## Quick facts
- **Record:** Senate Floor
- **Section type:** Amendments
- **Chamber:** Senate
- **Date:** June 24, 2026
- **Congress:** 119th Congress
- **Why this source matters:** This section came from the Senate floor portion of the record.
## Linked context
- **People mentioned:** [Shaheen, Jeanne](/members/S001181)
- **Committees:** [Committee on Foreign Relations](/committees/ssfr00), [Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation](/committees/sscm00), [Committee on Energy and Commerce](/committees/hsif00)
## Readable version of the official text
SA 6513. Mrs. SHAHEEN \(for herself and Mr. Ricketts\) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of title XII, add the following:
Subtitle F—U.S. Technology Procurement and Access to Trusted Hardware
SEC. 1281. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the “U.S. Technology
Procurement and Access to Trusted Hardware Act” or the
“U.S. Tech PATH Act”.
SEC. 1282. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
\(1\) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term
“appropriate congressional committees” means—
\(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and
\(B\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
\(2\) Foreign country of concern.—The term “foreign country
of concern” has the meaning given the term “covered
nation” in section 4872\(f\) of title 10, United States Code.
\(3\) Foreign government partner.—The term “foreign
government partner” includes international organizations.
\(4\) International organizations.—The term “international
organizations” has the meaning given the term in section 1
of the International Organizations Immunities Act \(22 U.S.C.
288\).
\(5\) Trusted cyber and digital technologies.—The term
“trusted cyber and digital technologies” means
technologies, including equipment, services, hardware, or
software used in information and communications technology
networks, for which the Secretary of State, in coordination
with the Secretary of Commerce, has determined—
\(A\) the provider, supplier, or manufacturer is not owned
by, controlled by, or subject to the influence of a foreign
country of concern; and
\(B\) do not pose an unacceptable risk to the national
security of the United States or the security and safety of
United States persons.
\(6\) Pax silica initiative.—The term “Pax Silica
initiative” refers to the Department of State-led
diplomatic, economic security, and supply chain initiative,
announced on December 11, 2025, to strengthen cooperation
among the United States, allied countries, partner countries,
industry, and other relevant stakeholders for the purpose of
developing and securing trusted supply chains and
infrastructure necessary for artificial intelligence,
semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, and other
technologies determined by the Secretary of State to be
essential to United States national security, economic
security, and technological competitiveness.
SEC. 1283. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
\(1\) foreign government partners are increasingly turning
towards strategic competitors like the People's Republic of
China to procure cyber and digital technologies due to their
low-cost, acceptable efficacy, ease and speed of acquisition,
and support for associated training and maintenance;
\(2\) foreign government partner procurement of cyber and
digital technologies from suppliers aligned with strategic
competitors of the United States poses significant and
distinct risks, including—
\(A\) supply chain vulnerabilities created by dependence on
strategic competitors whose governments may compel access to
data, networks, or systems, undermining the cybersecurity and
strategic autonomy of the procuring government;
\(B\) the erosion of interoperability and alignment with
United States cybersecurity frameworks, standards, and best
practices, reducing the ability of foreign government
partners to operate securely alongside United States systems
and those of United States allies; and
\(C\) the adoption of digital governance practices that are
inconsistent with United States economic and national
security interests;
\(3\) United States foreign government partners consistently
signal strong demand for trusted cyber and digital
technologies from United States suppliers;
\(4\) United States initiatives such as Pax Silica should
facilitate technology procurements by building enduring
technology partnerships between foreign government partners
and United States suppliers, including by—
\(A\) assisting foreign government partners in navigating
regulatory, logistical, and technical hurdles to trusted
cyber and digital technology procurement;
\(B\) providing foreign government partners with strategic
direction from the United States Government;
\(C\) incorporating foreign government partner needs into
program development from the outset; and
\(D\) maintaining long-term engagement with foreign
government partners throughout the procurement cycle of
trusted cyber and digital technologies; and
\(5\) as the United States seeks to maintain its global
competitive edge in critical and emerging technologies,
including advanced cybersecurity, artificial intelligence,
advanced telecommunications, and robotics, it is in the
interest of the United States Government to establish
policies and procedures that streamline foreign government
partners' ability to procure trusted and reliable
technologies from the United States and United States allies
and partners.
