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May 12, 2026
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Download official Senate Record PDFReturn to issue contextMr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
information is still available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications that have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such an annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC.
transmittal of a determination to congress
Please find enclosed a Determination and accompanying
documentation from the Department of State.
Title of DETERMINATION: Determination under Section
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act.
Background: Consistent with section 36(b)(1) of the Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, the Department of State wishes to
inform you that the Secretary has exercised his delegated
authority, as described in the enclosed Memorandum of
Justification, to authorize the immediate transfer of U.S.-
origin defense articles to the Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait,
Qatar, and the UAE.
Recipients:
Speaker of the House
President of the Senate
Chairman, SFRC and Ranking Minority Member
Chairman, HFAC and Ranking Minority Member
Sincerely,
Paul Guaglianone,
Senior Bureau Official,
Bureau of Legislative Affairs.
Enclosure.
DETERMINATION UNDER SECTION 36(b)(1) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT
Pursuant to section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control
Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, I hereby determine an emergency exists
that requires the immediate sale through the following
foreign military sales cases, including any further
amendments specific to the cost, quantity, or requirements of
these cases, in the national security interest of the United
States:
For Bahrain:
PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T
For Israel:
APKWS-II
For Kuwait:
PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T
Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS)
For Qatar:
PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T
APKWS-II
For the UAE:
PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T
APKWS-II
This determination shall be published in the Federal
Register and, along with the accompanying Memorandum of
Justification, shall be transmitted to Congress with the
applicable notifications.
Marco Rubid,
Secretary of State.
memorandum of justification for emergency arms transfers to bahrain,
kuwait, qatar, the united arab emirates, and israel, under section
36(b)(1) of the arms export control act.
On February 28, 2016, the United States and Israel launched
a broad and joint operation against the Iranian regime to
remove the existential threat it poses to the United States,
Israel, the Middle East. and the world. This historic
operation is a defining point in the region's military
operations and the region's cooperation with the United
States in a fight against a destabilizing regime.
Despite the combined successes of Operation Midnight Hammer
and Operation Rising Lion to cripple Iran's ability to
project power and terror in 2025, the Iranian regime has not
abandoned its plans. In the eight months since the Twelve-Day
War, the regime restored damaged nuclear infrastructure,
accelerated missile production, and continued to finance,
train, and arm its proxies throughout the Middle East, while
at the same time combating its internal civil crisis and
large-scale protests with excessive and deadly force. The
combination of accelerated reconstruction of nuclear
infrastructure, its ba]listic missile stockpile, and its
continued circumvention of sanctions created a new reality in
the Iranian arena. These trends led to the decision to launch
Operation Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, with the aim of halting
the regime's attempts to reconstitute its instruments of
power.
Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE all have
sustained hundreds of direct and ongoing ballistic missile
and drone strikes since the start of Operation Epic Fury and
Roaring Lion, and they have suffered civilian or military
fatalities. In Bahrain, Iran has conducted hundreds of
strikes against Isa Air Base, the Bahrain International
Airport, and one of Bahrain's major oil refinery complexes.
In Kuwait, Iran has launched attacks against Embassy Kuwait,
Camp Buehring, airport fuel tanks, and government buildings,
killing at least seven U.S. service members. Qatar has
suffered significant impacts to its liquified natural gas
facilities due to Iranian strikes, which have resulted in an
estimated $20 billion in lost annual revenue on top of
strikes against Al Udeid Air Base. In the UAE, Iran has
targeted Al Dahfra Air Base, U.S. diplomatic facilities,
Emirati airports, ports, and oil infrastructure. Israel has
weathered the most waves of Iranian and proxy attacks on
military, industrial, and residential infrastructure.
These countries have demonstrated strong collaboration with
CENTCOM to not only protect each country's sovereignty and
citizens, but also to protect U.S. citizens, servicemen and
women, and assets in country. Bahrain. Kuwait, Qatar, and the
UAE have all successfully intercepted many attacks using the
U.S.-provided Patriot system. All five countries have
experienced countless attacks by one-way attack drones and
are utilizing U.S. provided interceptors and munitions to
counter these attacks.
These countries are essential defense and security
partners, and the United States is committed to ensuring our
partners have the means to defend themselves. The Departments
of State and War are coordinating with Bahrain, Israel,
Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE to meet their military
requirements and ensure their needs are met to defend their
territory and citizens, as well as Americans living, working,
and traveling in the region.
Given the scale and scope of the regional conflict, it is
in the U.S. national security interest to swiftly provide
Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE with the systems
they require to defend themselves and to reinforce deterrence
against other regional threats. The immediacy of the
challenge at hand requires overcoming the statutory 30-day
Congressional notification timeline to expedite transfers to
Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.
