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Congressional Daily Record
This section is about changes proposed to a bill or resolution. It mentions committees such as Select Committee on Intelligence, members such as Gary C. Peters.
Issued
June 24, 2026
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Download official Senate Record PDFReturn to issue contextSA 6392. Mr. PETERS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
Strike section 812 and insert the following:
SEC. 812. REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION RELATED TO SUPPLY
CHAIN RISK.
Section 3252 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to
read as follows:
“Sec. 3252. Requirements for information relating to supply
chain risk
“(a) Authority.—Subject to subsection (b), the head of a
covered agency may—
“(1) carry out a covered procurement action; and
“(2) limit, notwithstanding any other provision of law, in
whole or in part, the disclosure of information relating to
the basis for carrying out a covered procurement action.
“(b) Determination and Notification.—The head of a
covered agency may exercise the authority provided in
subsection (a) only after—
“(1) consulting with and receiving a written
recommendation from procurement officials, general counsels,
or other relevant officials of the covered agency, including
the chief acquisition officer and the chief information
officer of the agency (or comparable employee);
“(2) making a determination in writing, in unclassified or
classified form, that—
“(A) use of the authority in subsection (a)(1) is
necessary to protect national security by reducing supply
chain risk, including the facts, evidence, and conclusions of
the risk assessment upon which this determination was made;
“(B) less intrusive measures have been taken and are not
reasonably expected to reduce such supply chain risk,
including—
“(i) the facts and evidence upon which this determination
was made;
“(ii) the options that were considered in making this
determination;
“(iii) the actions taken from this consideration; and
“(iv) why such options were not reasonably available to
reduce supply chain risk;
“(D) in a case where the head of the covered agency plans
to limit disclosure of information under subsection (a)(2),
the risk to national security due to the disclosure of such
information outweighs the risk due to not disclosing such
information; and
“(E) in the case of termination of an existing agreement,
contract, or license, such action is necessary to address an
imminent risk to national security;
“(3) providing a classified or unclassified notice of the
determination made under paragraph (2) to the appropriate
congressional committee, and briefings upon request not later
than 1 day after the request, which notice shall include—
“(A) a summary of the risk assessment and the facts and
evidence upon which the risk assessment is based, including
the nature of the supply chain risk, that serves as the basis
for the written determination required by paragraph (2);
“(B) a summary of the basis for the determination,
including a discussion of less intrusive measures that were
taken and why they were not reasonably expected to reduce
supply chain risk; and
“(C) a legal opinion from the Department of Defense Office
of the General Counsel that the determination required in
paragraph (2), as well as the analysis required in
subparagraphs (A) and (B), meets the statutory requirements
of this section;
“(4) determining and certifying to the appropriate
congressional committees that a foreign entity of concern in
the supply chain has carried out nefarious, malicious, or
concerning actions warranting such exercise of authority; and
“(5) the Inspector General of the Department of Defense
conducts a review and determines that all requirements under
this subsection have been met.
“(c) Limitation on Disclosure.—If the head of a covered
agency has exercised the authority provided in subsection
(a)(2) to limit disclosure of information—
“(1) no action undertaken by the agency head under such
authority shall be subject to review in a bid protest before
the Government Accountability Office or in any Federal court;
and
“(2) the agency head shall—
“(A) notify appropriate parties of a covered procurement
action and the basis for such action only to the extent
necessary to effectuate the covered procurement action;
“(B) allow the appropriate parties of a covered
procurement action a 30-day window to address the
Department's concerns or take other remedial actions;
“(C) notify other Department of Defense components or
other Federal agencies responsible for procurements that may
be subject to the same or similar supply chain risk, in a
manner and to the extent consistent with the requirements of
national security; and
“(D) ensure the confidentiality of any such notifications.
“(d) Limitations on Authority.—(1) Unless a complete and
detailed notification has been received by the appropriate
congressional committees within 5 days of a determination
under this section, the determination shall have no effect
for purposes of this section until the notification has been
received.
“(2) A determination under this section shall not be
invoked for contract disputes or as a negotiating tool and
shall only be invoked to protect critical defense systems
from adversary exploitation by screening out suppliers who
pose unacceptable risks of sabotage or malicious subversion
in the procurement process.
