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Congressional Daily Record
This section is about changes proposed to a bill or resolution. It mentions committees such as Committee on Foreign Relations, members such as Jeanne Shaheen.
Issued
June 24, 2026
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Download official Senate Record PDFReturn to issue contextSA 6505. Mrs. SHAHEEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of subtitle A of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1210. SECURITY ASSISTANCE.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations for Security Assistance
to the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security
Forces.—
(1) In general.—There is authorized to be appropriated to
the Department of State, for each of the first 5 fiscal years
beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act—
(A) $200,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing;
(B) $25,000,000 for International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement;
(C) $11,500,000 for Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs; and
(D) $3,500,000 International Military Education and
Training.
(2) Notice before provision of assistance.—
(A) Restriction.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
not more than 50 percent of the funds appropriated pursuant
to paragraph (1) may be obligated until after the Secretary
of State certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives that—
(i) the Government of Lebanon has declared Hezbollah's
military activities illegal; and
(ii) the Lebanese Armed Forces are implementing directives
of the Government of Lebanon regarding—
(I) the establishment of a monopoly of force within
Lebanon; and
(II) the disarmament of Hezbollah.
(B) Inapplicability.—The restriction on obligating funds
under subparagraph (A) shall not apply to assistance provided
to special operations units and associated enabling forces of
the Lebanese Armed Forces.
(3) Authorization of contingent funding after the first
fiscal year.—
(A) Contingency.—Subparagraph (B) shall take effect if a
briefing required under subsection (c) during the fiscal year
beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act
demonstrates meaningful progress, as determined by the
Secretary of State—
(i) by the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security
Forces to counter Iranian proxy forces operating in Lebanon,
including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad;
and
(ii) by the Government of Lebanon to develop and implement
a plan to expand state services and increase legitimate
political participation in Lebanese communities that are
currently dependent on parallel services from Hezbollah.
(B) Funding.—Subject to the contingency described in
subparagraph (A), in addition to the appropriations
authorized under paragraph (1), there is authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State, for the second,
third, fourth, and fifth fiscal year beginning after the date
of the enactment of this Act—
(i) $50,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing;
(ii) $6,000,000 for International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement;
(iii) $3,000,000 for Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs; and
(iv) $1,000,000 for International Military Education and
Training.
(4) Authorization of additional contingent funding after
the second fiscal year.—
(A) Contingency.—Subparagraph (B) shall take effect if the
briefings required under subsection (c) during each of the
first 2 fiscal years beginning after the date of the
enactment of this Act demonstrate meaningful progress, as
determined by the Secretary of State—
(i) by the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security
Forces to counter Iranian proxy forces operating in Lebanon,
including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad;
and
(ii) by the Government of Lebanon to implement a plan to
expand state services and increase legitimate political
participation in Lebanese communities that are currently
dependent on parallel services from Hezbollah.
(B) Funding.—Subject to the contingency described in
subparagraph (A), in addition to the appropriations
authorized under paragraphs (1) and (3), there is authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary of State, for each of the
third, fourth, and fifth fiscal years beginning after the
date of the enactment of this Act—
(i) $50,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing;
(ii) $6,000,000 for International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement;
(iii) $3,000,000 for Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs; and
(iv) $1,000,000 for International Military Education and
Training.
(5) Use of funds.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to
authorizations under paragraphs (1)(B), (3)(B), and (4)(B)
shall be used by the Secretary of State to build the capacity
of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security
Forces, including by—
(A) countering Iranian proxy forces operating in Lebanon,
including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad;
(B) implementing—
(i) the August 2025 decision to exercise a state monopoly
of arms;
(ii) the September 2025 plan to achieve this monopoly by
disarming Hezbollah;
(iii) the March 2026 decision to ban Hezbollah security and
military activities; and
(iv) the April 2026 decision to bring weapons in Beirut
under government control;
(C) fully implementing all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions;
(D) training and vetting members of the Lebanese Armed
Forces and the Internal Security Forces;
(E) countering and interdicting revenue sources for
Hezbollah and other malign actors, including revenues derived
from financial crimes, Captagon, and other illicit good
production and trafficking in Lebanon;
(F) detecting and interdicting trafficking of weapons,
materials related to weapons of
mass destruction, dual-use goods, and sensitive technologies
in Lebanon; and
(G) implementing the program described in subsection (b).
(b) Program to Build the Capacity of the Lebanese Armed
Forces and the Internal Security Forces With Respect to
Captagon and Other Illicit Goods.—
(1) In general.—The Secretary of State shall establish a
program to provide assistance to strengthen the capacity of
Lebanese security institutions to identify, track, and
improve their forensics detection capabilities with respect
to financial crimes and production and trafficking of
Captagon and other illicit goods that provide a source of
revenue for Hezbollah and other malign actors.
(2) Program requirements.—Recipients of assistance from
the program required under paragraph (1)—
(A) shall be limited to Lebanese officials who have
expertise and experience or are being trained in matters
described in paragraph (1); and
(B) may be carried out, in the case of inbound exchanges,
as part of exchange programs and international visitor
programs administered by the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs of the Department of State, including the
International Visitor Leadership Program, in coordination
with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs.