For the reasons cited above, an emergency exists requiring
immediate provision of these defense articles to Bahrain,
Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE in the national security
interest of the United States. These transfers, through
foreign military sales, will provide needed defense
capabilities to Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE as
soon as possible. The Secretary of State, therefore, has
certified an emergency exists under sections 36(b)(1) of the
Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, thereby waving the
Congressional review requirement of these provisions.
Transmittal No. 26-0Z
Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology
or Capability (Sec. 36(b)(5)(C), AECA)
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Bahrain.
(ii) Sec. 36(b)(1), AECA Transmittal No.: 19-06; Date: May
3, 2019; Implementing Agency: Army.
Funding Source: National Funds.
(iii) Description: On May 3, 2019, Congress was notified by
congressional certification transmittal number 19-06 of the
possible sale, under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export
Control Act, of sixty (60) Patriot Advanced Capability-3
(PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles; thirty-
six (36) Patriot MIM-104E Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM-T)
with canisters; nine (9) M903 Launching Stations; five (5)
Antenna Mast Groups; three (3) Electrical Power Plants III;
two (2) AN/MPQ-65 radar sets; and two (2) AN/MSQ-132
Engagement Control Stations. The following non-major defense
equipment (MDE) items were also included: communications
equipment; tools and test equipment; range and test programs;
support equipment; prime movers; generators; publications and
technical documentation; training equipment; spare and repair
parts; personnel training; Technical Assistance Field Team
(TAFT); U.S. Government and contractor technical,
engineering, and logistics support services; Systems
Integration and Checkout (SICO); field office support; and
other related elements of logistics and program support. The
estimated total value was $2.478 billion. MDE constituted
$1.445 billion of this total.
This transmittal notifies the inclusion of the following
MDE items: one hundred fifty (150) Patriot MIM-104E GEM-T
with canisters; and fifty (50) PAC-3 MSE missiles. The
following non-MDE items will also be included: communications
equipment; tools and test equipment; range and test programs;
support equipment; prime movers; generators; publications and
technical documentation; training equipment; spare and repair
parts; personnel training; TAFT; U.S. Government and
contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support
services; SICO; field office support; and other related
elements of logistics and program support. The estimated
total value of the new items is $1.625 billion. The estimated
MDE value will increase by $1.125 billion to a revised $2.57
billion. The estimated non-MDE value will increase by $500
million to a revised $1.533 billion. The estimated total case
value will increase by $1.625 billion to a revised $4.103
billion. MDE constitutes $2.57 billion of this total.
(iv) Significance: The inclusion of this MDE represents an
increase in capability over what was previously notified. The
proposed sale will enhance Bahrain's interoperability with
the United States. Bahrain will use Patriot missiles to
improve its missile defense capability, defend its
territorial integrity, and deter regional threats.
(v) Justification: This proposed sale will support the
foreign policy and national security of the United States by
helping to improve the security of a major non-NATO ally that
is a force for political stability and economic progress in
the Middle East.
(vi) Sensitivity of Technology:
The Sensitivity of Technology Statement contained in the
original notification applies to items reported here.
The highest level of classification of defense articles,
components, and services included in this potential sale is
SECRET.
(vii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026.
Transmittal No. 26-CH
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Israel.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment * $675.2 million.
Other $317.2 million.
Total $992.4 million.
Funding Source: Foreign Military Financing.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
Ten thousand (10,000) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon
System-II All Up Round
Non-MDE:
The following non-MDE items will also be included: test
support equipment; other support equipment; technical data;
spare and repair parts; publications and technical
documentation; personnel training and training equipment;
transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering,
technical, and logistics support services; and other related
elements of logistics and program support.
(iv) Military Department: Navy (IS-P-AVW).
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None known at this time.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached
Annex.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026.
* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export
Control Act.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION
Israel—Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II All-Up-Round
The Government of Israel has requested to buy ten thousand
(10,000) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II All Up
Round. The following non-major defense equipment items will
also be included: test support equipment; other support
equipment; technical data; spare and repair parts;
publications and technical documentation; personnel training
and training equipment; transportation; U.S. Government and
contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support
services; and other related elements of logistics and program
support. The estimated total cost is $992.4 million.
This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy
and national security of the United States by helping to
improve the security of a strategic regional partner that has
been, and continues to be, an important force for political
stability and economic progress in the Middle East.
The proposed sale will improve Israel's capability to meet
current and future threats, strengthen its homeland defense,
and serve as a deterrent to regional threats. Israel will
have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into
its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
The principal contractor will be BAE Systems, located in
Nashua, NH. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of
any offset agreement proposed in connection with this
potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in
negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.
Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the
assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor
representatives to Israel.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 26-CH
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex Item No. vii
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
All Up Round is a low cost air-to-air and air-to-ground
system that consists of an APKWS-II guidance section
developed by BAE Systems, legacy 2.75-inch MK66 Mod 4 rocket
motor, and legacy MK152 and MK435/436 warhead/fuse. The
APKWS-II is a tactical rocket system that can be launched
from several platforms, offering multi-mission, multi-target
capability and precision-strike lethality. These guided
rockets are steered to the target by following reflected
laser beam energy directed onto the target either by the
launching aircraft, a second aircraft, or ground based troops
operating a laser designator.
components, and services included in this potential sale is
SECRET.
knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the
information could be used to develop countermeasures that
might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the
development of a system with similar or advanced
capabilities.
substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive
technology being released as the U.S. Government. This
proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign
policy and national security objectives outlined in the
Policy Justification.
transmittal have been authorized for release and export to
the Government of Israel.
Transmittal No. 26-1A
Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology
or Capability (Sec. 36(b)(5)(C), AECA)
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Kuwait.
(ii) Sec. 36(b)(1), AECA Transmittal No.: 20-16; Date: May
28, 2020; Implementing Agency: Army.
Funding Source: National Funds.
(iii) Description: On May 28, 2020, Congress was notified
by congressional certification transmittal number 20-16 of
the possible sale, under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export
Control Act, of eighty-four (84) Patriot Advanced Capability
3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancements (MSEs) with canisters;
two (2) Patriot MSE test missiles 2-pack per unit of issue;
thirty-five (35) remanufactured (upgrades): Patriot
modification kit, missile launchers A902+ Series to A903
Series; twenty-six (26) PAC-3 Missile Round Trainer; and
twenty-six (26) Empty Round Trainer. The following non-major
defense equipment (MDE) items were also included: Flight Test
Target—Zombie; PAC-3 missile spares held in Continental
United States for repair and return; PAC-3 telemetry kits;
training devices; simulators; transportation; organizational
equipment; spare and repair parts; support equipment; tools
and test equipment; technical data and publications;
personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government
and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support
services; and other related elements of logistics support.
The estimated total value was $800 million. MDE constituted
$700 million of this total.
This transmittal notifies the inclusion of the following
MDE items: five hundred (500) PAC-3 MSEs; and five hundred
(500) PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Tactical Missiles (GEM-T) with
canisters. The following non-MDE items will also be included:
tools and test equipment; support equipment; publications and
technical documentation; personnel training and training
equipment; spare and repair parts; facility design; U.S.
Government and contractor technical, engineering, and
logistics support services; and other related elements of
logistics, sustainment, and program support. The estimated
total value of the new items is $9.3 billion. The estimated
MDE value will increase by $8.2 billion to a revised $8.9
billion. The estimated non-MDE value will increase by $1.1
billion to a revised $1.2 billion. The estimated total case
value will increase by $9.3 billion to a revised $ 10.1
billion. MDE constitutes $8.9 billion of this total.
(iv) Significance: This notification accounts for requested
additional MDE and non-MDE items not included in the original
notification. The inclusion of this MDE represents an
increase in capability over what was previously notified.
This proposed sale will improve Kuwait's capability to
strengthen its homeland air defense by better meeting current
and future air threats.
(v) Justification: This proposed sale will support the
foreign policy and national security objectives of the United
States by improving the security of a major non-NATO ally
that has been an important force for political stability and
economic progress in the Middle East.
(vi) Sensitivity of Technology:
The PAC-2 GEM-T missiles with canisters is a specialized
variant of the Patriot Missile Defense System designed to
intercept high-speed tactical ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, and enemy aircraft. The GEM-T uses a blast-
fragmentation warhead. It detonates in the immediate vicinity
of a target to destroy it with shrapnel and explosive force.
It uses track-via missile guidance, where the missile relays
target data back to the ground radar for processing, and the
ground station sends steering commands back to the missile.
The highest level of classification of defense articles,
components, and services included in this potential sale is
SECRET.
(ix) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026.
Transmittal No. 26-CR
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Kuwait.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment * $1.5 billion.
Other $1.0 billion.
Total $2.5 billion.
