers reasonable to use; and
((B)) in the case of an antidumping duty proceeding, use any dumping margin from any segment of the proceeding under the applicable antidumping order.
((2)) ** Discretion to apply highest rate** In carrying out paragraph (1), the administering authority may apply any of the countervailable subsidy rates or dumping margins specified under that paragraph, including the highest such rate or margin, based on the evaluation by the administering authority of the situation that resulted in the administering authority using an adverse inference in selecting among the facts otherwise available.
((3)) ** No obligation to make certain estimates or address certain claims** If the administering authority uses an adverse inference under subsection (b)(1)(A) in selecting among the facts otherwise available, the administering authority is not required, for purposes of subsection (c) or for any other purpose—
((A)) to estimate what the countervailable subsidy rate or dumping margin would have been if the interested party found to have failed to cooperate under subsection (b)(1) had cooperated; or
((B)) to demonstrate that the countervailable subsidy rate or dumping margin used by the administering authority reflects an alleged commercial reality of the interested party.