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June 24, 2026
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Download official Senate Record PDFReturn to issue context## Quick facts - **Record:** Senate Floor - **Section type:** Amendments - **Chamber:** Senate - **Date:** June 24, 2026 - **Congress:** 119th Congress - **Why this source matters:** This section came from the Senate floor portion of the record. ## Linked context - **People mentioned:** [Risch, James E.](/members/R000584) - **Bills and resolutions:** [S.Con.Res. 14 \(117th Congress\)](/legislation/sconres14-117), [H.R. 3427 \(119th Congress\)](/legislation/hr3427-119) - **Committees:** [Committee on Foreign Relations](/committees/ssfr00), [Committee on Foreign Affairs](/committees/hsfa00), [Committee on Appropriations](/committees/ssap00) ## Readable version of the official text SA 6559. Mr. RISCH \(for himself and Mrs. Shaheen\) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of the bill, add the following: DIVISION F—DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027 SEC. 8001. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. \(a\) Short Title.—This division may be cited as the “Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027”. \(b\) Table of Contents.—The table of content for this division is as follows: DIVISION F—DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027 - Sec. 8001. Short title; table of contents. - Sec. 8002. Definitions. TITLE I—WORKFORCE MATTERS Sec. 8101. Mid-career training float. Sec. 8102. Rebidding for personnel at closed posts. Sec. 8103. Report on Pacific Islands embassy staffing incentives. Sec. 8104. Enduring foreign language proficiency incentive pay. Sec. 8105. Support for regional medical officer psychiatrists. Sec. 8106. Workforce exit interviews. Sec. 8107. Integration of Marine Security Guard Detachments at United States diplomatic posts. Sec. 8108. Additions to reporting requirements for deaths at post. Sec. 8109. Policy on negotiation of bilateral work agreements. Sec. 8110. Coverage of return costs. Sec. 8111. Requirement for Uyghur language training. Sec. 8112. Extension of post-employment restrictions on Senate- confirmed officials at the Department of State. Sec. 8113. Reducing foreign language training related delays in Foreign Service assignments. Sec. 8114. Ensuring full staffing of the countering Russian Influence Fund. Sec. 8115. Facilitating moves for domestic employees teleworking overseas. Sec. 8116. Strengthening the Department's capacity for economic and technology competition. TITLE II—ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS Sec. 8201. Streamlining move procedures. Sec. 8202. Bureau of Intelligence and Research personnel. Sec. 8203. Streamlining Arctic Ambassador responsibilities. Sec. 8204. Adversary alignment. Sec. 8205. Strategy on Department plan to reopen diplomatic facilities - in Syria. - Sec. 8206. Amendment to reflect the Bureau of Medical Services. TITLE III—INFORMATION SECURITY AND CYBER DIPLOMACY Sec. 8301. Security review of science and technology agreement with the People's Republic of China. Sec. 8302. Internal report on smart cable analytics. Sec. 8303. Generative artificial intelligence enabled language translation. TITLE IV—PUBLIC DIPLOMACY Sec. 8401. Mega-decade sports diplomacy. Sec. 8402. Strengthening United States response to adversarial propaganda. TITLE V—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS Sec. 8501. Report on Consular Affairs officers joining United States missions to Pacific Island countries. Sec. 8502. Expedited appointment program for major events. Sec. 8503. Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 implementation report. Sec. 8504. Counterintelligence unit at all critical counterintelligence threat posts. Sec. 8505. Authorization of certain public libraries to collect and retain fees for the acceptance and execution of passport applications. Sec. 8506. Review of tour lengths for Foreign Service officers at critical Human Intelligence threat posts. Sec. 8507. Modernization of consular forms. Sec. 8508. Expansion of limited consular appointment authority. Sec. 8509. Report on indefinite suspensions for members of the Civil Service. Sec. 8510. Limitation on waiver of passport expiration date requirement for nationals of countries requiring United States citizens to possess passports that expire at least 6 - months after their departure. - Sec. 8511. Artificial intelligence use for online presence review. TITLE VI—MISCELLANEOUS Sec. 8601. Report on People's Republic of China global policing. Sec. 8602. Au pair regulation. Sec. 8603. Requirement for think tanks to disclose foreign funding. Sec. 8604. Marking and branding. Sec. 8605. Permitting for international bridges and land ports of entry. Sec. 8606. Arms Export Control Act increase for direct commercial contracts authority. Sec. 8607. Sunsetting the 180-day COVID obligation and expenditure reports. Sec. 8608. Clarification of notification, reporting, and consultation requirements. Sec. 8609. Congressional delegations. Sec. 8610. Modification of the special rule for countries downgraded from and reinstated to the tier 2 watch list in the Trafficking in Persons report. Sec. 8611. United States support to United Nations peacekeeping duplicative reporting. Sec. 8612. Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf privileges and immunities. Sec. 8613. Restrictions on stinger missile transfers to Bahrain. Sec. 8614. Alignment of Arms Export Control Act amendments with the Export Control Reform Act. Sec. 8615. Charge fees for and recover revenues from goods and services at United States Expo pavilions. Sec. 8616. Modernizing the not fully cooperating countries process. Sec. 8617. Change to the missile sanctions laws statutory references. Sec. 8618. Congressional notifications under the Arms Export Control Act. Sec. 8619. Report on critical language expertise. Sec. 8620. Use of artificial intelligence to meet congressional reporting requirements. Sec. 8621. Millenium Challenge Corporation compacts. Sec. 8622. Office of the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance. Sec. 8623. Strategy on maritime economic resilience. Sec. 8624. Modernization of international agreements related to - critical undersea infrastructure. - Sec. 8625. Embassy evacuation and notification planning. - Sec. 8626. Young African Leaders Initiative. - Sec. 8627. Extensions. TITLE VII—OTHER MATTERS Subtitle A—SHADOW Fleet Sanctions Act of 2026 Sec. 8700. Short titles. Chapter 1—Sanctions With Respect to the Russian Federation Sec. 8701. Definitions. subchapter a—sanctions with respect to russian shadow fleet PART I—Imposition of Sanctions Sec. 8702. Imposition of sanctions with respect to vessels suspected of participation in or support of the Russian shadow fleet. Sec. 8702A. Imposition of sanctions with respect to foreign persons that support Russian illicit shipping with vessels subject to United States sanctions. Sec. 8702B. Imposition of sanctions with respect to port terminals accepting oil from Russian shadow fleet vessels. PART II—Disclosures, Publications, and Reports Sec. 8703. Alignment of designation authorities with European Union and United Kingdom regarding Russian shadow fleet. Sec. 8703A. Support of efforts of the Joint Expeditionary Force. Sec. 8703B. Report on specific licenses granted under Executive Order 14024. PART III—Flag State Requirements and Strategy Sec. 8704. Minimum standards for operating as a flag state registry and assessment of efforts to prevent the circumvention of sanctions and other crimes. Sec. 8704A. Strategy for countries that do not make sufficient efforts to comply with minimum standards for operating as a flag state. PART IV—Other Matters Sec. 8705. International efforts to identify vessels transporting Russian-origin oil. subchapter b—sanctions with respect to russian-origin energy products Sec. 8706. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons with certain interests in Russian energy projects. Sec. 8706A. Strategy to counter role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions with respect to Russian-origin petroleum products. subchapter c—sanctions with respect to russian defense industrial base Sec. 8707. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons that sell, lease, or provide goods or services relating to the defense industrial base of the Russian Federation. subchapter d—modifications of protecting europe's energy security act of 2019 Sec. 8708. Modifications of Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019. subchapter e—general provisions - Sec. 8709. Sanctions described. - Sec. 8709A. Exceptions; waivers. - Sec. 8709B. Implementation. - Sec. 8709C. Termination of sanctions authorities. Chapter 2—Other Matters Sec. 8710. Determination with respect to Russian military actions in support of Russian shadow fleet. Sec. 8710A. Resources for sanctions implementation at the Department of State. Sec. 8710B. Modification of limitation on military cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation. Sec. 8710C. Emergency appropriations for the Countering Russian Influence Fund. Sec. 8710D. Report on presidential drawdown authority and Ukraine - Security Assistance Initiative. - Sec. 8710E. Support for Ukraine arms sales. Subtitle B—Deterring Aggression Against Taiwan - Sec. 8711. Short title. - Sec. 8712. Sense of Congress. - Sec. 8713. Definitions. - Sec. 8714. Task force. - Sec. 8715. Report. Subtitle C—PEACE in Sudan Sec. 8721. Short titles. Sec. 8722. Statement of policy. Sec. 8723. Definitions. Sec. 8724. Report on activities of certain foreign governments and groups in Sudan. Sec. 8725. Report on atrocities and gross violations of internationally-recognized human rights in Sudan. Sec. 8726. Strategy. Sec. 8727. Assessment of eligibility of armed actors in Sudan for designation as specially designated global terrorists. Sec. 8728. Sanctions. Sec. 8729. Special Envoy for Sudan. Sec. 8730. Assistance to the Government of Sudan by international financial institutions. Sec. 8731. Sudan Business Risk Advisory. Sec. 8732. United States engagement at the United Nations with respect to Sudan. Sec. 8733. Foreign assistance to Sudan. Sec. 8734. Annual report on financial assets held by armed actors in - Sudan. - Sec. 8735. Termination. - Sec. 8736. Rule of construction. - Sec. 8737. Sunset. Subtitle D—SCAM Act/Scam Compound Accountability and Mobilization Sec. 8741. Short title. Sec. 8742. Findings. Sec. 8743. Sense of Congress. Sec. 8744. Statement of policy. Sec. 8745. Definitions. Sec. 8746. Strategy to counter scam compounds and hold transnational criminal organizations and human traffickers accountable. Sec. 8747. Establishing a Task Force to implement the Strategy. Sec. 8748. Strengthening tools to dismantle scam compounds and hold transnational criminal organizations accountable. Sec. 8749. Redress to victims of international scam compound operations. Sec. 8750. Satellite imagery access to monitor human rights abuses related to scam compounds to discover the presence of - human trafficking. - Sec. 8751. Sunset. Subtitle E—Strategic Subsea Cables - Sec. 8761. Short title. - Sec. 8762. Definitions. Chapter 1—International Coordination and Engagement on Critical Undersea Infrastructure Sec. 8763. Findings. Sec. 8763A. Sense of Congress. Sec. 8763B. Enhancing United States Government engagement with relevant international bodies to safeguard United States interests. Sec. 8763C. Imposition of sanctions with respect to critical undersea infrastructure sabotage. Sec. 8763D. Report on activities by the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Sec. 8763E. Report on potential sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure. Sec. 8763F. Engaging foreign partners to strengthen the security of critical undersea infrastructure. Chapter 2—Department of State Critical Undersea Infrastructure Expertise Sec. 8764. Expanding critical undersea infrastructure-related expertise at the Department of State. Chapter 3—Subsea Communications Infrastructure Coordination, Construction, and Repair Sec. 8765. Improving United States Government coordination of subsea communications infrastructure. Sec. 8765A. Strengthening information sharing between United States Government and private sector actors on subsea communications infrastructure. Subtitle F—Tech PATH/U.S. Technology Procurement and Access to Trusted Hardware Sec. 8771. Short titles. Sec. 8772. Definitions. Sec. 8773. Sense of Congress. Sec. 8774. United States Technology Procurement Program. Sec. 8775. Office of United States Technology Procurement. Sec. 8776. Expanding necessary technology and related expertise at United States overseas missions. Sec. 8777. Extending authorization of appropriations for the Regional Technology Officer Program. Sec. 8778. Preserving market-based competition for cyber and digital technologies. Sec. 8779. Government Accountability Office report. Sec. 8780. Foreign Service officer technology career track feasibility - study and report. - Sec. 8780A. Derivation of funds. Subtitle G—Countering China's Control of the Caucasus Act - Sec. 8791. Short title. - Sec. 8792. Reports and briefings. Subtitle H—Saving Lives and Taxpayer Dollars Act Sec. 8793. Annual report. Subtitle I—Reporting on Syria Sec. 8794. Report on the impact of United States assistance. Sec. 8794A. Strategy on ISIS-related detainee and displacement camps in Syria. Sec. 8794B. Strategy for engagement with Syrian authorities and for - evaluating security at the United States mission. - Sec. 8794C. Strategy to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS in Syria. Subtitle J—Additional Authorities - Sec. 8795. Repeals of Syria sanctions statutes. - Sec. 8796. Establishment of Ukraine Lessons Learned Task Force. - Sec. 8797. Poland defense industrial cooperation program. SEC. 8002. DEFINITIONS. In this division: \(1\) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means— \(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and \(B\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. \(2\) Department.—The term “Department” means the Department of State. \(3\) Secretary.—The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of State. TITLE I—WORKFORCE MATTERS SEC. 8101. MID-CAREER TRAINING FLOAT. \(a\) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a strategy to establish and maintain a “training float” by January 1, 2027, to authorize between 8 and 10 percent of the members of the Civil Service and the Foreign Service to participate in long-term training at any time. \(b\) Elements.—The strategy developed pursuant to subsection \(a\) shall include— \(1\) a proposal to ensure personnel in the training float remain dedicated to training or professional development activities; \(2\) recommendations to maintain, and an assessment of the feasibility of maintaining, a minimum of 8 percent of personnel in the float at all times; and \(3\) any additional resources and authorities needed to maintain the training float described in this section. \(c\) Monitoring.—Beginning not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall ensure personnel in any training float established pursuant to this section remain dedicated to training or professional development activities. SEC. 8102. REBIDDING FOR PERSONNEL AT CLOSED POSTS. \(a\) Defined Term.—In this section and in section 8103, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means— \(1\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; \(2\) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; \(3\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and \(4\) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. \(b\) In General.—If the Department closes, consolidates, or downsizes any element of the Department of State, including any bureau, office, or diplomatic or consular post, any Foreign Service officers employed by such element shall be allowed to rebid for comparable positions within the Foreign Service. \(c\) Notification.—Not later than 30 days after the closure, consolidation, or downsizing of any element of the Department of State, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the personnel impact of such action, including— \(1\) the number of personnel at the affected post, disaggregated Foreign Service officers, eligible family members, and local embassy staff; \(2\) the number of Foreign Service officers who chose to rebid for new positions and the posts at which such Foreign Service officers are currently stationed; and \(3\) the status of all other affected personnel. SEC. 8103. REPORT ON PACIFIC ISLANDS EMBASSY STAFFING INCENTIVES. \(a\) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources shall— \(1\) submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes plans for addressing staffing needs at United States embassies in Pacific Island countries; and \(2\) provide a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress that includes— \(A\) a discussion of the contents of the report submitted pursuant to paragraph \(1\); and \(B\) nonfinancial incentives offered to Foreign Service officers serving at United States embassies in Pacific Island countries, including mission-specific training. \(b\) Contents.