SEC. 1284. UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY PROCUREMENT PROGRAM.
\(a\) Establishment.—There is established in the Department
of State the United States Cyber and Digital Technology
Procurement Program \(referred to in this subtitle as the
“Program”\), which shall be administered by the Bureau for
Cyberspace and Digital Policy, and which may support Pax
Silica and other related initiatives. To the maximum extent
practicable, the Program shall seek to serve as a demand-
driven mechanism in response to cyber and digital technology
needs as determined by the participating foreign government
partner.
\(b\) Purposes.—The purposes of the Program shall include
the following:
\(1\) To streamline foreign government partner procurement of
trusted cyber and digital technologies, including commercial
off-the-shelf technologies, consistent with United States
export control laws, including cybersecurity standards
appropriate to relevant policy goals of the United States.
\(2\) To establish long-term cyber and digital technology
procurement pipelines with United States providers, including
after the termination of the Program.
\(3\) To identify the appropriate United States Government
financing mechanisms to address challenges associated with
affordability of trusted cyber and digital technologies.
\(4\) To provide a comprehensive package to foreign
government partners, with the support of and in coordination
with United States industry technical experts, as
appropriate, to navigate trusted cyber and digital technology
procurement requirements, to understand technical and system
complexity, to assess absorptive capacity, and to identify
foreign government partner-specific logistical and export
control challenges, including by—
\(A\) designing and implementing procurement, deployment, and
technical knowledge transfer that enable the participating
foreign government partner to modernize and secure systems;
\(B\) providing clear guidelines for United States and
trusted foreign supplier entry and eligibility;
\(C\) conducting assessments related to the participating
foreign government partner's workforce or technological
requirements, including any gaps in absorptive capacity,
including—
\(i\) feasibility studies to identify, design, and implement
the deployment of trusted cyber and digital technology
solutions; and
\(ii\) sustainability assessments to determine the
participating foreign government partner's ability to procure
and invest in trusted cyber and digital technologies,
including the ability to sustain such investments in the
long-term;
\(D\) providing capacity building to ensure that the
participating foreign government partner obtains the relevant
skills for requirements identification and assessment,
integration of United States procurements into existing
operating environments, research and procurement, logistics,
deployment, and configuration to ensure a long-term
arrangement with United States suppliers; and
\(E\) assisting the participating foreign government partner
in developing a long-term strategy to procure and budget for
trusted cyber and digital technology procurements, including
beyond the end of the Program's lifecycle.
\(5\) To assess the risks and tradeoffs of foreign government
partners adopting cyber and digital technologies from foreign
countries of concern and prioritize foreign government
partners for outreach efforts based on that risk assessment.
\(c\) Covered Cyber and Digital Technologies.—In
implementing the Program, the Secretary of State shall, in
coordination with the participating foreign government
partner and United States industry technical experts, as
appropriate, prioritize the following trusted cyber and
digital technologies, as well as any other trusted cyber and
digital technologies designated by the Secretary pursuant to
subsection \(d\):
\(1\) Software and its associated subscriptions and
licensing, including—
\(A\) operating systems;
\(B\) enterprise management software;
\(C\) cloud-based storage solutions and compute access;
\(D\) industrial control and automation software, including
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition \(SCADA\), distributed
control systems \(DCS\), and programmable logic controller
\(PLC\) programming environments;
\(E\) digital twin, simulation, and modeling software; and
\(F\) cloud and edge orchestration platforms for robotic and
operational technology \(OT\) device management.
\(2\) Hardware, including—
\(A\) processors;
\(B\) human-machine interfaces \(HMIs\) and operator consoles;
\(C\) networking equipment, including switches, routers, and
gateways;
\(D\) industrial networking equipment;
\(E\) biotechnology equipment, including genomic sequencers
and related hardware; and
\(F\) other related technologies.
\(3\) Cybersecurity products, including—
\(A\) firewalls;
\(B\) intrusion detection and prevention systems;
\(C\) Security Information and Event Management \(SIEM\)
systems;
\(D\) threat intelligence and monitoring systems;
\(E\) endpoint detection systems;
\(F\) Security Operations Centers \(SOC\);
\(G\) secure authentication systems; and
\(H\) cybersecurity training and consulting services.
