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Congressional Daily Record
This section is about changes proposed to a bill or resolution. It mentions committees such as Committee on Armed Services, members such as John Thune.
Issued
June 22, 2026
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Download official Senate Record PDFReturn to issue contextSA 5896. Mr. THUNE (for Mr. Curtis (for himself and Ms. Cortez Masto)) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by Mr. Thune to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1252. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CAPACITY TO COMPLY WITH
THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT.
(a) Short Title.—This section may be cited as the “Taiwan
Relations Reinforcement Act”.
(b) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term
“appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Gray zone tactics.—The term “gray zone tactics”
means coercive actions, including military, paramilitary,
cyber, space, economic, informational, and legal actions and
other activities conducted below the threshold of armed
conflict to alter the status quo without triggering a
conventional military response.
(3) Taiwan contingency.—The term “Taiwan Contingency”
means any attempt—
(A) to overthrow or dismantle the governing institutions in
Taiwan;
(B) to occupy any territory controlled or administered by
Taiwan;
(C) to violate the territorial integrity of Taiwan; or
(D) to take significant action against Taiwan, including—
(i) conducting a naval blockade of Taiwan;
(ii) seizing any outlying island of Taiwan; or
(iii) perpetrating a significant physical or cyber attack
on Taiwan that erodes the ability of the governing
institutions in Taiwan to operate or provide essential
services to the citizens of Taiwan.
(c) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the
following 5 years, the Secretary of War, in coordination with
the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command,
shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional
committees that assesses the capacity of the United States to
fully implement sections 2 and 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act
(22 U.S.C. 3301 and 3302), including—
(1) maintaining the capacity to resist any resort to force
or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security
or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan;
(2) providing Taiwan with arms of a defensive character in
such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability; and
(3) preserving peace, security, and stability in the
Western Pacific as matters of international concern.
(d) Matters to Be Included.—
(1) In general.—Each report required under subsection (c)
shall include—
(A) a detailed assessment of whether the current and
projected military posture, force structure, operational
plans, and capabilities of the United States are sufficient
to credibly deter—
(i) a large-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan;
(ii) a maritime or air blockade of Taiwan; and
(iii) major missile or air strike campaigns against Taiwan;
(B) an assessment of the United States' capacity to
credibly deter and resist forms of coercion that would
jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system of
the people on Taiwan, including sustained forms of coercion
across air, maritime, cyber, space, economic, and information
domains;
(C) an assessment of the United States' operational
readiness and sustainability, including—
(i) readiness, posture, basing access and overflight,
mobility, logistics resilience, prepositioned stocks, and
munitions sufficiency in the Indo-Pacific region;
(ii) projected munitions expenditure rates and
replenishment timelines under high-intensity conflict
scenarios;
(iii) the ability of the defense industrial base to sustain
operations in a protracted conflict of not less than 1 year;
and
(iv) vulnerabilities to supply chain disruption, cyber
attack, or anti-access/area denial strategies across domains;
(D) an assessment of the availability, reliability, and
sufficiency of allied and partner contributions to deterrence
and defense in a Taiwan contingency and to resist gray zone
coercion; and
(E) an assessment of the capacity of the United States to
comply with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) in a
scenario in which the United States is simultaneously
responding to aggression initiated by the Russian Federation,
the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, or a terrorist organization.
(2) Capability gaps and resource requirements.—For each
assessment described in paragraph (1), the report shall—
(A) identify current capability gaps, shortfalls, and
vulnerabilities;
(B) estimate capability gaps during the following 10 years
based on current budget projections;
(C) specify budgetary, force posture, acquisition,
industrial base, and legislative changes required to mitigate
the gaps referred to in subparagraph (C); and
(D) include an estimated timeline and costs to achieve a
level of capability sufficient to credibly deter and, if
necessary, defeat aggression against Taiwan.
(e) Form.—Each report required under subsection (c) shall
be submitted in classified form, but may include an
unclassified executive summary.
(f) Briefing.—Not later than 30 days after submission of
each report pursuant to subsection (c), the Secretary of War
shall provide a classified briefing to the appropriate
congressional committees regarding the findings and
recommendations contained in such report.
(g) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section may be
construed—
(1) to authorize the use of military force; or
(2) to alter or supersede any existing statutory
requirement under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et
seq.).