—The report required under subsection \(a\)\(1\) shall include— \(1\) steps to implement the findings included in the Foreign Service officer allowances report required under section 5302 of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2021 \(division E of Public Law 117-81\) to provide incentives for Foreign Service officers to serve in Pacific Island countries, including— \(A\) hardship and danger pay; \(B\) the opportunity to provide one-grade stretches before stretch season and allow bidding on Pacific Island country posts on the early assignment cycle; \(C\) eligibility to receive student loan repayments; \(D\) incentive pay to extend tours at Pacific Island country posts; \(E\) additional recreation entitlements; \(F\) priority consideration for onward assignments; \(G\) opportunities to serve repeated tours in the same region to develop expertise while aiding career advancement; and \(H\) consideration of United States embassies in Pacific Island countries for Special Incentive Post designation eligibility; \(2\) the status of the virtual schooling pilot program undertaken by the Office of Overseas Schools and other programs designed to support the dependents and spouses of diplomats stationed at Pacific Island country posts; \(3\) current administrative requirements, including reporting requirements, required for embassies in Pacific Island countries and proposals for how to lower the administrative burden on small embassies; and \(4\) any additional measures and financial and nonfinancial incentives to encourage Foreign Service officers to seek assignments to, and remain at, hardship posts in countries where addressing growing and malign foreign government influence is especially critical to United States interests, especially at new posts in remote locations, such as the United States embassies in the Kingdom of Tonga, the Solomon Islands, and the Republic of Vanuatu. SEC. 8104. ENDURING FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY INCENTIVE PAY. \(a\) Enduring Foreign Language Proficiency Incentive Pay.— \(1\) In general.—Not later than January 1, 2027, the Secretary shall establish an additional pay structure for members of the Foreign Service designed to incentivize enduring foreign language proficiency. \(2\) Objective.—The objective of the additional incentive pay established pursuant to paragraph \(1\) is to promote the retention of language skills among members of the Foreign Service, even when the current posts they fill are not language designated or otherwise do not require regular use of the critical languages in question. \(3\) Elements.—The Secretary may consider the following elements when devising the new incentive pay structure: \(A\) Concurrent receipt.—A member of the Foreign Service who is already receiving another form of language incentive pay a certain language is not eligible to concurrently receive enduring language proficiency incentive pay under this section. \(B\) Certification.—Enduring proficiency in a designated critical language shall be subject to annual certification by the Secretary. \(C\) Multiple languages.—Individuals who continue to meet proficiency requirements in multiple languages may be eligible to receive enduring language incentive pay for each of such languages. \(D\) Language categories.—The Secretary may design the enduring incentive pay on a scale that provides a range of payments reflecting the difficulty of the language skills in question, encompassing world languages, difficult world languages, hard languages and super hard languages. \(b\) Reports.— \(1\) Initial report and briefing.—The Secretary shall provide an initial report and briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the structure and planned implementation for the new incentive pay structure authorized under this section. \(2\) Annual reports.—The Secretary shall submit an annual report to the appropriate congressional committees that— \(A\) describes the use of the new incentive pay structure authorized under this section by members of the Foreign Service; \(B\) identifies the number of recipients of the language proficiency incentive payment authorized under this section and the specific languages for which such incentive pay is being offered; and \(C\) contains any other information the Secretary considers relevant. SEC. 8105. SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER PSYCHIATRISTS. \(a\) Sense of Congress.—It is the Sense of Congress that— \(1\) regional medical officer psychiatrists play an integral role in ensuring the readiness of Department personnel stationed abroad; and \(2\) trained clinical social workers can be an asset to the Department by supporting the sparse number of regional medical officer psychiatrists stationed at United States diplomatic posts worldwide. \(b\) Hiring Quotas.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 4 years, the Secretary shall hire not fewer than 20 trained social workers to support the work of regional medical officer psychiatrists at United States diplomatic posts worldwide. \(c\) Annual Report.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 4 years, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that— \(1\) identifies the number of trained social workers hired by the Department during the previous calendar year; \(2\) identifies the total number of trained social workers employed by the Department as of the date on which such report is submitted; and \(3\) lists each United States diplomatic post at which trained social workers are currently stationed, including the number of trained social workers stationed at each post. SEC. 8106. WORKFORCE EXIT INTERVIEWS. Section 5402 of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2021 \(division E of Public Law 117-81; 22 U.S.C. 2736\) is amended— \(1\) in subsection \(b\), by striking “provide an opportunity for an exit interview to” and inserting “conduct exit interviews with”; and \(2\) by inserting at the end the following: “\(e\) Report.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027, and annually thereafter for the following 10 years, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that— “\(1\) describes the Department's process for conducting exit interviews with Foreign Service officers; “\(2\) identifies any changes the Department has made to the exit interview process during the previous calendar year; and “\(3\) describes any trends in the responses the Department has received from exit interviews conducted with Foreign Service officers during the previous calendar year.”. SEC. 8107. INTEGRATION OF MARINE SECURITY GUARD DETACHMENTS AT UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS. \(a\) Report.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that— \(1\) assesses the level of integration of Marine Security Guard Detachments into communities of personnel under Chief of Mission authority at United States diplomatic posts abroad; \(2\) describes the steps the Secretary and Chiefs of Mission are taking to better integrate Marine Security Guard Detachments into communities of personnel under Chief of Mission authority at United States diplomatic posts abroad; \(3\) describes the steps the Secretary and Chiefs of Mission are taking to support mental health and improve the quality of life of Marine Security Guard Detachments at United States diplomatic posts abroad; and \(4\) identifies any barriers the Secretary perceives as inhibiting— \(A\) greater integration of Marine Security Guard Detachments into communities of personnel under Chief of Mission authority at United States diplomatic posts abroad; and \(B\) improvements to the quality of life of Marine Security Guard Detachments at United States diplomatic posts abroad. SEC. 8108. ADDITIONS TO REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR DEATHS AT POST. Section 57 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 \(22 U.S.C. 2729\(a\)\(3\)\) is amended by adding at the end the following: “\(d\) Congressional Notification.—Not later than 30 days after any overseas death from nonnatural causes of any United States citizen under Chief of Mission authority or of any family member of a United States citizen under Chief of Mission authority, the Secretary shall submit written notification to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that includes— “\(1\) the date of such person's death; “\(2\) the location where such death occurred, including the municipality, state or province, and country; “\(3\) the cause of such death, including— “\(A\) information on the circumstances of such death; and “\(B\) if the death resulted from an act of terrorism or suicide, a statement disclosing such information; and “\(4\) such other information as the Secretary shall consider appropriate.”. SEC. 8109. POLICY ON NEGOTIATION OF BILATERAL WORK AGREEMENTS. \(a\) In General.—In each country in which the Department maintains a United States embassy or consulate, the Secretary shall seek to negotiate and establish a bilateral work agreement with the host government that covers eligible family members of United States direct hire personnel employed by the Department. \(b\) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes— \(1\) a list of every country in which there is an active bilateral work agreement negotiated between the Department and the host government; and \(2\) the status of the Department's efforts to negotiate bilateral work agreements in all other countries not include in the list described in paragraph \(1\), including— \(A\) the primary obstacle the Department faces in each country to securing such a bilateral work agreement; and \(B\) how the Department is working to overcome such obstacle. SEC. 8110. COVERAGE OF RETURN COSTS. The Department, to the maximum extent practicable, shall pay for costs incurred by members of the Foreign Service that directly result from duties required as part of their return to the United States at the time of their retirement from the Foreign Service. SEC. 8111. REQUIREMENT FOR UYGHUR LANGUAGE TRAINING. \(a\) Uyghur Language Training and Staffing.—The Secretary may take such steps as may be necessary to ensure— \(1\) Uyghur language training is available to Foreign Service officers; and \(2\) efforts are made to ensure that at least 1 Uyghur- speaking member of the Service \(as defined in section 103 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 \(22 U.S.C. 3903\)\) is assigned to— \(A\) at least 1 United States diplomatic or consular post in the People's Republic of China; and \(B\) at least 1 United States diplomatic post in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Turkey. \(b\) Report.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Foreign Service Institute shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that outlines all of the steps that have been taken to implement subsection \(a\). SEC. 8112. EXTENSION OF POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS ON SENATE-CONFIRMED OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. \(a\) Extension.—Section 1\(m\)\(7\) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 \(22 U.S.C. 2651a\(m\)\(7\)\) is amended by striking “5 years after the date of the enactment of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022” and inserting “5 years after the date of the enactment of the Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027”. \(b\) Report.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the implementation of the restrictions described in section 1\(m\) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 \(22 U.S.C. 2651a\(m\)\), including— \(1\) a description of the actions of the Department since the date of enactment of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 \(division I of Public Law 117-263\) to provide applicable officials with the notice of restrictions required under section 1\(m\)\(5\) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 \(22 U.S.C. 2651a\(m\)\(5\)\); \(2\) a description of any guidance provided to the applicable officials before they left government service; \(3\) a description of efforts by the Department to monitor and ensure compliance with the requirements under section 1\(m\) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 \(22 U.S.C. 2651a\(m\)\); and \(4\) a list of any known or discovered violations of the restrictions set forth in section 1\(m\) of such Act and any steps taken in response to such violations. \(c\) Countries of Concern.—Section 1\(m\)\(1\)\(A\) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 \(22 U.S.C. 2651a\(m\)\(1\)\(A\)\) is amended— \(1\) in clause \(iv\), by adding “and” at the end; \(2\) in clause \(v\), by striking “; and” and inserting a period; and \(3\) by striking clause \(vi\). SEC. 8113. REDUCING FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING RELATED DELAYS IN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSIGNMENTS. \(a\) In General.—The Secretary shall ensure— \(1\) Foreign Service officers with critical language skills are prioritized for posts that require hard and super hard language skills; and \(2\) such officers are not excluded from bidding due to language requirements for officers with lesser language skills. \(b\) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes— \(1\) any barriers that exist within the Foreign Service assignment process and foreign language training requirements within the Foreign Service that delay Foreign Service officers who do not require additional foreign language training from being selected for assignments that generally include a language training requirement; and \(2\) steps the Secretary is taking to eliminate delays in the timely deployment of Foreign Service officers who do not require additional foreign language training to their next assignment. SEC. 8114. ENSURING FULL STAFFING OF THE COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FUND. \(a\) Report Required.—Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that— \(1\) identifies the number of full-time staff dedicated to the Countering Russian Influence Fund Unit established under section 5160 of the Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 \(division E of Public Law 119-60; 22 U.S.C. 9543 note\), including a staffing plan for the upcoming calendar year; \(2\) describes the priorities identified for the unit, consistent with section 254 of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 \(title II of subtitle B of Public Law 115-44\); \(3\) describes the unit's efforts to counter Russian influence and hybrid activities, including sabotage, information operations, weaponized migration, strategic corruption, and other activities described in paragraph \(2\), in the Europe and Eurasia regions; \(4\) describes monitoring and evaluation tools and metrics to ensure that the unit's objectives are being met; and \(5\) includes a spending plan for the funds that have been appropriated to carry out the Countering Russian Influence Fund under section 7047\(d\) of the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 \(division F of Public Law 119-75\). \(b\) Form.—The report required under subsection \(a\) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. SEC. 8115. FACILITATING MOVES FOR DOMESTIC EMPLOYEES TELEWORKING OVERSEAS. The Secretary shall prescribe regulations authorizing the Department to pay the costs associated with moving domestic employees teleworking overseas who are spouses of Department employees, and their personal belongings, directly from the Department employee's overseas post to the Department employee's next overseas post. SEC. 8116. STRENGTHENING THE DEPARTMENT'S CAPACITY FOR ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION. \(a\) Definitions.—In this section: \(1\) Appropriate committees of congress.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means— \(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; \(B\) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; \(C\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and \(D\) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. \(2\) Critical and emerging technologies.—The term “critical and emerging technologies” means technologies selected by the Secretary, in consultation with other Federal agencies, from the critical and emerging technologies list published by the National Science and Technology Council at the Office of Science and Technology Policy. \(b\) In General.—The Secretary shall require the National Foreign Affairs Training Center to provide Foreign Service officers with a course covering Department cyber, digital, and critical and emerging technologies policies. \(c\) Annual Training Report.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually for the following 5 years, the Secretary shall submit a report to appropriate congressional committees describing the development of the course required under subsection \(b\), including— \(1\) a list of topics covered by the course; \(2\) the number of course attendees during the previous calendar year; \(3\) where such attendees were subsequently posted or assigned; and \(4\) any additional resources required to maintain the course. \(d\) Technology Pathway Report.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress assessing the feasibility and advisability of establishing a dedicated technology pathway for Foreign Service officers. \(e\) Report on Restrictive Economic Measures.— \(1\) In general.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter for the following 4 years, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing its tools for undertaking restrictive economic measures. \(2\) Elements.—Each report required under paragraph \(2\) shall— \(A\) list tools for which— \(i\) the Department serves as the lead agency; or \(ii\) for which the Department participates in an interagency process and can propose targets or measures, including sanctions, export controls, and investment review mechanisms; \(B\) describe the role of the Department in developing, considering, and implementing such measures, including— \(i\) the source of the authority; and \(ii\) the lead bureau and office for each authority; and \(C\) describe the Department's capacity to assess such measures consistent with United States foreign policy objectives. \(3\) Form of report.—Each report required under paragraph \(2\) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. TITLE II—ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS SEC. 8201. STREAMLINING MOVE PROCEDURES. \(a\) In General.