Funding Source: National Funds.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
Six (6) dismounted Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS)
engagement operations centers (EOCs)
Two (2) hosted IBCS EOCs
Six (6) dismounted IBCS integrated collaborative
environments (ICEs)
Two (2) hosted IBCS ICEs
Fourteen (14) mounted IBCS integrated fire control network
relays
Eight (8) engagement control station to radar interface
unit modification kits
Thirty-five (35) launcher integrated network kit on
enhanced launcher electronic system (ELES) kits
Twenty-four (24) KIV 77 or 79 identification, friend or foe
encryptors
Non-MDE:
The following non-MDE items will also be included:
communications equipment; tools and test equipment; support
equipment; generators; vehicles; transportation;
construction; publications and technical documentation;
training equipment including the air defense reconfigurable
trainer; spare and repair parts; personnel training;
technical assistance field team; U.S. Government and
contractor technical assistance and services, IBCS Phase 2
planning, engineering, and logistics support services;
systems integration and checkout; field office support; and
other related elements of logistics and program support.
(iv) Military Department: Army (KU-B-UZJ).
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None known at this time.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached
Annex.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026.
*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export
Control Act.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION
Kuwait—Integrated Battle Command System Enabled Phased Array Tracking
Radar to Intercept on Target
The Government of Kuwait has requested to purchase six (6)
dismounted Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) engagement
operations centers (EOC); two (2) hosted IBCS EOCs; six (6)
dismounted IBCS integrated collaborative environments (ICE);
two (2) hosted IBCS ICEs; fourteen (14) mounted IBCS
integrated fire unit modification kits; thirty-five (35)
launcher integrated network kits on enhanced launcher
electronic system kits; and twenty-four (24) KIV 77 or 79
identification, friend or foe encryptors. The following non-
major defense equipment items will also be included:
communications equipment; tools and test equipment; support
equipment; generators; vehicles; transportation; publications
and technical documentation; training equipment including the
air defense reconfigurable trainer; spare and repair parts;
personnel training; technical assistance field team; U.S.
Government and contractor technical assistance and services,
IBCS Phase 2 planning, engineering, and logistics support
services; systems integration and checkout; transportation;
field office support; and other related elements of logistics
and program support. The estimated total cost is $2.5
billion.
This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and
national security objectives of the United States by
improving the security of a major non-NATO ally that has been
an important force for political stability and economic
progress in the Middle East.
The proposed sale will improve Kuwait's capability to meet
current and future threats by providing advanced air defense
detection as part of the procurement of the
Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense sensor radar system
combined with the integration of the IBCS as the command and
control and thereby providing a layered defense capability.
This enhanced capability will protect Kuwait and local allied
land forces and will significantly improve Kuwait's
contribution to Integrated Air Missile Defense. Kuwait will
have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into
its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
The principal contractors will be Northrop Grumman, located
in Falls Church, VA; RTX Corporation, located in Arlington,
VA; and Lockheed-Martin, located in Dallas, TX. At this time,
the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement
proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset
agreement will be defined in negotiations between the
purchaser and the contractor(s).
Implementation of this proposed sale will not require
permanent assignment of any additional U.S. Government or
contractor representatives to Kuwait.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 26-CR
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex Item No. vii
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
(RIU) provides operational control of the Phased Array
Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (PATRIOT) MPQ-65 radar
set (RS). The RIU is an adapted PATRIOT AN/MSQ-132
Configuration 3+ Increment 3 engagement control station with
a PATRIOT A-kit modification added. The RIU exchanges
componentized PATRIOT sensor messages with the Integrated
Battle Command System (IBCS) B-side component, either the
engagement operations center (EOC) or the integrated fire
control network (IFCN) relay, via the AB interface control
document (ICD) directed messages. These messages include
tracking measurement data, feature data, engagement support,
uplink and downlink support, state and mode transition, radar
status, initialization data, etc. The RIU converts AB ICD
messages into internal current force PATRIOT RS radar action
messages and radar response messages, allowing the radar
resident portion of the PATRIOT componentized sensor to
remain unchanged.
adapts existing and forthcoming air and missile defense (AMD)
sensors, weaponry, and mission command technologies into a
unified defense system. This integration facilitates a
comprehensive air picture, enhances defended areas, and
provides flexible deployment options. The IBCS serves as the
command-and-control solution (C4ISR) for AIAMD, providing net
centric, plug & fight (P&F), and system-of-systems command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance. and reconnaissance. IBCS comprises two primary
components: the EOC and the IBCS IFCN relays. The EOC
delivers C4ISR functions at battalion, battery, and platoon
levels within the AMD task force. Both the EOC and IFCN
relays are equipped with a P&F B-Kit, enabling AIAMD weapon
and sensor components to operate within the networked system.