(c) Briefing.—Not later than 15 days before the obligation
of any funds appropriated pursuant to subsection (a), the
Secretary of State shall brief the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives regarding—
(1) the steps taken during the previous year by the
Lebanese security institutions to counter Iranian proxy
forces operating in Lebanon, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad;
(2) the steps taken during the previous year by Lebanese
security institutions to counter the production and
trafficking of Captagon and other illicit goods in Lebanon;
(3) how United States assistance created or augmented the
capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal
Security Forces to undertake the steps described in
paragraphs (1) and (2);
(4) how the production and trafficking of Captagon and
other revenues sources, to include financial crimes and
illicit good production and trafficking, has harmed the
Lebanese economy and benefitted Hezbollah and other malign
actors;
(5) the steps taken by the Lebanese Armed Forces to counter
any instances of collusion between the Lebanese Armed Forces
and Hezbollah, such as—
(A) promoting the establishment of rapid inspection units;
(B) conducting randomized spot checks;
(C) implementing mechanisms for incentivizing weapons
relinquishment;
(D) implementing mechanisms for incentivizing outcome-based
performance by Lebanese Armed Forces units and personnel; and
(E) imposing consequences, such as criminal liability, for
Lebanese Armed Forces personnel who have colluded with
Hezbollah; and
(6) how the assistance authorized under subsection (a) will
further improve the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces
and the Internal Security Forces to counter Iranian proxy
forces operating in Lebanon, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
(d) Oversight of Support Assistance.—Not later than 120
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Secretary
of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives an unclassified report, with a
classified annex, if necessary, that—
(1) describes the progress made by the Government of
Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces, and the Internal Security
Forces and any remaining gaps in developing and implementing
a plan, with timelines and measurable objectives—
(A) to fully disarm Hezbollah, including with the support
of the United States and the international community;
(B) to expand state services and increasing legitimate
political participation in Lebanese communities that are
currently dependent on parallel services from Hezbollah; and
(C) to implement—
(i) the August 2025 decision to exercise a state monopoly
of arms;
(ii) the September 2025 plan to achieve this monopoly by
disarming Hezbollah;
(iii) the March 2026 decision to ban Hezbollah security and
military activities; and
(iv) the April 2026 decision to bring weapons in Beirut
under government control;
(2) details the Government of Iran's illicit financing and
support of armed non-state actors in Lebanon, including
Hezbollah and institutions it controls, such as Al-Qard Al-
Hassan;
(3) describes whether and how the political and economic
stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon
are important for regional stability and the national
economic and security interests of the United States;
(4)(A) describes the efforts led by the United States to
coordinate and deconflict between the Lebanese Armed Forces
and the Israel Defense Forces;
(B) assesses the steps that should be taken by the Lebanese
Armed Forces to increase coordination and deconfliction;
(C) assesses the steps that should be taken by the Israel
Defense Forces to increase coordination and deconfliction;
(D) describes additional authorities or tools that may aid
these coordination and deconfliction efforts or increase the
ability of the United States to provide effective guidance to
the Lebanese Armed Forces and Israel Defense Forces; and
(E) describes efforts to build upon the monitoring
mechanism led by the United States after the Announcement of
a Cessation of Hostilities and Related Commitments on
November 27, 2024, to establish a combined intelligence and
military coordination body with international partners that
sets clear, measurable objectives and time-bound metrics to
ensure credibility and transparency in the process of
disarming Hezbollah;
(5) identifies the steps the Government of Lebanon is
taking to enact reforms to Lebanon's banking and financial
sectors, including—
(A) steps to implement Lebanon's April 2025 bank secrecy
law;
(B) steps to pass and implement a law to restructure
Lebanon's banking sector; and
(C) steps to pass and implement a law to address the
allocation of losses in Lebanon's banking sector;
(6) describes the progress made toward building peaceful
relations between the Government of Lebanon and the
Government of Israel, including—
(A) steps to pursue negotiations and efforts to impede
negotiations;
(B) the advisory and coordination mechanisms set up by the
United States and the international community;
(C) progress made as a result of direct negotiations that—
(i) recognize Lebanon's sovereignty and work toward
enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701
(2006);
(ii) affirm that the Government of Lebanon, rather than any
foreign power (such as Iran), is the representative of the
Lebanese people;
(iii) undermine Iran's claims to negotiate for Lebanon; and
(iv) undermine Iran's attempts to intrude in Lebanon's
domestic affairs and the conduct of its foreign policy;
(D) steps to suspend the enforcement of, or repeal,
Lebanon's anti-normalization laws, derived from Lebanon Law
1/1955, which was ratified by the Parliament of Lebanon on
June 23, 1955, to prohibit any economic, commercial, or
personal interactions between the people of Lebanon and the
people of Israel, and provisions of the Lebanese Criminal
Code and the Lebanese Code of Military Justice; and
(7) describes humanitarian and reconstruction needs and
challenges in Lebanon, including—
(A) the immediate state of humanitarian needs and the long-
term reconstruction needs in Lebanon, particularly south of
the Litani river;
(B) the causes of such challenges;
(C) efforts that have been made to address these
challenges;
(D) the effects of not addressing these challenges on the
economy and security inside Lebanon; and
(E) the effects of such challenges on regional stability
and security if applicable.