—The Secretary shall ensure United States diplomatic posts receive support from Department headquarters when conducting a permanent move from one facility to another facility, including by establishing— \(1\) a Department move handbook containing best practices, lessons learned from previous post moves, and a repository of templates and resources that is updated not less frequently than every 5 years; and \(2\) a feedback loop between move coordinators and the Department headquarters to ensure lessons learned are recorded at the completion of every post move. \(b\) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees detailing steps the Department has taken to meet the requirements described in subsection \(a\). SEC. 8202. BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH PERSONNEL. \(a\) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that— \(1\) intelligence analysis is a vital part of national security; \(2\) excellent analysis results from years of study; and \(3\) the experience necessary to best support national security cannot be quickly learned. \(b\) In General.—A Foreign Service officer may not be assigned to or selected for any position in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for positions higher than GS-12 or FS-03 unless such officer has at least 2 years of relevant intelligence experience. SEC. 8203. STREAMLINING ARCTIC AMBASSADOR RESPONSIBILITIES. Section 5143 of the Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 \(division E of Public Law 119-60; 22 U.S.C. 2651a note\) is amended— \(1\) by striking subsection \(d\); \(2\) by redesignating subsections \(e\), \(f\), \(g\), \(h\), and \(i\) as subsections \(d\), \(e\), \(f\), \(g\) and \(h\), respectively; and \(3\) in subsection \(d\)\(3\), as redesignated, by inserting “, in coordination with the senior officials of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, and the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,” after “Affairs”. SEC. 8204. ADVERSARY ALIGNMENT. The Secretary shall convene an annual meeting of relevant Department officials covering Iran, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to discuss how these adversarial countries are— \(1\) cooperating; \(2\) coordinating on shared priorities; \(3\) providing military, economic, intelligence, and diplomatic support to the other countries; \(4\) facilitating sanctions evasion, transshipment of controlled goods, and illicit financial activity; and \(5\) sharing lessons-learned about ongoing conflicts in which they are involved. SEC. 8205. STRATEGY ON DEPARTMENT PLAN TO REOPEN DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES IN SYRIA. Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees that a strategy that— \(1\) indicates when the Department intends to reinstate a diplomatic presence in Syria; \(2\) includes an analysis of the timeline required for the Department to reopen its diplomatic facilities within Syria, including a cost estimate for reopening such facilities; \(3\) describes the necessary diplomatic security measures needed to maintain full-time diplomatic operations in Syria; and \(4\) includes recommendations for steps the Department could take to improve its ability to establish and maintain full- time diplomatic operations in Syria. SEC. 8206. AMENDMENT TO REFLECT THE BUREAU OF MEDICAL SERVICES. Section 1\(p\) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 \(22 U.S.C. 2651a\(p\)\) is amended— \(1\) in the subsection heading, by striking “Office of” and inserting “Bureau of”; and \(2\) in paragraph \(1\), by striking “Office of Medical Services,” and inserting “Bureau of Medical Services”. TITLE III—INFORMATION SECURITY AND CYBER DIPLOMACY SEC. 8301. SECURITY REVIEW OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. \(a\) Definitions.—In this section: \(1\) Appropriate committees of congress.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means— \(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; \(B\) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; \(C\) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; \(D\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; \(E\) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and \(F\) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. \(2\) Intelligence community.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 \(50 U.S.C. 3003\). \(3\) STA.—The term “STA” means the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in Science and Technology, signed at Washington January 31, 1979, its protocols, and any implementing agreements entered into pursuant to such Agreement on or before the date of the enactment of this Act. \(b\) Security Review.— \(1\) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in coordination with relevant Federal science agencies and the intelligence community, shall conduct a security review of the United States-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. \(2\) Elements.—The review required under paragraph \(1\) shall— \(A\) assess the potential risks of maintaining the STA, including the transfer under such agreement of technology or intellectual property capable of harming the national security interests of the United States or enabling the People's Republic of China Military Civil-Fusion strategy; \(B\) assess the Secretary's ability to monitor compliance of the People's Republic of China's commitments established under the STA; \(C\) evaluate the benefits of the STA agreement to the economy, military, industrial, and scientific base of the People's Republic of China and of the United States; and \(D\) evaluate the value of the information and data the United States Government receives under the STA related to the People's Republic of China that the United States otherwise would not have access to should it withdraw its participation in the STA. \(c\) Report.— \(1\) In general.—Not later than 30 days after completing the review of the STA required under subsection \(b\), the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress detailing the findings of the review. \(2\) Form.—The report required under paragraph \(1\) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. \(d\) Certification.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall certify to the appropriate committees of Congress whether it is in the national security interest of the United States to maintain its participation in the STA through its current duration. \(e\) Guidance.—Not later than 90 days after the Secretary certifies that it is no longer in the national security interest of the United States to maintain its participation in the STA, the Secretary, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, shall promulgate guidance on United States Federal science agency interactions with counterpart agencies in the People's Republic of China for the purposes of protecting United States technology, intellectual property, and research. SEC. 8302. INTERNAL REPORT ON SMART CABLE ANALYTICS. During the 2-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall compile and publish, within the Department, a semiannual report on SMART cable analytics that includes, for every cable transmitted from the Department headquarters in Washington, D.C.— \(1\) the date on which the cable was transmitted; \(2\) a brief title that reflects the topic of the cable; \(3\) the official, bureau, or office within the Department from which the cable originated; \(4\) the number of Department employees who received the cable; and \(5\) the number of Department employees who opened the cable. SEC. 8303. GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ENABLED LANGUAGE TRANSLATION. \(a\) Program for Language Translation Capabilities.—Section 1\(n\) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 \(22 U.S.C. 2651a\(n\)\) is amended— \(1\) by redesignating paragraph \(5\) as paragraph \(6\); and \(2\) by inserting after paragraph \(4\) the following: “\(5\) Program for language translation capabilities.— “\(A\) Establishment.—The Chief Information Officer, in coordination with the Chief Data and Artificial Intelligence Officer, shall establish a program for the utilization of multi-modal generative artificial intelligence language translation capabilities within the Department of State. “\(B\) Matters to be included.—The program required under subparagraph \(A\) shall— “\(i\) include an automated, human-in-the-loop review and verification process option and a machine-only process option, which allows users to choose which process to utilize in adherence with Department policies; “\(ii\) include real-time training and fine-tuning of translation models for use within different geographic regions and Department mission areas; “\(iii\) be available on unclassified and classified information technology networks; “\(iv\) be capable of generating original content in non- English languages; and “\(v\) be available at all United States and overseas missions of the Department. “\(C\) Department policies.—The Chief Information Officer shall ensure the deployment and use of artificial intelligence tools for language translation capabilities as part of this program adhere to Department policies, including the conditions whenever it is appropriate to use machine-only processes or automated human-in-the-loop review and verification processes. “\(D\) Definitions.—In this paragraph: “\(i\) Automated, human-in-the-loop review and verification process.—The term \`automated, human-in-the-loop review and verification process' means an automated process within an artificial intelligence language translation system that requires human linguists to review and verify translations performed by an artificial intelligence model for accuracy prior to returning translated materials to a user. “\(ii\) Machine-only process.—The term \`machine-only process' means an artificial intelligence language translation capability that delivers a translation to a user without review by a human linguist. “\(iii\) Multimodal.—The term \`multi-modal' means multiple modes or formats of content to be translated, including audio, text, video, and text contained within images.”. \(b\) Briefing; Report.—The Chief Information Officer of the Department shall— \(1\) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees regarding the status the program established under section 1\(n\)\(5\) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as amended by subsection \(a\); and \(2\) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding the implementation of artificial intelligence applications within the Department to improve Department efficiency and mission operations, including specific discussion of the program referred to in paragraph \(1\). TITLE IV—PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SEC. 8401. MEGA-DECADE SPORTS DIPLOMACY. \(a\) Definitions.—In this section, the terms “American decade of sports” and “mega-decade of sports” mean the major international sporting competitions hosted in the United States between 2024 and 2034, including— \(1\) the 2024 Copa America; \(2\) the 2025 Club World Cup; \(3\) the 2026 FIFA World Cup; \(4\) the 2028 Summer Olympics and Paralympics; \(5\) the 2031 Men's and 2033 Women's Rugby World Cup; and \(6\) the 2034 Winter Olympics and Paralympics. \(b\) Mega-decade Sports Diplomacy Strategy.— \(1\) Submission of initial strategy.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 5-year sports diplomacy strategy to strategically leverage the major sporting events being hosted in the United States to enhance United States soft power, diplomatic relationships, and global leadership. \(2\) Submission of subsequent strategy.—Not later than 5 years after the date on which the initial strategy is submitted pursuant to paragraph \(1\), the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a subsequent 5-year strategy that is similar to the strategy required under paragraph \(1\), but also includes evaluations of lessons learned from international sporting events held in the United States during the previous 5-year period. \(3\) Elements.—The strategies required under paragraphs \(1\) and \(2\) shall include— \(A\) a description of the Department's diplomatic objectives and metrics of success related to the mega-decade of sports; \(B\) a plan to partner with local host cities, diaspora communities, creatives, athletes, the sports industry, private sector entities, human rights organizations, and civil society stakeholders surrounding the competitions for the purpose of showcasing United States national strengths and forging new diplomatic connections; \(C\) a Department coordination plan for leveraging sporting events to advance various diplomatic lines of effort, including by— \(i\) integrating sports diplomacy into regional bureaus' bilateral engagements and efforts to pursue new areas of cooperation with foreign partners; \(ii\) integrating sports into public diplomacy to reach new foreign audiences that might not otherwise engage with United States embassies abroad; and \(iii\) leveraging sports diplomacy to advance commercial diplomacy; \(D\) a plan to ensure an expeditious and secure visa process for athletes and their families and support staff and eligible international visitors planning to travel to the United States to attend major international sporting events, including reducing visa appointment wait times; \(E\) a description of the financial and personnel support needed to implement the 5-year sports diplomacy strategy; and \(F\) any plans to deploy domestic public diplomacy resources, such as the Cultural Unit and Foreign Press Center established during the 1984 Summer Olympic Games, to enable foreign visitors to engage with American culture and values. \(4\) Public availability.—The strategies required under paragraphs \(1\) and \(2\) shall be made publicly available on an internet website of the Department not later than— \(A\) 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, with respect to the strategy required under paragraph \(1\); and \(B\) 5 years after the date described in subparagraph \(A\), with respect to the strategy required under paragraph \(2\). \(5\) Consultation.—The Secretary shall— \(A\) consult with the appropriate congressional committees regarding the elements of the strategies required under paragraphs \(1\) and \(2\) before submitting either strategy; and \(B\) provide information regarding the implementation of the most recently submitted strategy every 180 days during the period beginning on the date of such submission and ending on December 31, 2034. \(c\) Office of Sports Diplomacy.— \(1\) In general.—The Office of Sports Diplomacy \(referred to in this subsection as the “Office”\) is established in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department. \(2\) Functions.—The Office shall manage sports diplomacy exchange programs and implement the strategies required under subsections \(b\), including by coordinating with Department and interagency stakeholders— \(A\) to coordinate the implementation of the strategy across relevant bureaus, directorates, and offices of the Department; \(B\) to work with host cities and their social, political, and economic partners to identify new avenues for engagement with foreign entities; \(C\) to engage local diaspora communities to deepen people- to-people connections with foreign visitors and officials; \(D\) to partner with the United States sports industry, major sports leagues, and individual athletes to promote new international sports partnerships and sports diplomacy programs; \(E\) to collaborate with host cities' international trade and tourism offices to deepen economic and commercial ties with foreign nations; \(F\) to elevate United States arts, film, and music creators to promote cultural exchange and connection with foreign visitors; and \(G\) to coordinate with Department and interagency stakeholders to ensure efficient and expeditious processing of visas for eligible international visitors, broadcasters, athletes, and support staff interested in attending major international sporting events in the United States. \(3\) Sunset.—This subsection shall cease to have any force or effect beginning on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. \(d\) Annual Implementation Reports.—Not later than 1year after the submission of the strategy required under subsection \(b\)\(1\), and annually thereafter until December 31, 2034, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing the progress made toward achieving the objectives of this section. SEC. 8402. STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO ADVERSARIAL PROPAGANDA. Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a plan related to the Strategy transmitted to Congress on March 6, 2026, entitled “A Comprehensive Strategy to Counter Anti-U.S. Propaganda”, which shall— \(1\) identify the bureau leading Department efforts to counter foreign adversarial propaganda; \(2\) identify the number of full-time personnel, part-time personnel, and contractors, respectively, dedicated to countering foreign adversarial propaganda; \(3\) describe how the Department will ensure the use of commercial tools to detect and expose adversarial foreign social media accounts and troll campaigns prioritizes foreign accounts and campaigns aimed at sowing discord in the United States and in allied and partner countries originating in— \(A\) the People's Republic of China; \(B\) the Russian Federation; \(C\) the Islamic Republic of Iran; or \(D\) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; \(4\) assess the resources necessary to counter the Russian Federation's efforts to leverage the People's Republic of China's social media platforms; and \(5\) describe how the Department will accomplish the action described in paragraph \(4\) during the 1-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act. TITLE V—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS SEC. 8501. REPORT ON CONSULAR AFFAIRS OFFICERS JOINING UNITED STATES MISSIONS TO PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES. \(a\) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that— \(1\) Pacific Island countries, especially the Freely Associated States, are close United States partners located across highly strategic waters that are critical for United States national security; and \(2\) it is in the national security interests of the United States to maintain and strengthen relations with the governments and citizens of Pacific Island countries. \(b\) Defined Term.