These components connect via an A-Kit to interface with the
IBCS B-Kit.
defense effectiveness by using composite tracks from multiple
sensors to provide accurate target tracking and weapon firing
solutions. It offers a common engagement center and data
sharing across all Army AMD echelons, improving response to
threats with near real-time coordination. The AIAMD
architecture ensures resilient defense with automatic fail-
over and rapid reconfiguration, minimizing single point
failures. IBCS supports dynamic defense design, extended
range, and non-line-of-sight engagements, reducing coverage
gaps, manpower, and costs while improving training
capabilities.
encryptors is a combat identification system designed for
command and control. It uses a transponder that listens to an
interrogation signal and then sends a response that
identifies the broadcaster.
Missile Defense sensor is an advanced secure cryptographic
device, enabling safe distribution and storage of
communication security keys.
components, and services included in this potential sale is
SECRET.
knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the
information could be used to develop countermeasures that
might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the
development of a system with similar or advanced
capabilities.
substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive
technology being released as the U.S. Government. This
proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign
policy and national security objectives outlined in the
Policy Justification.
transmittal have been authorized for release and export to
the Government of Kuwait.
Transmittal No. 26-CG
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Qatar
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment* $3.95 billion.
Other $0.06 billion.
Total $4.01 billion.
Funding Source: National Funds.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment {MDE):
Two hundred (200) Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept
On Target (PATRIOT) Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) Guidance
Enhanced Missiles-Tactical.
Three hundred (300) PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
Missile Segment Enhancement.
Non-MDE:
The following non-MDE items will also be included: PAC-2
and PAC-3 missile and ground support equipment spare parts;
classified and unclassified repair and return; PAC-2 and PAC-
3 missile canister consumables; PAC-3 field surveillance
program; U.S. Government and contractor technical,
engineering, and logistics technical assistance; quality
assurance; and other related elements of logistics and
program support.
(iv) Military Department: Army QA-B-UAH.
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: QA-B-UAP.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None known at this time.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached
Annex.
(Vlll) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026.
*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export
Control Act.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION
Government of Qatar—PATRIOT Missile Replenishment of National
Stockpile
The Government of Qatar has requested to buy two hundred
(200) Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept On Target
(PATRIOT) Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) Guidance Enhanced
Missile-Tactical; and three hundred (300) PATRIOT Advanced
Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement. The
following non-major defense equipment items will also be
included: PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles and ground support
equipment spare parts; classified and unclassified repair and
return; PAC-2 and PAC-3 missile canister consumables; PAC-3
field surveillance program; U.S. Government and contractor
technical, engineering, and logistics technical assistance;
quality assurance; and other related elements of logistics
and program support. The estimated total cost is $4.01
billion.
This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and
national security objectives of the United States by
improving the security of a friendly country that continues
to be an important force for political stability and economic
progress in the Middle East.
The proposed sale will improve Qatar's capability to meet
current and future threats by enabling Qatar to operate in
bilateral and multilateral coalition environments and
providing enhanced interoperability with U.S. military units
for training and defense. Qatar will use the PATRIOT missile
system to replenish its missile defense capability, defend
its territorial integrity, and deter threats for regional
stability.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
The principal contractors will be Lockheed Martin, located
in Dallas, TX; and RTX Corporation, located in Arlington, VA.
At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset
agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale.
Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between
the purchaser and the contractors.
Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the
assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor
representatives to Qatar.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 26-CG
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex Item No. vii
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
(PATRIOT) Advanced Capability (PAC-2) Guidance Enhanced
Missiles-Tactical (GEM-T) missile is a specialized variant of
the PATRIOT Missile Defense System designed to intercept
high-speed tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and
enemy aircraft. The GEM-T uses a blast-fragmentation warhead.
It detonates in the immediate vicinity of a target to destroy
it with shrapnel and explosive force. Using track-via-missile
guidance, the missile relays target data back to the ground
radar for processing and the ground station sends steering
commands back to the missile.
Enhanced (MSE) missile is a small, highly agile, kinetic kill
interceptor for defense against tactical ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, and air-breathing threats. The MSE variant
of the
PAC-3 missile represents the next generation in hit-to-kill
interceptors and provides expanded battlespace against
evolving threats. The PAC-3 MSE improves upon the original
PAC-3 capability with a higher performance solid rocket
motor, modified lethality enhancer, more responsible control
surfaces, upgraded guidance software, and insensitive
munitions improvements.
The PAC-3 MSE missile has sensitive and critical technology
primarily in the area of design and production know-how and
data inherent to certain components.
components, and services included in this potential sale is
SECRET.
knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the
information could be used to develop countermeasures that
might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the
development of a system with similar or advanced
capabilities.
substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive
technology being released as the U.S. Government. This
proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign
policy and national security objectives outlined in the
Policy Justification.
transmittal have been authorized for release and export to
the Government of Qatar.