\(4\) Telecommunications equipment, including—
\(A\) subsea fiber-optic cable and associated equipment;
\(B\) cellular equipment, including open radio access network
\(ORAN\) equipment;
\(C\) satellite-enabling infrastructure; and
\(D\) broadband infrastructure, including fiber optic network
equipment.
\(5\) Equipment and related products to enable the adoption
of artificial intelligence \(AI\) solutions, including—
\(A\) compute;
\(B\) storage;
\(C\) memory;
\(D\) models, including both closed- and open-weight models;
\(E\) AI model licenses;
\(F\) edge AI capabilities, including next-generation
smartphone technology and relevant mobile operating systems;
and
\(G\) AI model applications.
\(d\) Annual Review of Covered Cyber and Digital
Technologies.—The Secretary of State shall conduct an annual
assessment to identify the inclusion or removal of
technologies under subsection \(c\) based on the national
security risk to the United States of a foreign country of
concern gaining significant market share of such technology
within a foreign government partner country.
\(e\) Risk Mitigation Requirements.—The Secretary shall—
\(1\) before approving a partnership under the Program—
\(A\) conduct, and submit to the appropriate congressional
committees, an initial assessment of cyber and digital
technology misuse and diversion risks, including—
\(i\) the foreign government partner's export control
enforcement capacity;
\(ii\) the foreign government partner's history of technology
transfer to foreign countries of concern, including
permitting remote access to technology; and
\(iii\) investments by foreign countries of concern in the
foreign government partner's critical sectors;
\(B\) establish monitoring and mitigation requirements
proportional to the risk assessed under paragraph \(1\);
\(C\) include end-use monitoring provisions in all Program
agreements; and
\(D\) coordinate with the intelligence community and the
Department of Defense regarding counterintelligence and
national security risks; and
\(2\) on an annual basis for the duration of a partnership
under the Program, update and submit to the appropriate
congressional committees the assessment required by paragraph
\(1\) in order to continually assess the conditions described
in clauses \(i\), \(ii\), and \(iii\) of paragraph \(1\)\(A\),
including any improvements in such conditions.
\(f\) Foreign Government Partner Contribution.—For any
partnership with a foreign government partner under the
Program, the Secretary shall, to the maximum extent
practicable, seek to ensure cost-sharing with the foreign
government partner to facilitate the foreign government
partner's long-term buy-in and sustained procurements of
trusted cyber and digital technologies.
\(g\) Additional Interagency Coordination.—In implementing
the Program, to address challenges associated with
affordability, financing, technical evaluations, procurement
requirements, and long-term capacity building, the Secretary
of State shall, on a case-by-case basis, coordinate, as
appropriate, with the relevant Federal agencies, including
the Department of Commerce, the United States International
Development Finance Cooperation, and the United States Trade
and Development Agency.
\(h\) Use of Funds.—Funds made available to carry out the
Program shall be used—
\(1\) to provide assistance or financing—
\(A\) to foreign government partner civilian government
agencies; or
\(B\) to law enforcement or military agencies, only if such
entities are the owners and operators of the foreign
government partner's civilian critical infrastructure; and
\(2\) to develop blended finance mechanisms, co-developed
with the participating foreign government partner, that
partners with fund managers, project developers, third-party
investors, infrastructure providers, and other private
partners to advance the objections outlined in subsection
\(b\).
\(i\) Partner Disqualification.—
\(1\) Prohibition on the use of funds.—No funds shall be
made available under this subtitle to—
\(A\) a foreign country of concern; or
\(B\) any country, entity, or person—
\(i\) upon which sanctions are imposed by the United States
Department of the Treasury; or
\(ii\) that is an entity or person on the Entity List
maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the
Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to
part 744 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
\(2\) Vetting.—The Secretary of State shall vet foreign
government partners to determine whether there is credible
information that such partner—
\(A\) has committed serious human rights abuses or engaged in
corruption, as defined by section 1 of Executive Order 13818
\(50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of
persons involved in serious human rights abuse or
corruption\), or is determined to be ineligible for assistance
pursuant to section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2378d\); and
\(B\) uses or is likely to use technologies outlined in
subsection \(c\) and supported by this subtitle to engage in—
\(i\) violations of human rights;
\(ii\) targeted or bulk surveillance in violation of rule of
law principles or fundamental freedoms;
\(iii\) the monitoring of journalists, activists, human
rights defenders, opposition parties, or political
dissidents;
\(iv\) internet shutdowns or to limit or control elections or
protests;
\(v\) political censorship or the targeting and suppression
of political speech or political opponents;
\(vi\) denial of access to technology or services based on
race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or other discriminatory
factors; and
\(vii\) acts of transnational repression.