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means— \(1\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; \(2\) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; \(3\) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; \(4\) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; \(5\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; \(6\) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; \(7\) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and \(8\) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. \(c\) Report.— \(1\) In general.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in coordination with the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command, and the Chief of Naval Operations, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that analyzes the feasibility of attaching Department of State consular officers to Coast Guard and Navy missions in Pacific Island countries. \(2\) Elements.—The report required under paragraph \(1\) shall include— \(A\) an assessment of— \(i\) the current demand for consular services from citizens of Pacific Island countries; and \(ii\) the challenges such citizens face in obtaining consular services; \(B\) an assessment of the approximate value, including in time and resources saved, the initiative described in paragraph \(1\) could save citizens of Pacific Island countries that do not host United States embassies by having their United States consular decisions adjudicated or receiving other consular services; \(C\) an assessment of the cost that would be incurred by the Department, the United States Coast Guard, the United States Indo-Pacific Command, and the United States Navy from the implementation of such initiative, including potential alternative cost-effective options and recommendations for providing consular services to citizens of Pacific Island countries; \(D\) an assessment of the frequency and duration of Coast Guard and Navy deployments to Pacific Island countries, including— \(i\) deployment frequency measured against the desired number of visits; \(ii\) the amount of time typically spent in port for such visits; and \(iii\) disruptions to planned Coast Guard and Navy missions in order to visit locations needing consular assistance; and \(E\) an evaluation of the logistical issues to be addressed to implement the initiative described in paragraph \(1\), including— \(i\) an analysis of the spacing requirements to host Department personnel and equipment aboard the various types of Coast Guard and Navy vessels that make port calls to the Pacific Islands; \(ii\) an analysis of the information technology and connectivity requirements to conduct consular affairs activities in the Pacific Islands; \(iii\) the feasibility of printing visas aboard Coast Guard and Navy vessels; \(iv\) maintaining the physical security of consular officers and relevant adjudication equipment, during such missions; \(v\) the impacts to Coast Guard and Navy vessels' operations and security; and \(vi\) the estimated time consular officers would spend on board Coast Guard and Navy vessels between visits to Pacific Island countries. SEC. 8502. EXPEDITED APPOINTMENT PROGRAM FOR MAJOR EVENTS. \(a\) In General.—Chapter 8 of title II of the Immigration and Nationality Act \(8 U.S.C. 1321 et seq.\) is amended by adding at the end the following: “SEC. 280A. EXPEDITED APPOINTMENT PROGRAM FOR MAJOR EVENTS. “\(a\) Definitions.—In this section: “\(1\) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term \`appropriate congressional committees' means— “\(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; “\(B\) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; “\(C\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and “\(D\) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. “\(2\) Event organizer.—The term \`event organizer' means an entity responsible for administering ticketing or registration for a Major Event. “\(3\) Major event.—The term \`Major Event' means an event held in the United States that the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, has designated as meeting the criteria established under subsection \(b\), including criteria relating to— “\(A\) the expected number of foreign visitors; “\(B\) the national or international scope of the event; “\(C\) whether the event is ticketed or registration-based; and “\(D\) the ability of the event organizer— “\(i\) to verify attendees are ticketed or registered for the event; and “\(ii\) to submit verified attendee information in accordance with subsection \(f\) not later than 60 days before the first day of the event. “\(4\) Qualified event attendee.—The term \`Qualified Event Attendee' means an alien who— “\(A\) has purchased, obtained, or otherwise holds an official ticket or registration for a Major Event; “\(B\) has been verified by the event organizer as ticketed or registered; and “\(C\) is included on a verified attendee list submitted by the event organizer pursuant to subsection \(f\). “\(5\) Secretary.—The term \`Secretary' means the Secretary of State. “\(b\) Registry of Major Events.— “\(1\) Establishment.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall establish and maintain a registry of Major Events for purposes of this section. “\(2\) Criteria.—The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall— “\(A\) establish objective criteria for the designation of Major Events; and “\(B\) make such criteria publicly available. “\(3\) Application.—An event organizer may submit an application for designation of an event as a Major Event in such form, manner, and time as the Secretary may reasonably require. “\(4\) Public list.—The Secretary shall maintain a publicly available list of events designated as Major Events. “\(c\) Expedited Appointment Program.— “\(1\) Establishment.—The Secretary shall establish an expedited appointment program to provide Qualified Event Attendees priority access to scheduling visa interview appointments at consular posts abroad. “\(2\) Scheduling only.—The expedited appointment program established pursuant to paragraph \(1\)— “\(A\) shall only provide priority scheduling; and “\(B\) may not be construed— “\(i\) to waive any visa eligibility requirement; “\(ii\) to waive any documentary requirement; “\(iii\) to waive or reduce screening, vetting, or security procedures; “\(iv\) to guarantee visa issuance; or “\(v\) to limit the authority of a consular officer to refuse a visa. “\(d\) Event Visa Queue.— “\(1\) Separate queue.—The Secretary shall require consular posts to maintain, in addition to any other appointment queues, a separate appointment scheduling queue for Qualified Event Attendees. “\(2\) Priority scheduling.—The Secretary shall provide for priority scheduling for applicants in the appointment scheduling queue required under paragraph \(1\), subject to the safeguards described in subsection \(h\). “\(e\) Period of Eligibility.—The Secretary shall establish, for each Major Event, a period during which Qualified Event Attendees may access the expedited appointment program, which shall— “\(1\) begin on the date on which the Major Event is so designated pursuant to subsection \(b\); and “\(2\) end after the conclusion of the event, as determined by the Secretary. “\(f\) Event Organizer Obligations.— “\(1\) Verified attendee list.—As a condition of designation of an event as a Major Event, the event organizer shall submit to the Secretary, in a secure manner and on a schedule determined by the Secretary, a verified attendee list containing such information as the Secretary determines to be necessary to administer this section. “\(2\) Identity verification.—The event organizer shall verify the identity of each individual included on a verified attendee list. “\(3\) Fraud prevention.—The Secretary shall require event organizers to implement reasonable controls to prevent fraud, including controls to prevent eligibility based on resale or unofficial tickets or registrations. “\(4\) Noncompliance.—The Secretary may remove an event from the registry under subsection \(b\) or suspend the eligibility of such event under this section if the event organizer fails to comply with the requirements under this subsection. “\(5\) Privacy and security.—The Secretary shall establish appropriate privacy and data security protocols for information submitted under this subsection, consistent with applicable law. “\(g\) Staffing and Operational Measures.—The Secretary may take such measures as may be necessary to implement this section, including— “\(1\) the temporary assignment or deployment of consular personnel; and “\(2\) appointment scheduling capacity adjustments at consular posts experiencing event-driven demand. “\(h\) Safeguards.— “\(1\) No material degradation.—The Secretary shall implement this section in a manner that does not materially degrade appointment availability for other visa applicants. “\(2\) Nondiscrimination.—The expedited appointment program shall be administered in a consistent and nondiscriminatory manner. “\(3\) No additional applicant fee.—Except as provided in subsection \(i\), the Secretary may not impose an additional fee on an alien for participation in the expedited appointment program. “\(i\) Optional Event Facilitation Surcharge.— “\(1\) Authority.—The Secretary may establish a modest surcharge to support the administrative and operational costs of implementing this section. “\(2\) Use of funds.—Amounts collected under this subsection shall be available to the Secretary, subject to appropriation, for purposes of administering this section, including administering staffing surges and scheduling improvements. “\(j\) Reports.— “\(1\) Annual report.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the implementation of this section. “\(2\) Post-event report.—Not later than 180 days after the conclusion of each Major Event, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the implementation of this section with respect to such event.”. \(b\) Clerical Amendment.—The table of contents for the Immigration and Nationality Act \(8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.\) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 280 the following: “Sec. 280A. Expedited appointment program for major events.”. \(c\) No Private Right of Action.—Nothing in the amendments made by this section may be construed to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, entities, officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. \(d\) Effective Date.—This section, and the amendments made by this section, shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 8503. SECURE EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION AND COUNTERTERRORISM ACT OF 2022 IMPLEMENTATION REPORT. \(a\) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees detailing the steps the Department has taken to implement amendments made to the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 \(title VI of division A of H.R. 3427, as enacted into law by section 1000\(a\)\(7\) of Public Law 106-113 and contained in appendix G of that Act\) after the date of the enactment of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 \(title XCIII of Public Law 117- 263\). \(b\) Contents.—The report required under subsection \(a\) shall include— \(1\) an overview of the Department's approach to implementing the amendments made to the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 by the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022; \(2\) a description of the guidelines the Secretary has adopted to collect and utilize information from each diplomatic post at which the construction of a new embassy compound or new consulate compound could result in the closure or co-location of an American Space that is owned and operated by the United States Government \(commonly known as an “American Center”\), or any other public diplomacy facility under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999; \(3\) a list of every instance in which the Secretary utilized the authorities established by the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022, including an explanation of why such authorities were determined to be necessary in each instance; \(4\) an assessment of cost savings, disaggregated by year and efficiencies gained, by the Department as a result of the amendments to the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 made by the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022; and \(5\) an assessment of how, if at all, the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 could be further amended to ensure the Department's risk calculus is calibrated in a manner that best advances United States interests abroad, while simultaneously ensuring the safety and security of United States personnel and diplomatic posts. SEC. 8504. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNIT AT ALL CRITICAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THREAT POSTS. The Secretary shall require that each United States diplomatic post rated critical for counterintelligence threats to employ not fewer than 1 full-time Diplomatic Security agent at all times. SEC. 8505. AUTHORIZATION OF CERTAIN PUBLIC LIBRARIES TO COLLECT AND RETAIN FEES FOR THE ACCEPTANCE AND EXECUTION OF PASSPORT APPLICATIONS. \(a\) In General.—Subsection \(a\) of the Passport Act of June 4, 1920 \(22 U.S.C. 214\(a\)\), is amended by adding at the end the following: “\(4\) The Secretary of State may authorize a public library that is organized as a nongovernmental organization, a nonprofit, a charitable organization, or a trust and is in compliance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of State for the acceptance and execution of passport applications— “\(A\) to serve as a passport acceptance facility; and “\(B\) to collect and retain the execution fee for a passport accepted by such public library.”. \(b\) Authorization of Public Libraries That Previously Served as Passport Acceptance Facilities.— \(1\) In general.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall authorize any public library to serve as a passport acceptance facility and to collect and retain an execution fee for a passport accepted by such library, if, before the date of the enactment of this Act, such public library— \(A\) had served as a passport acceptance facility; and \(B\) was in compliance with the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of State for the acceptance and execution of passport applications. \(2\) Report.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes— \(A\) documentation of the Secretary's compliance with the requirements described in paragraph \(1\); or \(B\) if the Secretary is not in compliance with such requirements, an explanation for such noncompliance. \(c\) Conforming Amendment.—Subsection \(a\)\(1\) of the Passport Act of June 4, 1920 \(22 U.S.C. 214\(a\)\(1\)\), is amended— \(1\) by striking “State officials or the United States Postal Service” and inserting “a State, a local government, the United States Postal Service, or a public library that meets the requirements described in paragraph \(4\)”; and \(2\) by striking “by such officials or by that Service.” and inserting “by such State, local government, Postal Service, or public library.”. SEC. 8506. REVIEW OF TOUR LENGTHS FOR FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS AT CRITICAL HUMAN INTELLIGENCE THREAT POSTS. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that— \(1\) evaluates the length of Foreign Service postings at critical Human Intelligence threat posts identified in the Security Environment Threat List; \(2\) assesses the counterintelligence or safety risks of current tour of duty lengths; \(3\) determines whether changes at specific posts are necessary to mitigate counterintelligence safety risks referred to in paragraph \(2\); and \(4\) describes the changes the Department is making in accordance with the determination under paragraph \(3\) and the timeline for implementing such changes. SEC. 8507. MODERNIZATION OF CONSULAR FORMS. \(a\) In General.—The Secretary shall ensure that all consular forms managed by the Bureau of Consular Affairs are mobile responsive and have an electronic signature option. \(b\) Briefing and Certification.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall— \(1\) brief the appropriate congressional committees regarding the status of the modernization efforts described in subsection \(a\); and \(2\) submit written certification to the appropriate congressional committees that all consular forms managed by the Bureau of Consular Affairs are mobile responsive and have an electronic signature option. SEC. 8508. EXPANSION OF LIMITED CONSULAR APPOINTMENT AUTHORITY. Section 309 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 \(22 U.S.C. 3949\) is amended— \(1\) in subsection \(a\), by inserting “, or 8 years in duration for personnel performing consular services,” after “may not exceed 5 years in duration”; and \(2\) in subsection \(b\)\(6\)— \(A\) in subparagraph \(A\), by striking “or” at the end; \(B\) in subparagraph \(B\), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and \(C\) by adding at the end the following: “\(C\) a limited noncareer appointment for a period not to exceed 2 years, in the case of personnel performing consular services.”