Transmittal No. 26-CN
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Qatar.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment* $675.2 million.
Other $317.2 million.
Total $992.4 million.
Funding Source: National Funds
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
Ten thousand (10,000) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon
System-II all-up-rounds Advanced (Single Variant)
Non-MDE:
The following non-MDE items will also be included: LAU-131
A/A launchers; Mk-152 high explosive warheads; MK66 rocket
motors; proximity fuzes; WTU-1/B practice warheads; inert
MK66 rocket motors; support equipment; other support
equipment; publications and technical documentation;
transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering,
technical, and logistics support services; and other related
elements of logistics and program support.
(iv) Military Department: Navy (QA-P-AAI), Air Force (QA-D-
QAS).
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: QA-B-WYX.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None known at this time.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached
Annex.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026.
* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export
Control Act.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION
Qatar—Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II All-Up-Round
The Government of Qatar has requested to buy ten thousand
(10,000) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II all-up-
rounds advanced (single variant). The following non-major
defense equipment items will also be included: LAU-131 A/A
launchers; Mk-152 high explosive warheads; MK66 rocket
motors; proximity fuzes; WTU-1/B practice warheads; inert
MK66 rocket motors; support equipment; other support
equipment; publications and technical documentation;
transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering,
technical, and logistics support services; and other related
elements of logistics and program support. The estimated
total cost is $992.4 million.
This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy
and national security of the United States by helping to
improve the security of a strategic regional partner that has
been, and continues to be, an important force for political
stability and economic progress in the Middle East.
The proposed sale will improve Qatar's capability to meet
current and future threats, strengthen its homeland defense,
and serve as a deterrent to regional threats. Qatar will have
no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its
armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
The principal contractor will be BAE Systems, located in
Nashua, NH. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of
any offset agreement proposed in connection with this
potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in
negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.
Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the
assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor
representatives to Qatar.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 26-CN
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(l) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex Item No. vii
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
all-up-round is a low cost air-to-air and air-to-ground
system that consists of an APKWS-II guidance section
developed by BAE Systems, legacy 2.75-inch MK66 Mod 4 rocket
motor, and legacy MK152 and MK435/436 warhead/fuse. The
APKWS-II is a tactical rocket system that can be launched
from several platforms, offering multi-mission, multi-target
capability and precision-strike lethality. These guided
rockets are steered to the target by following reflected
laser beam energy directed onto the target either by the
launching aircraft, a second aircraft, or ground-based troops
operating a laser designator.
components, and services included in this potential sale is
SECRET.
knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the
information could be used to develop countermeasures that
might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the
development of a system with similar or advanced
capabilities.
substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive
technology being released as the U.S. Government. This
proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign
policy and national security objectives outlined in the
Policy Justification.
transmittal have been authorized for release and export to
the Government of Qatar.
Transmittal No. 26-0V
Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology
or Capability (Sec. 36(B)(5)(C), AECA)
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab
Emirates.
(ii) Sec. 36(b)(1), AECA Transmittal No.: 19-37; Date: May
3, 2019; Implementing Agency: Army.
Funding Source: National Funds
(iii) Description: On May 3, 2019, Congress was notified by
congressional certification transmittal number 19-37 of the
possible sale, under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export
Control Act, of up to four hundred fifty-two (452) Patriot
Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement
(MSE). Also included were tools and test equipment; support
equipment; publications and technical documentation;
personnel training and training equipment; spare and repair
parts; facility design; U.S. Government and contractor
technical, engineering, and logistics support services; and
other related elements of logistics and program support. The
estimated total value was $2.728 billion Major Defense
Equipment (MDE) constituted $82.70 billion of this total.
On September 28, 2021, Congress was notified by
congressional certification transmittal number 21-OC of the
inclusion of an additional five hundred ten (510) PAC-3 MSE
(included 10 fly-to-buy missiles). The following non-MDE
items were also included: tools and test equipment; support
equipment; publications and technical documentation;
personnel training and training equipment; spare and repair
parts; facility design; U.S. Government and contractor
technical, engineering, and logistics support services; and
other related elements of logistics, sustainment, and program
support. The estimated MDE value was increased by $2.728
billion to a revised $5.428. The estimated total case value
was increased by $3.172 billion to a revised $5.90 billion.
MDE constituted $5.428 billion of this total.