\(3\) Disqualification.—Any foreign government partner
determined by the Secretary of State to engage in the
activities described in paragraph \(2\)\(B\) shall be ineligible
for support or assistance under this subtitle.
\(j\) Regional Technology Officers.—The Secretary of State
shall, to the maximum extent practicable, leverage the
Department of State's Regional Technology Officer Program,
pursuant to section 9508 of the Department of State
Authorization Act of 2022 \(22 U.S.C. 10305\), to assist United
States overseas missions in identifying foreign government
partners to participate in the Program.
\(k\) Foreign Commercial Officers.—As appropriate, the
Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Secretary
of Commerce, seek to leverage the Foreign Commercial Officer
Program to assist United States overseas missions in
identifying foreign government partners to participate in the
Program.
\(l\) Congressional Notification Requirement.—Not later than
15 days before amounts from the Cyberspace, Digital
Connectivity, and Related Technologies \(CDT\) Fund are
obligated for purposes of carrying out this section, the
Secretary of State shall submit notification of such
obligation to—
\(1\) the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate;
\(2\) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
\(3\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of
Representatives; and
\(4\) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
\(m\) Annual Report.—Not later than one year after the date
of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
Commerce, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that includes—
\(1\) a complete list of participating foreign government
partners in the Program;
\(2\) progress and results achieved in the previous calendar
year;
\(3\) the overall amount of purchases or investments each
foreign government partner has made since initial
participation in the Program;
\(4\) specific trusted cyber and digital technologies
provided to participating foreign government partners,
including—
\(A\) the name of the provider company or companies;
\(B\) the total value of the procurements;
\(C\) description of the capability; and
\(D\) how the procured capability addresses the original
request submitted by the foreign government partner, if
applicable;
\(5\) next steps for each participating foreign government
partner in their respective Program pipeline;
\(6\) any challenges for a foreign government partner's
participation in the Program, including how those challenges
are being addressed; and
\(7\) how risks related to technology transfer, if
applicable, are being mitigated.
\(n\) Authorization of Appropriations.—There is authorized
to be appropriated
$500,000,000 for fiscal year 2026 through fiscal year 2031 to
the Cyberspace, Digital Connectivity, and Related
Technologies \(CDT\) Fund under section 592 of the Foreign
Assistance Act for Fiscal Year 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2349cc-1\) for
purposes of carrying out this section.
\(o\) Sunset.—The Program and its associated authorities
established under this section shall terminate on the date
that is eight years after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
SEC. 1285. OFFICE OF UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY PROCUREMENT.
\(a\) Designation of Responsibility.—The Secretary of State
shall designate an existing office within the Bureau for
Cyberspace and Digital Policy of the Department of State, or
newly establish an Office of United States Technology
Procurement \(referred to in this subtitle as the “Office”\),
which shall be responsible for administering the Program.
\(b\) Personnel.—
\(1\) Composition.—The Office shall be comprised of a
Director, a Deputy Director, and such other staff as the
Secretary deems appropriate.
\(2\) Staffing.—The Office shall include personnel with
demonstrated expertise or experience in performing the
following functions:
\(A\) Grant design and management.
\(B\) Program monitoring, evaluation, and learning.
\(C\) Cyber and digital technology commercialization,
deployment, or procurement.
\(3\) Director.—The Director of the Office shall fulfill the
following responsibilities:
\(A\) Identify, on an annual basis, specific strategic
priorities for the Program consistent with United States
national security priorities and objectives.
\(B\) In coordination with the other relevant officials,
select and approve all partnerships with foreign government
partners under the Program.
\(C\) Conduct oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the
effectiveness of the Program, including long-term outcome
assessments, to ensure the Program advances United States
foreign policy and national security interests and to ensure
monitoring, evaluation, and learning results directly inform
future grant decisions.
\(D\) Ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that all
Program activities are carried out in coordination with other
Federal efforts to promote the United States technology stack
overseas.