. SEC. 8509. REPORT ON INDEFINITE SUSPENSIONS FOR MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE. Section 610\(c\)\(5\) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 \(22 U.S.C. 4010\(c\)\(5\)\) is amended by inserting “and each member of the Civil Service whose security clearance remains suspended for more than one calendar year” after “one calendar year”. SEC. 8510. LIMITATION ON WAIVER OF PASSPORT EXPIRATION DATE REQUIREMENT FOR NATIONALS OF COUNTRIES REQUIRING UNITED STATES CITIZENS TO POSSESS PASSPORTS THAT EXPIRE AT LEAST 6 MONTHS AFTER THEIR DEPARTURE. \(a\) In General.—Section 212\(a\)\(7\)\(B\)\(ii\) of the Immigration and Nationality Act \(8 U.S.C. 1182\(a\)\(7\)\(B\)\(ii\)\) is amended to read as follows: “\(ii\) Reciprocity requirement.—Notwithstanding subsection \(d\)\(4\) and section 217, the passport expiration date requirement under clause \(i\) may only be waived with respect to a national of a foreign country to the extent such country similarly waives its passport expiration date requirement with respect to citizens of the United States.”. \(b\) Effective Date.—The amendment made by subsection \(a\) shall take effect on the date that is 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 8511. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE USE FOR ONLINE PRESENCE REVIEW. \(a\) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that— \(1\) the integration of artificial intelligence \(referred to in this section as “AI”\) into Consular Affairs work for visa adjudication requires measures to be taken to reduce the likelihood of negative results or discriminatory outcomes; and \(2\) as AI technologies are utilized for efficiency, human oversight remains critical and visa adjudication decisions must ultimately rest with consular officers. \(b\) Report on Implementation of AI for Online Presence Review.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing how the Department uses AI to review the online presence and other information of visa candidates. \(c\) Report Elements.—The report required under subsection \(b\) shall describe— \(1\) the Bureau of Diplomatic Technology's implementation plan; \(2\) the specific ways consular officers are using AI in the visa adjudication process; \(3\) how AI is being used to identify information and how such information is analyzed; and \(4\) safeguards that are in place to protect the privacy of visa candidates, particularly minors. TITLE VI—MISCELLANEOUS SEC. 8601. REPORT ON PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA GLOBAL POLICING. \(a\) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes— \(1\) significant developments in the People's Republic of China's international law enforcement engagements occurring during the 12-month period immediately preceding the submission of each such report; \(2\) United States Government assessments of the impact of those engagements on United States interests; and \(3\) United States Government and partner country efforts to address the growing influence of the People's Republic of China's international law enforcement activities. \(b\) Elements.—Each report required under subsection \(a\) shall include— \(1\) the implications for United States national security and interests of the People's Republic of China's commitments to sell or donate third countries with police training, resources, and funding; \(2\) the foreign policy implications for United States national security and interests of People's Republic of China-supported international law enforcement facilities, the adoption of People's Republic of China-origin surveillance technology or other digital tools by foreign law enforcement partners, and joint training; and \(3\) the implications for United States national security and interests of the People's Republic of China international police summits and major bilateral and multilateral engagements with foreign partners. \(c\) Form of Report.—Each report required under subsection \(a\) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. SEC. 8602. AU PAIR REGULATION. \(a\) Clarification of Exclusive Federal Regulatory Authority.— \(1\) In general.—A State or political subdivision of a State may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force or effect of law related to or that would impose additional or different terms or conditions upon the au pair program administered by the Department of State. \(2\) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this section may be construed to limit the application of State laws of general applicability, including criminal laws, that are unrelated to and do not alter or affect any area of Federal regulation applicable to the Department's au pair program. \(b\) Revised Proposed Rule.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall conduct an assessment and submit to the President a proposed rule that— \(1\) provides a uniform national modification that— \(A\) increases the stipend and the educational stipend provided by a host family to an au pair; \(B\) reflects the room, board, and other programmatic costs borne by a host family; and \(C\) sustains the same level of program participation by both au pairs and host families; \(2\) enhances flexibility in the au pair program to accommodate unique family scheduling needs, including military families, first responders, single parents, shift workers, and other host families with non-traditional work schedules; \(3\) ensures necessary safeguards are updated to protect the health and safety of au pairs, host families, and their children; and \(4\) promotes the immersion of an au pair into the family life of their host family, consistent with the cultural exchange purposes of the au pair program. SEC. 8603. REQUIREMENT FOR THINK TANKS TO DISCLOSE FOREIGN FUNDING. \(a\) Definitions.—In this section: \(1\) Covered organization.—The term “covered organization” means any United States think tank that received funding, including in the form of grants, from the Department in the previous calendar year. \(2\) Covered source of funding.—The term “covered source of funding” means a foreign governmental entity from the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or the Russian Federation. \(3\) Foreign governmental entity.—The term “foreign governmental entity” means— \(A\) any department, agency, or other entity of a foreign government at the national, regional, or local level; \(B\) any governing party or coalition of such a government, including subsidiary national, regional, or local level entities; \(C\) any entity majority-owned or majority-controlled by such a government; or \(D\) any company, economic project, cultural organization, exchange program, or nongovernmental organization that is more than 33 percent owned or controlled by such a government or advisors, consultants, or representatives of such a government. \(4\) Think tank.—The term “think tank” means a stand- alone institution, organization, corporation, or group that studies public policy issues with the primary objective of providing information, ideas, and recommendations to United States Government entities regarding the development and implementation of policy. \(b\) Rulemaking.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations requiring covered organizations to submit an annual disclosure to the Under Secretary of State for Management that describes— \(1\) any funding, cooperative research or staffing agreements, or joint projects— \(A\) received from or executed with a covered source of funding; and \(B\) the purpose or subject of which relates to a topic the covered organization engages on with the Department; and \(2\) any practices or processes undertaken by the covered organization to ensure that its research agenda or products are not influenced by covered sources of funding. \(c\) Report Required.—Not later than 120 days after the effective date of the regulations prescribed under subsection \(b\), the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes— \(1\) the status of implementing the regulations and any challenges or obstacles to such implementation; \(2\) the offices within the Department that are responsible for implementing the regulations; and \(3\) any recommendations to improve upon the regulations required under this section to overcome challenges to implementation. SEC. 8604. MARKING AND BRANDING. \(a\) In General.—Section 641 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2401\) is amended to read as follows: “SEC. 641. MARKING AND BRANDING. “The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies implementing covered United States international assistance programs and funds, and with due consideration for the safety and security of implementing partners and beneficiaries, shall establish and prescribe the use of uniform branding and marking requirements to appropriately identify all goods provided to foreign beneficiaries under this Act, which shall include the flag of the United States and the words \`from the American people'.”. \(b\) Audit.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Department, or any equivalent or successor Inspector General charged with overseeing covered United States international assistance programs and funds, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees containing the results of an audit of compliance with relevant branding and marking requirements by partners implementing such programs and funds, including any requirements prescribed pursuant to section 641 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by subsection \(a\). \(c\) Definitions.—In this section, the term “covered United States international assistance programs and funds” means United States international assistance authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to carry out— \(1\) chapters 1 and 10 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. and 22 U.S.C. 2293 et seq.\), relating to Development Assistance or Global Health Programs; \(2\) chapter 9 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2292 et seq.\), relating to International Disaster Assistance and Transition Initiatives; \(3\) chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.\) relating to Economic Support Funds; \(4\) the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.\) and paragraphs \(3\) and \(5\) of section 502\(b\) of the National Endowment for Democracy Act \(title V of Public Law 98-164; 22 U.S.C. 4411\) relating to the Democracy Fund; \(5\) chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.\), the FREEDOM Support Act \(Public Law 102-511; 22 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.\), and the Support for Eastern European Democracy \(SEED\) Act of 1989 \(Public Law 101-179; 22 U.S.C. 5401 et seq.\), relating to Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia; \(6\) subsections \(a\), \(b\), and \(c\) of section 2 of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 \(22 U.S.C. 2601\), relating to Migration and Refugee Assistance and Emergency Migration and Refugee Assistance; \(7\) the Food for Peace Act \(7 U.S.C. 1691 et seq.\); \(8\) section 509\(b\) of the Global Fragility Act of 2019 \(title V of division J of Public Law 116-94\), relating to the Complex Crisis Fund; \(9\) the Global Health Security and Diplomacy and International Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Act \(subtitle D of title LV of division E of Public Law 117- 263; 22 U.S.C. 2151b note\); \(10\) the United States African Development Foundation Act \(title V of Public Law 96-533; 22 U.S.C. 290h et seq.\); \(11\) the provisions of section 401\(b\) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 \(22 U.S.C. 290f\(b\)\) relating to the Inter-American Foundation; and \(12\) section 661 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2421\), relating to the United States Trade and Development Agency. SEC. 8605. PERMITTING FOR INTERNATIONAL BRIDGES AND LAND PORTS OF ENTRY. Section 6 of the International Bridge Act of 1972 \(33 U.S.C. 535d\) is amended— \(1\) in subsection \(a\)— \(A\) in paragraph \(1\)— \(i\) in the matter preceding subparagraph \(A\), by striking “December 31, 2024,” and inserting “December 31, 2035,”; and \(ii\) by striking subparagraphs \(A\), \(B\), and \(C\), and inserting the following: “\(A\) An international bridge between the United States and Mexico. “\(B\) An international bridge between the United States and Canada. “\(C\) A port of entry on the international land border between the United States and Mexico. “\(D\) A port of entry on the international land border between the United States and Canada.”; and \(B\) in paragraph \(2\)\(A\)\(ii\), by inserting “or land port of entry” after “international bridge”; \(2\) in subsection \(b\), by inserting “or land port of entry” after “international bridge”; \(3\) in subsection \(c\)\(2\), by inserting “or land port of entry” after “international bridge”; \(4\) in subsection \(f\), by inserting “or land port of entry” after “international bridge” each place it appears. SEC. 8606. ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT INCREASE FOR DIRECT COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AUTHORITY. Section 23\(h\) of the Arms Export Control Act \(22 U.S.C. 2763\(h\)\) is amended by striking “$100,000,000” and inserting “$300,000,000”. SEC. 8607. SUNSETTING THE 180-DAY COVID OBLIGATION AND EXPENDITURE REPORTS. Section 406\(b\) of the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020 \(Public Law 116-123\) is amended by striking “until all funds have been expended” and inserting “through Fiscal Year 2026”. SEC. 8608. CLARIFICATION OF NOTIFICATION, REPORTING, AND CONSULTATION REQUIREMENTS. Section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2394-1\) is amended by striking subsection \(c\) and inserting the following: “\(c\) The President shall notify, report to, and consult with the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives concerning any funds in the International Affairs Budget Function, the authorizations of appropriations for which are in their respective jurisdictions, to the same degree and with the same conditions as the President notifies, reports to, or consults with the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. The requirements under this subsection are in addition to, and not in lieu of, other notification, reporting, and consultation requirements. “\(d\) Clarification.—No other provision of law, including any notwithstanding authority, may be construed to authorize a waiver or alteration of a requirement to consult, report, notify, or brief Congress, unless such provision clearly authorizes a waiver or alteration of requirement to consult, report, notify, or brief Congress or specifies that it supersedes this section.”. SEC. 8609. CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS. Section 5172 of the Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 \(division E of Public Law 119-60; 22 U.S.C. 2680 note\) is amended— \(1\) by redesignating subsections \(c\) and \(d\) as subsections \(d\) and \(e\), respectively; and \(2\) by inserting after subsection \(b\) the following: “\(c\) Decisions Not to Support Travel.— “\(1\) In general.—Any decision not to support congressional travel shall rest exclusively with the Chief of Mission of the relevant country or the Secretary of State and may not be delegated to any other official. “\(2\) Justification.—Not later than 5 days after a decision not to support congressional travel, the deciding official shall provide the head of the congressional delegation with a specific written justification for such decision.”. SEC. 8610. MODIFICATION OF THE SPECIAL RULE FOR COUNTRIES DOWNGRADED FROM AND REINSTATED TO THE TIER 2 WATCH LIST IN THE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT. \(a\) Modification to Special Rule for Downgraded and Reinstated Countries.—Section 110\(b\)\(2\)\(F\) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 \(division A of Public Law 106-386; 22 U.S.C. 7107\(b\)\(2\)\(F\)\) is amended— \(1\) in the matter preceding clause \(i\), by striking “the special watch list” and all that follows through “the country—” and inserting “the Tier 2 watch list described in subparagraph \(A\) for more than 2 years immediately after the country consecutively—”; \(2\) in clause \(i\), in the matter preceding subclause \(I\), by striking “the special watch list described in subparagraph \(A\)\(iii\)” and inserting “the Tier 2 watch list described in subparagraph \(A\)”; and \(3\) in clause \(ii\), by inserting “in the year following such waiver under subparagraph \(D\)\(ii\)” before the period at the end. SEC. 8611. UNITED STATES SUPPORT TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING DUPLICATIVE REPORTING. Section 4\(d\)\(5\)\(B\) of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 \(22 U.S.C. 287b\(d\)\(5\)\(B\)\), is hereby repealed. SEC. 8612. COOPERATION COUNCIL FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. The International Organizations Immunities Act \(22 U.S.C. 288 et seq.\) is amended by adding at the end the following: “Sec. 20. Under such terms and conditions as the President shall determine, the President may extend the provisions of this Act to the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf in the same manner, to the same extent, and subject to the same conditions, as they may be extended to a public international organization in which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under the authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation for such participation.”. SEC. 8613. RESTRICTIONS ON STINGER MISSILE TRANSFERS TO BAHRAIN. Section 581\(b\) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990 \(Public Law 101-167\), is amended— \(1\) in the subsection heading, by striking “Replacement”; \(2\) in the matter preceding paragraph \(1\), by striking “in order to replace,” and all that follows through “or otherwise destroyed”; \(3\) in paragraph \(1\), by striking “Replacement”; and \(4\) in paragraph \(2\), by striking “replacement”. SEC. 8614. ALIGNMENT OF ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS WITH THE EXPORT CONTROL REFORM ACT. Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act \(22 U.S.C. 2778\) is amended by inserting after subsection \(c\) the following: “\(d\) The functions exercised under this Act shall not be subject to sections 551, 553 through 559, and 701 through 706 of title 5, United States Code.”. SEC. 8615. CHARGE FEES FOR AND RECOVER REVENUES FROM GOODS AND SERVICES AT UNITED STATES EXPO PAVILIONS. The Secretary is authorized to charge fees for, and recover revenues from, goods and services related to United States pavilions at international expositions, including for visitor services, retail shop services, and food and beverage services. SEC. 8616. MODERNIZING THE NOT FULLY COOPERATING COUNTRIES PROCESS. Section 40A\(a\) of the Arms Export Control Act \(22 U.S.C. 2781\(a\)\) is amended— \(1\) by striking “No defense article” and inserting the following: “\(1\) In general.—No defense article”; \(2\) in paragraph \(1\), as redesignated, by striking “, by May 15 of the calendar year in which that fiscal year begins,”; and \(3\) by adding at the end the following: “\(2\) Any additions or removals of foreign countries to the list of foreign countries determined as not cooperating with United States antiterrorism efforts pursuant to paragraph \(1\) shall be certified to Congress not later than May 15 of a fiscal year for implementation in the following fiscal year.”. SEC. 8617. CHANGE TO THE MISSILE SANCTIONS LAWS STATUTORY REFERENCES. \(a\) Violations by United States Persons.—Section 11B\(a\) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 \(50 U.S.C. 4612\(a\)\) is amended— \(1\) in paragraph \(1\)\(A\)\(i\), by striking “section 5 or 6 of this Act” and inserting “section 1753 of the Export Controls Act of 2018 \(50 U.S.C. 4813\)”; and \(2\) in paragraph \(2\), by striking “section 11 of this Act” and inserting “section 1754 of the Export Controls Act of 2018 \(50 U.S.C. 4819\)”. \(b\) Presumption That Item Is Designed for Use in a Missile.—Section 73\(f\) of the Arms Export Control Act \(22 U.S.C. 2797b\(f\)\) is amended by striking “for purposes of 4605\(j\)\(1\)\(A\) of title 50” and inserting “for purposes of section 1754 of the Export Controls Act of 2018 \(50 U.S.C. 4813\(c\)\(1\)\(A\)\)”. SEC. 8618. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATIONS UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT. \(a\) Dollar Amount Thresholds.—The Arms Export Control Act \(22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.\) is amended— \(1\) in sections 3\(d\)\(1\), 3\(d\)\(3\)\(A\), 36\(b\)\(1\), 36\(b\)\(5\)\(C\), 36\(c\)\(1\), and 63\(a\)\(1\), by striking “$14,000,000” each place it appears and inserting “$25,000,000 \(as adjusted pursuant to section 48\)”; \(2\) in sections 3\(d\)\(1\), 3\(d\)\(3\)\(A\), 36\(b\)\(1\), 36\(b\)\(5\)\(C\), 36\(c\)\(1\), 47\(6\), 63\(a\)\(1\), and 71\(d\), by striking “$50,000,000” each place it appears and inserting “$88,000,000 \(as adjusted pursuant to section 48\)”; \(3\) in sections 3\(d\)\(5\)\(A\), 36\(b\)\(6\)\(A\), 36\(c\)\(5\)\(A\), and 63\(a\)\(2\)\(A\), by striking “$25,000,000” each place it appears and inserting “$44,000,000 \(as adjusted pursuant to section 48\)”; \(4\) in sections 3\(d\)\(5\)\(B\), 36\(b\)\(6\)\(B\), 36\(c\)\(5\)\(B\), and 63\(a\)\(2\)\(B\), by striking “$100,000,000” each place it appears and inserting “$175,000,000 \(as adjusted pursuant to section 48\)”; \(5\) in section 25\(a\)\(1\)— \(A\) by striking “$7,000,000” and inserting “$12,000,000 \(as adjusted pursuant to section 48\)”; and \(B\) by striking “25,000,000” and inserting “44,000,000 \(as adjusted pursuant to section 48\)”; \(6\) in section 36\(a\)\(10\), by striking “$250,000” each place it appears and inserting “$440,000 \(as adjusted pursuant to section 48\)”; \(7\) in sections 36\(b\)\(1\), 36\(b\)\(5\)\(C\), and 47\(6\), by striking “$200,000,000” each place it appears and inserting “$350,000,000 \(as adjusted pursuant to section 48\)”; \(8\) in section 36\(b\)\(6\)\(C\), by striking “$300,000,000” and inserting “$526,000,000 \(as adjusted pursuant to section 48\)”; and \(9\) by adding after section 47 the following: “SEC. 48. ADJUSTMENTS FOR INFLATION. “\(a\) In General.—On the date that is 3 years after the date of the enactment of this section, and every 3 years thereafter, the amounts specified in subsection \(b\) shall be adjusted to reflect the percentage increase \(if any\) in inflation, as reflected by the increase in the average of the Consumer Price Index during the previous 3 years. “\(b\) Amounts Specified.—The amounts specified in this subsection are the dollar amounts in— “\(1\) paragraphs \(1\), \(3\)\(A\), \(5\)\(A\), and \(5\)\(B\) of section 3\(d\); “\(2\) section 25\(a\)\(1\); “\(3\) subsections \(a\)\(10\), \(b\)\(1\), \(b\)\(5\)\(C\), \(b\)\(6\)\(A\), \(b\)\(6\)\(B\), \(b\)\(6\)\(C\), \(c\)\(1\), \(c\)\(5\)\(A\), and \(c\)\(5\)\(B\) of section 36; “\(4\) section 47\(6\); “\(5\) paragraphs \(1\), \(2\)\(A\), and \(2\)\(B\) of section 63\(a\); and “\(6\) section 71\(d\). “\(c\) Defined Term.—In this section, the term \`Consumer Price Index' means the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor.”. \(b\) Information.— \(1\) Foreign military sales.—Section 36\(b\)\(1\) of the Arms Export Control Act \(22 U.S.C. 2776\(b\)\(1\)\) is amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph \(A\), by inserting, after “of such technology.”, the following: “Upon the initial introduction of a new system or capability for the recipient country, such numbered certification shall also contain, submitted by the President, detailed information on how the proposed sale contributes to the United States' foreign policy objectives regarding that country and region, as well as how those objectives are being implemented and measured by the United States Mission in that country and the Department of State's relevant regional and functional bureaus.”. \(2\) Direct commercial sales.—Section 36\(c\)\(1\) of such Act \(22 U.S.C. 2776\(c\)\(1\)\) is amended— \(A\) by striking “and \(C\) a description of the items to be exported” and inserting “\(C\) a description of the items to be exported, and \(D\) the timeline for delivery of the items to be exported”; and \(B\) by inserting, after “such offset agreement.”, the following: “Upon the initial introduction of a new system or capability for the recipient country, such numbered certification shall also contain, submitted by the President, detailed information on how the proposed export contributes to the United States' foreign policy objectives regarding that country and region, as well as how those objectives are being implemented and measured by the United States Mission in that country and the Department of State's relevant regional and functional bureaus.”. \(c\) Quarterly Briefings.—Section 36 of such Act \(22 U.S.C. 2776\) is amended by adding at the end the following: “\(j\) Quarterly Briefings.—Not less frequently than quarterly, the Secretary of State shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an unclassified briefing on the letters of offers to sell, and licenses to export, defense articles or defense services under this Act issued during the preceding quarter for which a certification was not required to be submitted to Congress under subsection \(b\) or \(c\).”. SEC. 8619. REPORT ON CRITICAL LANGUAGE EXPERTISE. \(a\) Sense of Congress.—It is the Sense of Congress that— \(1\) maintaining a robust cohort of Foreign Service officers proficient in critical languages is vital to United States national security; and \(2\) the Department should take efforts to address unnecessary delays in assigning Foreign Service officers who possess the requisite language proficiencies to critical United States missions. \(b\) In General.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on current expertise in critical languages at the Department. \(c\) Elements.—The report required under subsection \(a\) shall include the following elements: \(1\) The number of speakers with Interagency Language Roundtable proficiency of 2+/3 or above in the Foreign Service and the Civil Service. \(2\) A description of how the number of Department employees with proficiency in critical languages has changed over the most recent 5-year period. \(3\) A summary of the Department's workforce incentives to develop critical language training and expertise. \(4\) An assessment of whether the Department's current critical language capacity is sufficient to address the Department's global workforce needs, including with regards to strategic competition with the People's Republic of China. \(5\) A description of any obstacles to assigning Department of State employees who already possess the requisite foreign language proficiency to critical United States missions, including the People's Republic of China, in a timely manner. \(6\) A description of the critical language activities carried out by Foreign Service officers or Civil Service officers compared to activities carried out by contracted professional translators, including a justification for why contracted translators are utilized for particular activities. SEC. 8620. USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO MEET CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. \(a\) In General.—Every report the Department submits to the appropriate congressional committees shall contain— \(1\) a disclosure indicating whether artificial intelligence tools were used to produce any part of the content of the report transmitted; and \(2\) a certification that the report was reviewed and verified by a human user prior to submission. SEC. 8621. MILLENIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION COMPACTS. Section 609\(j\) of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 \(22 U.S.C. 7708\) is amended by adding the end the following new subsection: “\(m\) Other Matters.—Funds appropriated or otherwise made available for a Compact under this section may only be obligated if— “\(1\) such Compact obligates, or contains a commitment to obligate subject to the availability of appropriations and the mutual agreement of the parties to the Compact to proceed, the entire amount of the United States Government funding anticipated for the duration of the Compact; and “\(2\) the Chief Executive Officer consults with the appropriate congressional committees at the commencement of the implementation period of a Compact.”. SEC. 8622. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. \(a\) Purpose.—The purpose of this section is to provide for the independent and objective conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for foreign assistance. \(b\) Definitions.—In this section: \(1\) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means— \(A\) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; \(B\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; \(C\) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; \(D\) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; \(E\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and \(F\) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives. \(2\) Foreign assistance.—The term “foreign assistance” means amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for any fiscal year for— \(A\) programs currently or previously administered by the United States Agency for International Development and programs currently or previously administered by the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the United States African Development Foundation, or the Inter-American Foundation; \(B\) programs funded with appropriations, other than Department of Defense appropriations, for foreign assistance programs administered pursuant to part I, chapters 1, 3, 8, 9, and 10 and part II, chapter 4 of the Foreign Assistance Act \(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2292 et seq., 2293 et seq., 2346 et seq.\), sections 2\(a\) through \(c\) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 \(22 U.S.C. 2601\), the Food for Peace Act \(7 U.S.C. 1691 et seq.\), the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 \(22 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.\), the United States African Development Foundation Act \(title V of Public Law 96- 533; 22 U.S.C. 290h et seq.\), and the Food for Progress Act of 1985 \(7 U.S.C. 1736o\), or successor legislation; \(C\) any other non-military foreign assistance programs including global health, development assistance, international disaster assistance, food assistance and food security, and economic support; and \(D\) with regard to USAID, any other matter within the preview of the Office of the Inspector General for USAID upon the date of enactment of this Act. \(c\) Office of the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance.—The Office of the Inspector General for the United States Agency for International Development is hereby redesignated as the “Office of the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance”. The Office of the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance shall carry out activities in accordance with the purpose described in subsection \(a\). \(d\) Amendments to Inspector General Act of 1978.—Chapter 4 of title 5, United States Code is amended— \(1\) in section 401— \(A\) in paragraph \(1\), by striking “the Agency for International Development,”; and \(B\) in paragraph \(3\), by striking “the Administrator of the Agency for International Development,”; \(2\) in section 402\(a\), by adding at the end the following: “\(3\) Department of state.—In the establishment of the Department of State, there is established— “\(A\) an Office of Inspector General of the Department of State; and “\(B\) an Office of Inspector General for Foreign Assistance.”; \(3\) in section 406\(f\)\(3\), by striking “Agency for International Development,”; \(4\) in section 409— \(A\) in the section heading, by striking “Agency for International Development” and inserting “Inspector General for Foreign Assistance”; \(B\) by amending subsection \(a\) to read as follows: “\(a\) Definition, Duties and Responsibilities of Inspector General for Foreign Assistance.—The Inspector General for Foreign Assistance shall exercise all duties and responsibilities of an Inspector General of an establishment with respect to any agency, with the exception of the Department of Defense, on all matters relating to foreign assistance including global health, development assistance, international disaster assistance, food assistance and food security, and economic support, including jurisdiction for— “\(1\) all programs funded with appropriations, other than Department of Defense appropriations, for foreign assistance programs, other than Department of Defense programs, for foreign assistance programs administered pursuant to part I, chapters 1, 3, 8, 9, and 10 and part II, chapter 4 of the Foreign Assistance Act \(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2292 et seq., 2293 et seq., 2346 et seq.\), sections 2\(a\) through \(c\) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 \(22 U.S.C. 2601\), the Food for Peace Act \(7 U.S.C. 1691 et seq.\), the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 \(22 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.\), the United States African Development Foundation Act \(title V of Public Law 96-533; 22 U.S.C. 290h et seq.\), and the Food for Progress Act of 1985 \(7 U.S.C. 1736o\), or successor legislation; and “\(2\) programs currently or previously administered by the United States Agency for International Development, and programs currently or previously administered by the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the United States African Development Foundation, or the Inter-American Foundation.”; \(C\) by redesignating subsections \(b\), \(c\), and \(d\) as subsections \(d\), \(e\), and \(f\), respectively; \(D\) by inserting after subsection \(a\) the following: “\(b\) Coordination of Foreign Assistance Oversight.—The Inspector General for Foreign Assistance shall conduct audits, evaluations, inspections, and investigations by coordinating with the Offices of Inspectors General of the respective agencies responsible for— “\(1\) all foreign assistance programs, other than Department of Defense programs, administered pursuant to part I, chapters 1, 3, 8, 9, and 10 and part II, chapter 4 of the Foreign Assistance Act \(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2292 et seq., 2293 et seq., 2346 et seq.\), the Food for Peace Act \(7 U.S.C. 1691 et seq.\), sections 2\(a\) through \(c\) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 \(22 U.S.C. 2601\), the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 \(22 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.\), the United States African Development Foundation Act \(title V of Public Law 96-533; 22 U.S.C. 290h et seq.\), and the Food for Progress Act of 1985 \(7 U.S.C. 1736o\), or successor legislation; and “\(2\) programs currently or previously administered by the United States Agency for International Development, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the United States African Development Foundation, or the Inter-American Foundation. “\(c\) Assistance From Federal Agencies.— “\(1\) In general.—Upon request of the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance for information or assistance from any department, agency, or other entity of the Federal Government, with the exception of the Department of Defense, the head of such entity shall, to the extent practicable and not in contravention of any existing law, furnish such information or assistance to the Inspector General, or an authorized designee. “\(2\) Reporting of refused assistance.