On March 19, 2026, Congress was notified by congressional
certification transmittal number 25-01 of the increase in
value due to cost increases. There were no additional MDE or
non-MDE items reported with this notification, The estimated
total value of MDE increased by $5.532 billion for a revised
estimated value of $10.96 billion. The estimated total case
value increased by $5.56 billion to a revised total estimated
case value of $11.46 billion. MDE constituted $10.96 billion
of this total.
This transmittal notifies the inclusion of the following
MDE items: six hundred (600) PAC-3 MSE; one hundred fifty
(150) Patriot MIM-104E Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM-T)
with canisters; and twenty-five (25) M903 launching stations.
The following non-MDE items will also be included: tools and
test equipment; support equipment; publications and technical
documentation; personnel training and training equipment;
spare and repair parts; facility design; U.S. Government and
contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support
services; and other related elements of logistics and program
support. The estimated total value of the new items is $6.25
billion. The estimated MDE value will increase by $6 billion
to a revised $16.96 billion. The estimated non-MDE value will
increase by $0.25 billion to a revised $0.75 billion. The
estimated total case value will increase by $6.25 billion to
a revised $17.71 billion. MDE constitutes $16.96 billion of
this total.
(iv) Significance: This notification accounts for requested
additional MDE and non-MDE items not included in the original
notification. The inclusion of this MDE represents an
increase in capability over what
was previously notified. The proposed sale will support the
United Arab Emirates' ability to maintain reserve stock of
PAC-3 MSE and GEM-T to ensure adequate defense capabilities.
(v) Justification: This proposed sale will support the
foreign policy and national security objectives of the United
States by helping to improve the security of an important
regional partner. The United Arab Emirates continues to be a
vital U.S. partner for political stability and economic
progress in the Middle East.
(vi) Sensitivity of Technology: The Sensitivity of
Technology Statement contained in the original notification
applies to the additional items reported here.
The highest level of classification of defense articles,
components, and services included in this potential sale is
SECRET.
Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026.
Transmittal No. 26-CM
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab
Emirates.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment * $98.8 million.
Other $48.8 million.
Total $147.6 million.
Funding Source: National Funds.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE): One thousand five hundred
(1,500) Guidance Sections, Single Variant (Air-to-Air),
Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II.
Non-WDE:
The following non-MDE items will also be included: LAU-131
A/A launchers; Mk-152 high explosive warheads; MK66 rocket
motors; proximity fuzes; WTU-1/B practice warheads; inert
MK66 rocket motors; support equipment; publications and
technical documentation; transportation; U.S. Government and
contractor engineering, technical, training, and logistical
support services; and other related elements of logistics and
program support.
(iv) Military Department: Navy (AE-P-ABV).
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None known at this time.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached
Annex.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026.
* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control
Act.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION
United Arab Emirates—Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System-II
The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested to
buy one thousand five hundred (1,500) guidance sections.
single variant (air-to-air), Advanced Precision Kill Weapon
System-II. The following non-major defense equipment items
will also be included: LAU-131 A/A launchers; Mk-152 high
explosive warheads; MK66 rocket motors; proximity fuzes; WTU-
1/B practice warheads; inert MK66 rocket motors; support
equipment; publications and technical documentation;
transportation; US Government and contractor engineering,
technical, training, and logistical support services; and
other related elements of logistics and program support. The
estimated total cost is $147.6 million.
This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and
national security objectives of the United States by
improving the security of a major defense partner. The United
Arab Emirates is a force for political stability and economic
progress in the Middle East.
The proposed sale will improve the United Arab Emirates'
capability to meet current and future threats by developing
and maintaining a strong and ready self-defense capability
and improving interoperability with U.S. forces. The United
Arab Emirates will have no difficulty absorbing these
articles and services into its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
The principal contractor will be BAE Systems, Inc., located
in Nashua, NH. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware
of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this
potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in
negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.
Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the
assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor
representatives to the United Arab Emirates.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 26-CM
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex Item No. vii
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
is a design conversion of an unguided Hydra 2.75-inch rocket
with a laser guidance kit to give it precision-kill
capability. As a relatively low-cost weapon, it is intended
as an inexpensive means to destroy targets while limiting
collateral damage in close combat. The APKWS consists of an
APKWS-II guidance section developed by BAE Systems, a legacy
2.75-inch MK66 Mod 4 rocket motor, a legacy M151 or Mk-152
high explosive warhead, and a Mk435/436-point detonating fuze
or M728 proximity fuze. The guided rockets are steered to the
target by following reflected laser beam energy directed onto
the target either by the launching aircraft, a second
aircraft, or ground-based troops operating a laser
designator. The APKWS is a tactical rocket system that can be
launched from several platforms, including rotary wing, fixed
wing, and ground-based vehicles, offering multi-mission,
multi-target capability, and precision-strike lethality.
components, and services included in this potential sale is
SECRET.
knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the
information could be used to develop countermeasures that
might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the
development of a system with similar or advanced
capabilities.
Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of
protection for the sensitive technology being released as the
U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in
furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security
objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.
transmittal have been authorized for release and export to
the Government of the United Arab Emirates.
DETERMINATION UNDER SECTION 36(b)(1) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT
Pursuant to section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control
Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, 1 hereby determine an emergency exists
that requires the immediate sale through the following
foreign military sales cases, including any further
amendments specific to the cost, quantity, or requirements of
these cases, in the national security interest of the United
States:
For Bahrain:
PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T
For Israel:
APKWS-II
For Kuwait:
PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T
Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS)
For Qatar:
PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T
APKWS-II
For the UAE:
PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T
APKWS-II
This determination shall be published in the Federal
Register and, along with the accompanying Memorandum of
Justification, shall be transmitted to Congress with the
applicable notifications.
Marco Rubio,
Secretary of State.
MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION FOR EMERGENCY ARMS TRANSFERS TO BAHRAIN,
KUWAIT, QATAR, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, AND ISRAEL, UNDER SECTION
36(b)(1) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched
a broad and joint operation against the Iranian regime to
remove the existential threat it poses to the United States,
Israel, the Middle East, and the world. This historic
operation is a defining point in the region's military
operations and the region's cooperation with the United
States in a fight against a destabilizing regime.
Despite the combined successes of Operation Midnight Hammer
and Operation Rising Lion to cripple Iran's ability to
project power and terror in 2025, the Iranian regime has not
abandoned its plans. In the eight months since the Twelve-Day
War, the regime restored damaged nuclear infrastructure.
accelerated missile production, and continued to finance,
train, and arm its proxies throughout the Middle East, while
at the same time combating its internal civil crisis and
large-scale protests with excessive and deadly force. The
combination of accelerated reconstruction of nuclear
infrastructure. its ballistic missile stockpile, and its
continued circumvention of sanctions created a new reality in
the Iranian arena. These trends led to the decision to launch
Operation Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, with the aim of halting
the regime's attempts to reconstitute its instruments of
power.
Bahrain. Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE all have
sustained hundreds of direct and ongoing ballistic missile
and drone strikes since the start of Operation Epic Fury and
Roaring Lion, and they have suffered civilian or military
fatalities. In Bahrain, Iran has conducted hundreds of
strikes against Isa Air Base, the Bahrain International
Airport, and one of Bahrain's major oil refinery complexes.
In Kuwait, Iran has launched attacks against Embassy Kuwait,
Camp Buehring, airport fuel tanks, and government buildings,
killing at least seven U.S. service members. Qatar has
suffered significant impacts to its liquified natural gas
facilities due to Iranian strikes, which have resulted in an
estimated $20 billion in lost annual revenue on top of
strikes against Al Udeid Air Base. In the UAE, Iran has
targeted Al Dahfra Air Base, U.S. diplomatic facilities,
Emirati airports, ports, and oil infrastructure. Israel has
weathered the most waves of Iranian and proxy attacks on
military, industrial, and residential infrastructure.
These countries have demonstrated strong collaboration with
CENTCOM to not only protect each country's sovereignty and
citizens, but also to protect U.S. citizens, servicemen and
women, and assets in county. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the
UAE have all successfully intercepted many attacks using the
U.S.-provided Patriot system. All five countries have
experienced countless attacks by one-way attack drones and
are utilizing U.S. provided interceptors and munitions to
counter these attacks.
These countries are essential defense and security
partners, and the United States is committed to ensuring our
partners have the means to defend themselves. The Departments
of State and War are coordinating with Bahrain, Israel,
Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE to meet their military
requirements and ensure their needs are met to defend their
territory and citizens, as well as Americans living, working,
and traveling in the region.
Given the scale and scope of the regional conflict, it is
in the U.S. national security interest to swiftly provide
Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE with the systems
they require to defend themselves and to reinforce deterrence
against other regional threats. The immediacy of the
challenge at hand requires overcoming the statutory 30-day
Congressional notifIcation timeline to expedite transfers to
Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.
For the reasons cited above, an emergency exists requiring
immediate provision of these defense articles to Bahrain,
Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE in the national security
interest of the United States. These transfers, through
foreign military sales, will provide needed defense
capabilities to Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE
as soon as possible. The Secretary of State, therefore, has
certified an emergency exists under sections 36(b)(1) of the
Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, thereby waiving the
Congressional review requirement of these provisions.