\(E\) Compiling and submitting the list required by section
1284\(m\).
\(4\) Deputy director.—The Deputy Director of the Office may
have responsibility for policy and programming to assist the
Director, particularly with respect to coordination with
other United States departments and agencies.
\(c\) Authorization of Appropriations.—There is authorized
to be appropriated $2,000,000 for fiscal years 2026 through
2028 for the purposes of implementing the Office.
SEC. 1286. EXPANDING NECESSARY TECHNOLOGY AND RELATED
EXPERTISE AT UNITED STATES OVERSEAS MISSIONS.
\(a\) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that,
for the United States Government to successfully implement
the Program, it is vital that the United States recruit and
retain the necessary talent to facilitate such partnerships.
\(b\) In General.—The Secretary of State shall, to the
maximum extent possible, take measures to ensure that United
States overseas missions in countries that are participating
in the Program host at least one full-time personnel with
demonstrated proficiency in matters related to cybersecurity,
technology, and other related expertise to sufficiently carry
out the Program.
SEC. 1287. EXTENDING AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE
REGIONAL TECHNOLOGY OFFICER PROGRAM.
Subsection \(d\) of section 9508 of the Department of State
Authorization Act of 2022 \(22 U.S.C. 10305\) is amended by
striking “2027” and inserting “2032”.
SEC. 1288. PRESERVING MARKET-BASED COMPETITION FOR CYBER AND
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES.
\(a\) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United
States to support market-based mechanisms for the export and
adoption of United States cyber and digital technologies
abroad, and to oppose state-directed or state-controlled
economic models that risk to displace or crowd out private-
sector competition in cyber and digital technology markets.
\(b\) In General.—Nothing in this subtitle shall be
construed to permit the Secretary of State, in coordination
with other relevant Federal agencies, in carrying out the
program outlined in section 1284\(a\)—
\(1\) to unduly interfere with, or seek to substitute for,
market-based competition among United States cyber and
digital technology providers;
\(2\) to condition access to program support on the
acceptance of commercial terms, partnerships, or business
arrangements that United States cyber and digital technology
providers would not voluntarily accept in an arm's length
commercial transaction; or
\(3\) to require foreign government partners to receive
approval from the United States Government for procurements
from United States cyber and digital technology providers
pursued outside the Program, except as otherwise required by
any other regulations or Federal law.
\(c\) Cyber and Digital Technology Small Business Owners.—
Notwithstanding subsection \(a\), in carrying out the Program,
the Secretary of State may provide targeted assistance,
including capacity-building support and the facilitation of
foreign government partner engagement, to United States small
businesses and companies that lack the global reach, existing
relationships, or resources to compete independently in
foreign government partner procurement markets, provided that
such assistance does not confer an unfair competitive
advantage over other United States cyber and digital
technology providers.
SEC. 1289. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT.
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and not less frequently than every two years until
the termination of the Program's authorities, the Comptroller
General of the United States shall conduct and submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a review of the Program.
The review shall include an assessment of the Department of
State's implementation of the Program, including—
\(1\) the Department of State's capacity to implement the
Program, including personnel and budgetary resources;
\(2\) whether the Department of State has established the
necessary processes and procedures to successfully achieve
the Program objectives outlined in section 1284;
\(3\) the Department of State's ability to conduct
appropriate monitoring and evaluation of Program
implementation;
\(4\) any technologies added or removed from the list under
section 1284\(c\) of covered cyber and digital technologies;
and
\(5\) any other elements deemed necessary by the Comptroller
General of the United States.
SEC. 1290. FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER TECHNOLOGY CAREER TRACK
FEASIBILITY STUDY AND REPORT.
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary shall—
\(1\) conduct a study to determine the feasibility and
advisability of establishing a dedicated technology policy
career track or “cone” for Foreign Service officers; and
\(2\) submit a report containing a summary of the results of
such study to the appropriate committees of Congress.
SEC. 1291. DERIVATION OF FUNDS.
Amounts made available to carry out this subtitle shall be
derived from amounts authorized to be appropriated or
otherwise made available to the Department of State.
## Official source
- [Download the official section PDF](https://api.govinfo.gov/packages/CREC-2026-06-24/granules/CREC-2026-06-24-pt1-PgS3625/pdf)