—Whenever information or assistance requested by the Inspector General is, in the judgment of the Inspector General, unreasonably refused or not provided, the Inspector General shall report the circumstances to the Secretary of State and the head of the entity concerned, as appropriate, and to the appropriate congressional committees \(as defined in section 1265\(b\) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026\)without delay.”; \(E\) in subsection \(d\), as redesignated, by striking “of the Agency for International Development” and inserting “for Foreign Assistance”; \(F\) in subsection \(e\), as redesignated, by striking “Administrator of the Agency for International Development” and inserting “Secretary of State”; and \(G\) in subsection \(f\), as redesignated, by striking “of the Agency for International Development” and inserting “for Foreign Assistance”; and \(5\) in section 419\(c\)\(3\), by striking “of the United States Agency for International Development” and inserting “for Foreign Assistance”. \(e\) Availability of Previously Appropriated Funds.—Amounts otherwise available to the Office of Inspector General for the United States Agency for International Development shall remain available for the Office of the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance. SEC. 8623. STRATEGY ON MARITIME ECONOMIC RESILIENCE. Not later than 120 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy on how United States economic assistance and international diplomatic engagement can better support maritime economies and exclusive economic zones. Such strategy shall include— \(1\) a study on the regulatory and commercial barriers that hinder maritime economies; \(2\) how the Department can improve interagency coordination to support the growth of maritime economies; \(3\) the role external influence and actors, including the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, and the Islamic Republic of Iran play in impacting maritime economies; \(4\) an analysis of regional efforts to strengthen maritime economies and the role the United States can play in supporting such cross-regional efforts; \(5\) an assessment of beneficial training and exchange programs that center on supporting coastal communities, fisheries, ocean finance, industry expansion, and coastal and marine tourism, offshore energy production and transportation; and \(6\) recommendations on— \(A\) feasible programming that links commercial diplomacy with maritime economic development and exclusive maritime economic zones; and \(B\) the role United States businesses can play in expanding and supporting partner countries emerging markets related to maritime economies. \(C\) improving cooperation with allies on the critical undersea infrastructure protection. SEC. 8624. MODERNIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELATED TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE. \(a\) Diplomatic Engagement Required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a reporting containing— \(1\) the findings of a review of international agreements relating to critical undersea infrastructure, including the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables of 1884 \(the “1884 Convention”\); and \(2\) a plan to modernize the agreements referred to in paragraph \(1\), if applicable, or pursue new or additional bilateral or multinational agreements related to standards of conduct with regard to the installation, operation, or protection of critical undersea infrastructure. \(b\) Consultation With Congress.—In conducting the review required under subsection \(a\)\(1\), the Secretary shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees. \(c\) Engagement With International Stakeholders.—In conducting the review required under subsection \(a\)\(1\), the Secretary shall seek to engage, as appropriate, other relevant international stakeholders to support negotiation of agreements described in subsection \(a\)\(2\). \(d\) Coordination With Industry.—The Secretary shall consult with private submarine cable owners and operators, as appropriate, in conducting the review required under subsection \(a\)\(1\). \(e\) Report.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing— \(1\) the status of diplomatic efforts undertaken pursuant to subsection \(a\); \(2\) the positions of other parties to the 1884 Convention and key non-party states with respect to modernization, including any diplomatic efforts to encourage additional countries to become signatories to the 1884 Convention, pending the review required under subsection \(a\)\(1\); and \(3\) any obstacles to concluding a successor agreements or protocols, and proposed measures to address those obstacles. \(f\) Form.—The report required under subsection \(a\) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. \(g\) Definitions.—In this section: \(1\) Critical undersea infrastructure.—The term “critical undersea infrastructure” refers to both submarine communications cables and subsea energy infrastructure. \(2\) Submarine communications cable.—The term “submarine communications cable” means a cable system that carries bidirectional data and voice telecommunications traffic consisting of one or more submarine cables laid beneath the water, and all associated components that support the operation of the submarine cable system end-to-end, including the segments up to the system's terrestrial terminations at one or more Submarine Line Terminal Equipment \(SLTEs\) as well as the transponders that convert optical signals to electrical signals and vice versa. \(3\) Subsea energy infrastructure.—The term “subsea energy infrastructure” means a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, including— \(A\) to transmit electricity, including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations; \(B\) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure; and \(C\) associated landing stations and facilities. SEC. 8625. EMBASSY EVACUATION AND NOTIFICATION PLANNING. \(a\) Methodology to Capture Lessons Learned From Prior Embassy Evacuations.—The Secretary shall develop a formal, systematic methodology to capture lessons learned from prior embassy evacuations. \(b\) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the methodology to capture lessons learned from prior embassy evacuations. SEC. 8626. YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE. \(a\) Short Titles.—This section may be cited as the “Young African Leaders Initiative Act of 2026” or the “YALI Act of 2026”. \(b\) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that— \(1\) the Young African Leaders Initiative, launched in 2010, is a signature effort to invest in the next generation of African leaders; \(2\) Africa is a continent of strategic importance and it is vital for the United States to support strong and enduring partnerships with the next generation of African leaders; \(3\) the United States Government should prioritize investments to build the capacity of emerging young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, including through efforts that— \(A\) enhance leadership skills; \(B\) encourage entrepreneurship; \(C\) strengthen public administration and the role of civil society; and \(D\) connect young African leaders continentally and globally across the private, civic, and public sectors; and \(4\) youth in Africa have a positive impact on efforts to foster economic growth, improve public sector transparency and governance, and counter extremism, and should be an area of focus for United States outreach on the African continent. \(c\) Young African Leaders Initiative.— \(1\) In general.—There is established the Young African Leaders Initiative \(referred to in this section as “YALI”\), which shall be carried out by the Secretary. \(2\) Purpose.—YALI shall seek to build the capacity of young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa in the areas of business, civic engagement, or public administration, including through efforts that— \(A\) support young African leaders by offering professional development, training, and networking opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership, innovation, civic engagement, elections, internationally recognized human rights, entrepreneurship, good governance, peace and security, and public administration; and \(B\) build relationships with African leaders to promote economic growth, strengthen ties between United States and African businesses, build resilience to predatory lending practices, and improve capacity in key economic areas such as tendering, bidding, and contract negotiations, budget management and oversight, anti-corruption, and establishment of clear policy and regulatory practices. \(3\) Fellowships.— \(A\) In general.—YALI shall support the participation in the United States in the Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders of fellows from Africa who— \(i\) are between 21 and 35 years of age; \(ii\) have demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, public service, and leadership; and \(iii\) have had a positive impact in their communities, organizations, or institutions. \(B\) Oversight.—The fellowships described in subparagraph \(A\) shall be overseen by the Secretary of State through the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. \(C\) Eligibility.—The Secretary of State shall establish and publish— \(i\) eligibility criteria for participation as a fellow under subparagraph \(A\); and \(ii\) criteria for determining which eligible applicants will be selected. \(4\) Reciprocal exchanges.—Subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, United States citizens may— \(A\) engage in reciprocal exchanges in connection with alumni of the fellowship described in paragraph \(3\); and \(B\) collaborate on projects with such fellowship alumni. \(5\) Activities.— \(A\) United states-based activities.—The Secretary, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall oversee all United States-based activities carried out under YALI, including— \(i\) the participation of Mandela Washington Fellows in a 6- week Leadership Institute at a United States educational institution in business, civic engagement, or public management, including academic sessions, site visits, professional networking opportunities, leadership training, community service, and organized cultural activities; and \(ii\) the participation by Mandela Washington fellows in an annual Mandela Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide such Fellows the opportunity to meet with United States leaders from the private, public, and nonprofit sectors. \(B\) Implementation.—The Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall carry out this subsection by seeking to partner with the private sector— \(i\) to pursue public-private partnerships; \(ii\) to leverage private sector expertise; \(iii\) to expand networking opportunities; and \(iv\) to identify funding and fellowship opportunities for YALI. \(6\) Implementation plan.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit a plan to the appropriate congressional committees for implementing YALI, including— \(A\) a description of clearly defined program goals, targets, and planned outcomes for each year and for the duration of implementation of the program; \(B\) a strategy to monitor and evaluate the program and progress made toward achieving such goals, targets, and planned outcomes; and \(C\) a strategy to ensure the program is promoting United States foreign policy goals in Africa, including ensuring that the program is clearly branded, paired with robust public diplomacy efforts, and incorporates participants from a variety of countries, including communities in Africa facing economic distress, civil conflict, persecution, and other challenges. \(7\) Report.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 4 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, and publish in a publicly accessible, internet-based form, a report that includes— \(A\) a description of the progress made toward achieving the goals, targets, and planned outcomes referred to in paragraph \(6\)\(A\), including an overview of the program implemented in the previous year and an estimated number of beneficiaries; \(B\) an assessment of how YALI is contributing to and promoting United States-Africa relations, particularly in areas of increased private sector investment, trade promotion, support to civil society, improved public administration, promoting peace and security, and fostering entrepreneurship and youth empowerment; and \(C\) recommendations for improvements or changes to YALI and the implementation plan, if any, that would improve their effectiveness during subsequent years of YALI's implementation. \(8\) Defined term.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means— \(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; \(B\) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; \(C\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and \(D\) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. \(d\) Sunset.—The requirements set forth in paragraphs \(6\) and \(7\) of subsections \(c\) shall cease to have any force or effect beginning on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 8627. EXTENSIONS. \(a\) Diplomatic Support and Security.—Section 9302\(l\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 is amended by striking “2 years” and inserting “5 years”. \(b\) Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance.— Section 5201\(c\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2021 is amended by striking “4 years” and inserting “8 years”. \(c\) Supporting Tandem Spouses in the Foreign Service.— Section 6227\(d\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2023 is amended by striking “two years” and inserting “four years”. \(d\) Security Review Committees.—Section 7812\(d\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2024 is amended to read as follows: “The authority provided under section 301\(a\)\(3\) of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 \(22 U.S.C. 4831\(a\)\(3\)\) shall apply to facilities in Ukraine through September 30, 2030.” \(e\) Passport Fees.—Section 9802\(a\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 is amended by striking “September 30, 2026” and inserting “September 30, 2036”. \(f\) Personal Services Contractors Reporting Requirement.— Section 6401\(d\)\(2\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2023 is amended by striking “two years” and inserting “5 years”. \(g\) Notification of Revocation of Clearances.—Section 6710\(d\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2023 is amended by striking “three years” and inserting “6 years”. \(h\) Personal Services Contractors Contracting Authority Limitation.—Section 6401\(d\)\(1\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 is amended by striking “fiscal years 2024, 2025, and 2026” and inserting “fiscal years 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, and 2029”. \(i\) Curtails, Removals From Post, and Waivers of Privileges and Immunities.—Section 9209\(d\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 is amended by striking “5 years” and inserting “10 years”. \(j\) Management Assessments at Diplomatic and Consular Posts.—Section 9212\(g\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 is amended by striking “5-year” and inserting “10-year”. \(k\) Periodic Inspector General Reviews of Chiefs of Mission.—Section 7203\(a\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2024 is amended by striking “3-year” and inserting “6-year”. \(l\) Report on Chiefs of Mission and Deputy Chiefs of Mission.—Section 6210 of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2023 is amended by striking “4 years” and inserting “8 years”. \(m\) Direction to Embassy Deal Teams.—Section 6503\(h\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2023 is amended by striking “5 years” and inserting “10 years”. \(n\) List of Certain Telecommunications Providers.—Section 5502\(a\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2021 \(P.L.117-81\) is amended by striking “5 years” and inserting “10 years”. \(o\) Bureau Chief Data Officer Program Reporting Requirement.—Section 6302\(d\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2023 is amended by striking “3 years” and inserting “6 years”. \(p\) Cybersecurity Recruitment and Retention Authorization of Appropriations.—Section 9506\(b\)\(4\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 is amended by striking “2027” and inserting “2031”. \(q\) Regional Technology Officer Program Authorization of Appropriations.—Section 9508\(d\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 is amended by striking “2027” and inserting “2031”. \(r\) Regional Technology Officer Program Annual Briefing Requirement.—Section 9508\(c\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 is amended by striking “5 years” and inserting “10 years”. \(s\) Vulnerability Disclosure Policy and Bug Bounty Program Report.—Section 9509\(b\)\(2\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 is amended by striking “5 years” and inserting “10 years”. \(t\) Cyberspace, Digital Connectivity, and Related Technologies Fund.—Section 594 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2349cc-3\) is amended by striking “5-year” and inserting “10-year”. \(u\) Policy Regarding International Financial Institution Assistance With Respect to Advanced Technologies.—Section 6105\(d\) of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2021 is amended by striking “7 years” and inserting “14 years”. TITLE VII—OTHER MATTERS Subtitle A—SHADOW Fleet Sanctions Act of 2026 SEC. 8700. SHORT TITLES. This subtitle may be cited as the “Sanctioning Harborers And Dodgers Of Western Sanctions Act of 2026” or the “SHADOW Fleet Act of 2026”. CHAPTER 1—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION SEC. 8701. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: \(1\) Adequate maritime insurance.— \(A\) In general.