“(e) Additional Requirements Before Carrying Out a Covered
Procurement Action.—(1) The head of a covered agency may
carry out a covered procurement action [against affecting] a
domestic source or non-FOCI entity only after—
“(2) notifying the domestic source or non-FOCI entity that
a covered action is being considered;
“(3) providing the domestic source or non-FOCI entity, to
the extent consistent with the national security and law
enforcement interests, of information that forms the basis
for the covered action, in accordance with paragraph (3);
“(4) allowing the domestic source or non-FOCI entity 30
days after receipt of the notice to submit information and
argument to the head of the covered agency in response to
such notification; and
“(5) submitting notice to the appropriate congressional
committees that the covered procurement action is not being
taken for any purpose described in paragraph (2).
“(2) The head of a covered agency may not directly or
indirectly exclude a domestic source or non-FOCI entity as a
source pursuant to subsection (a) for—
“(A) exercising, declining to waive, or declining to
renegotiate any right under, or any term or condition of, a
contract, subcontract, agreement, license, or other
arrangement with a Federal agency; or
“(B) declining to enter into such an arrangement on terms
proposed by a Federal official.
“(f) Non-punitive Purposes.—The authority under this
section shall be exercised solely to protect the integrity
and security of covered systems, and not for purposes of
punishment, coercion, or retaliation.
“(g) Judicial Review.—Covered procurement actions carried
out under this section shall be subject to judicial review
under subchapter II of chapter 5, and chapter 7, of title 5,
United States Code (commonly known as the `Administrative
Procedure Act').
“(h) Rule of Construction.—Limitations on disclosure
allowed under this section do not preclude judicial review.
Nothing in this section shall be considered to restrict
judicial review available under the law.
“(i) Definitions.—In this section:
“(1) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term
`appropriate congressional committees' means—
“(A) in the case of a covered system included in the
National Intelligence Program or the Military Intelligence
Program, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate,
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives, and the congressional defense committees;
and
“(B) in the case of a covered system not otherwise
included in subparagraph (A), the congressional defense
committees.
“(2) Covered item of supply.—The term `covered item of
supply' means an item of information technology (as that term
is defined in section 11101 of title 40) that is purchased
for inclusion in a covered system and the loss of integrity
of which could result in a supply chain risk for a covered
system.
“(3) Covered procurement.—The term `covered procurement'
means—
“(A) a source selection for a covered system or a covered
item of supply involving either a performance specification,
as provided in section 3206(a)(3)(B) of this title, or an
evaluation factor, as provided in section 3206(b)(1) of this
title, relating to supply chain risk;
“(B) the consideration of proposals for and issuance of a
task or delivery order for a covered system or a covered item
of supply, as provided in section 3406(d)(3) of this title,
where the task or delivery order contract concerned includes
a contract clause establishing a requirement relating to
supply chain risk; or
“(C) any contract action involving a contract for a
covered system or a covered item of supply where such
contract includes a clause establishing requirements relating
to supply chain risk.
“(4) Covered procurement action.—The term `covered
procurement action' means any of the following actions, if
the action takes place in the course of conducting a covered
procurement:
“(A) The exclusion of a source that fails to meet
qualification standards established in accordance with the
requirements of section 3243 of this title for the purpose of
reducing supply chain risk in the acquisition of covered
systems.
“(B) The exclusion of a source that fails to achieve an
acceptable rating with regard to an evaluation factor
providing for the consideration of supply chain risk in the
evaluation of proposals for the award of a contract or the
issuance of a task or delivery order.
“(C) The decision to withhold consent for a contractor to
subcontract with a particular source or to direct a
contractor for a covered system to exclude a particular
source from consideration for a subcontract under the
contract.
“(5) Covered system.—The term `covered system' means a
national security system, as that term is defined in section
3552(b)(6) of title 44.
“(6) Domestic source.—The term `domestic source' has the
meaning given the term in section 702 of the Defense
Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4552).
“(7) Head of a covered agency.—The term `head of a
covered agency' means each of the following:
“(A) The Secretary of Defense.
“(B) The Secretary of the Army.
“(C) The Secretary of the Navy.
“(D) The Secretary of the Air Force.
“(8) Non-FOCi entity.—The term `non-FOCI entity' means—
“(A) a domestic source; or
“(B) an entity that has not been identified to be
operating under foreign ownership, control, or influence
pursuant to a Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency
review of such entity.
“(9) Supply chain risk.—The term `supply chain risk'
means the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously
introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design,
integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution,
installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system
so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the
function, use, or operation of such system.”.