—The term “adequate maritime insurance” means— \(i\) verified documentation evidencing protection and indemnity insurance, cargo insurance, and hull and machinery insurance, with audited financial statements of the insurer; \(ii\) records demonstrating compliance with relevant statutes and regulations regarding the insured subject matter; and \(iii\) a commitment to provide, upon reasonable request, evidence needed by the insurer, reinsurer, or broker to satisfy themselves or any regulator of such compliance. \(B\) Exclusion.—The term “adequate maritime insurance” does not include insurance provided by an insurer that— \(i\) is organized under the laws of the Russian Federation; and \(ii\) continues to provide coverage to any vessel designated for the imposition of sanctions under the laws of the United States, the European Union, or the United Kingdom without a specific waiver of or exception to the application of such sanctions. \(2\) Admitted; alien; lawfully admitted for permanent residence.—The terms “admitted”, “alien”, and “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act \(8 U.S.C. 1101\). \(3\) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means— \(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and \(B\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives. \(4\) Beneficial owner.—The term “beneficial owner” means, with respect to a vessel, any individual who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise— \(A\) exercises substantial control over the vessel; or \(B\) owns not less than 25 percent of the vessel. \(5\) Foreign person.—The term “foreign person” means an individual or entity that is not a United States person. \(6\) Foreign vessel.—The term “foreign vessel” means a vessel that is not a vessel of the United States \(as defined in section 116 of title 46, United States Code\). \(7\) Knowingly.—The term “knowingly”, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result. \(8\) Petroleum product.—The term “petroleum product” means oil of any kind or in any form, crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation fuel, fuel oil, kerosene, any product obtained from refining or processing of crude oil, liquefied petroleum gases, natural gas liquids, petrochemical feedstocks, condensate, waste or refuse mixtures containing any of such oil products, and any other liquid hydrocarbon compounds. \(9\) Russian-origin petroleum product.—The term “Russian- origin petroleum product” means a petroleum product extracted, refined, processed, or otherwise produced in the Russian Federation. \(10\) Russian person.—The term “Russian person” means— \(A\) a citizen or national of the Russian Federation; or \(B\) an entity organized under the laws of the Russian Federation or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of the Russian Federation. \(11\) Russian shadow fleet.—The term “Russian shadow fleet” means any foreign vessel or vessels used or directed by or on behalf of the Russian Federation to transport Russian-origin petroleum products in circumvention of sanctions imposed with respect to the Russian Federation by the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, or other countries. \(12\) Sabotage activities.—The term “sabotage activities” means actions, or preparations for actions, taken with the intent to cause defective production, operation, or damage to critical undersea infrastructure, including energy pipelines, offshore energy facilities, or subsea power lines and telecommunications cables and associated landing stations and facilities. \(13\) United states person.—The term “United States person” means— \(A\) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; \(B\) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or \(C\) a person in the United States. Subchapter A—Sanctions With Respect to Russian Shadow Fleet PART I—IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS SEC. 8702. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO VESSELS SUSPECTED OF PARTICIPATION IN OR SUPPORT OF THE RUSSIAN SHADOW FLEET. \(a\) In General.—Beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may impose the sanctions described in section 8709 with respect to any Russian shadow fleet vessel that, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, transports Russian-origin petroleum products in circumvention of sanctions imposed with respect to the Russian Federation by the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, or other countries, including— \(1\) any Russian shadow fleet vessel the owner or operator of which knowingly— \(A\) exhibits or engages in unsafe or nonstandard maritime behavior in furtherance of the transportation of Russian- origin petroleum products that originated in the Russian Federation; or \(B\) lacks adequate maritime insurance for the transport of goods described in subparagraph \(A\); \(2\) any foreign person that the President determines knowingly— \(A\) owns, operates, or manages a vessel described in paragraph \(1\); \(B\) provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel after sanctions are imposed with respect to the vessel; \(C\) facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support a vessel described in paragraph \(1\); \(D\) provides services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, a vessel described in paragraph \(1\) for the purpose of evading sanctions; \(E\) provided services for the testing, inspection, or certification for a vessel described in paragraph \(1\) for the purpose of evading sanctions; \(F\) serves as a master of such a vessel; or \(G\) transfers to the Russian Federation any foreign vessel designed to transport Russian-origin petroleum products. \(b\) Vessels Subject to Sanctions by the United Kingdom or the European Union.—Beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may impose the sanctions described in section 8709 with respect to any vessel that, on or after such date of enactment, is— \(1\) subject to sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation imposed by the United Kingdom, the European Union, the Group of 7, or a member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance; or \(2\) owned or operated by a person subject to such sanctions. \(c\) Indicators of Unsafe or Nonstandard Maritime Behavior.—In determining under subsection \(a\)\(1\)\(A\) if a vessel is exhibiting or engaged in unsafe or nonstandard maritime behavior, the President may use as prima facie evidence that the vessel is exhibiting or engaged in such behavior if the vessel has exhibited 3 or more indicators of such behavior, including the following: \(1\) Has refused to take on a pilot in accordance with best practices of the International Maritime Organization. \(2\) Does not respond when hailed by appropriate maritime authority. \(3\) Turns off the Automatic Identification System of the vessel without explanation or report to the appropriate maritime authority within a reasonable period of time. \(4\) Engages in unsafe maritime maneuvers with another vessel. \(5\) Is uninsured or underinsured, including any vessel that is insured by an insurance company organized under the laws of the Russian Federation or the Islamic Republic of Iran. \(6\) Is single-hulled contrary to standards of the International Maritime Organization. \(7\) Has changed ownership or flag registry more than once in the previous year. \(8\) Has a history of deliberately losing power or turning off transmitters without a compelling security need. \(9\) Has not been properly maintained, based on credible evidence. \(10\) Has been involved in a recent maritime or environmental incident. \(11\) Is escorted by the military of the Russian Federation. \(12\) Has engaged in sabotage activities. \(d\) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes any sanctions imposed under this section, including a brief description of each foreign person and foreign vessel with respect to which sanctions are imposed and the justification for such sanctions. SEC. 8702A. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PERSONS THAT SUPPORT RUSSIAN ILLICIT SHIPPING WITH VESSELS SUBJECT TO UNITED STATES SANCTIONS. \(a\) In General.—Beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may impose the sanctions described in section 8709 with respect to a foreign person if the President determines that the foreign person, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, has engaged in a transaction described in subsection \(b\) with a Russian shadow fleet vessel that is subject to sanctions imposed by the United States. \(b\) Transactions Described.—A transaction described in this subsection is any of the following: \(1\) The conduct of any ship-to-ship transfer involving Russian-origin petroleum products with a Russian shadow fleet vessel. \(2\) The provision of significant goods or services in support of a Russian shadow fleet vessel with the knowledge that the vessel is subject to sanctions imposed by the United States, unless such goods or services are provided to respond to an emergency. \(3\) In the case of the owner or operator of a foreign port, allowing a Russian shadow fleet vessel to port or otherwise receive services at the foreign port, unless that vessel needs to port or receive services as a result of an emergency. \(4\) In the case of a foreign person that is the owner or operator of a refinery, knowingly engaging in a transaction to process, refine, or otherwise deal in any Russian Federation-origin petroleum products that were transported on a Russian shadow fleet vessel. SEC. 8702B. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PORT TERMINALS ACCEPTING OIL FROM RUSSIAN SHADOW FLEET VESSELS. Beginning on the date that is 15 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may impose the sanctions described in section 8709 with respect to any foreign person that owns or operates a port in the People's Republic of China or the Republic of India that accepts oil from foreign vessels with respect to which the United States has imposed sanctions. PART II—DISCLOSURES, PUBLICATIONS, AND REPORTS SEC. 8703. ALIGNMENT OF DESIGNATION AUTHORITIES WITH EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING RUSSIAN SHADOW FLEET. \(a\) Report.— \(1\) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary, through the head of the Office of Sanctions Coordination and in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a list of each foreign vessel subject to sanctions imposed by the European Union or the United Kingdom that is determined to operate as part of the Russian shadow fleet. \(2\) Justification.—For any vessel listed in a report under paragraph \(1\) that is not subject to sanctions imposed by the United States, the report shall include the justification provided by the European Union or the United Kingdom, as the case may be, for designation of the vessel \(if that justification is available to the public\) and a brief justification of the reason provided by the European Union or the United Kingdom. \(b\) Strategy.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, through the head of the Office of Sanctions Coordination and in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, shall produce a strategy for enhancing alignment of sanctions designation authorities of the United States regarding vessels supporting the Russian shadow fleet with those authorities of the European Union and the United Kingdom. SEC. 8703A. SUPPORT OF EFFORTS OF THE JOINT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. \(a\) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States supports the efforts of the Joint Expeditionary Force to track, monitor, deter, and if necessary, respond to operations and illicit activities of the Russian shadow fleet. \(b\) Statement of Policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States to use relevant maritime elements of the United States Government to support and amplify the authorized efforts of the Joint Expeditionary Force. SEC. 8703B. REPORT ON SPECIFIC LICENSES GRANTED UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 14024. \(a\) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report listing any specific license granted or in effect under Executive Order 14024 \(50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property with respect to specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation\). \(b\) Form.—Each report required under subsection \(a\) shall be submitted in classified form. PART III—FLAG STATE REQUIREMENTS AND STRATEGY SEC. 8704. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR OPERATING AS A FLAG STATE REGISTRY AND ASSESSMENT OF EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE CIRCUMVENTION OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER CRIMES. It is the policy of the United States that the government of a country is complying with the minimum standards required by the United States for maintaining an open flag registry if, on balance, the government— \(1\) has enacted and implemented laws and established government structures, policies, and practices that prohibit and generally deter the use of its flag registry as a mechanism to circumvent sanctions imposed by the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, or other Group of 7 countries, including prohibiting its flag to continue to fly on vessels that are subject to sanctions imposed by any such country or jurisdiction; \(2\) has enacted and implemented laws and established government structures, policies, and practices that prohibit and generally deter the use of its flag registry to avoid detection of illicit activities, including drug trafficking, illicit arms shipments, human trafficking, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing activities; \(3\) enforces the laws described in paragraphs \(1\) and \(2\) by punishing any person found, through a fair judicial process, to have violated those laws; \(4\) takes steps to ensure ships flying its flag comply with well-established industry standards and best practices relating to maritime activities, including adhering to resolutions and warnings promulgated by the International Maritime Organization, such as Resolution A.1192\(33\) \(December 6, 2023\) relating to urging member states and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by the “dark fleet” or “shadow fleet”; \(5\) responds to credible reports from other countries and private entities warning of vessels flying its flag engaging in maritime behavior that poses safety risks, such as not allowing pilot access or turning off Automatic Identification Systems without adequate justification; \(6\) takes steps to ensure vessels flying its flag adhere to measures that lawfully prohibit and regulate ship-to-ship transfers of oil or petroleum products subject to sanctions; \(7\) takes steps to ensure vessels flying its flag possess adequate and credible insurance to cover the costs of maritime accidents; \(8\) takes steps to ensure vessels are operating under transparent ownership structures, including by verifying the beneficial ownership and management of vessels; and \(9\) takes steps to ensure vessels do not avoid flag state or port state control inspections or avoid commercial screenings and inspections. SEC. 8704A. STRATEGY FOR COUNTRIES THAT DO NOT MAKE SUFFICIENT EFFORTS TO COMPLY WITH MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR OPERATING AS A FLAG STATE. Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 2030, the Secretary, in consultation with the heads of appropriate Federal agencies, shall— \(1\) conduct an assessment of countries that do not meet the minimum standards for operating as a flag state registry in compliance with United States policy, including the standards described in section 8704; and \(2\) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for identifying and engaging with those countries. PART IV—OTHER MATTERS SEC. 8705. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY VESSELS TRANSPORTING RUSSIAN-ORIGIN OIL. It shall be the policy of the United States— \(1\) to fully promote the recommendations made by Resolution A.1192\(33\) of the International Maritime Organization, adopted on December 6, 2023; \(2\) to use the voice and vote of the United States in international organizations and engage other relevant multilateral bodies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, to strongly encourage the governments of all countries to adopt those recommendations, including the recommendation that a port state, when the state becomes aware of a vessel intentionally taking measures to avoid detection, such as switching off its Automatic Identification System or long-range identification and tracking system transmissions or concealing its actual identity, should, following an initial investigation to verify that the vessel has not stopped transmitting signals for legitimate reasons— \(A\) subject the vessel to enhanced inspections as authorized through relevant mechanisms of the port state; and \(B\) notify the flag administration of the vessel, as appropriate; and \(3\) to encourage governments of all countries to deny access to ports and services for any vessel that, following an initial investigation, is found to have turned off its transponder or entered false information for the purpose of conducting a transfer of or transaction for crude oil of Russian Federation origin or refined petroleum products made from such oil. Subchapter B—Sanctions With Respect to Russian-origin Energy Products SEC. 8706. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WITH CERTAIN INTERESTS IN RUSSIAN ENERGY PROJECTS. \(a\) In General.—Beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may impose the sanctions described in section 8709 with respect to any foreign person the President determines is, on or after such date of enactment, a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of, or principal shareholder with a controlling or majority interest in, any of the following Russian energy projects: \(1\) The Yamal Liquified Natural Gas Project or a successor project. \(2\) The Arctic 1, 2, and 3 Liquified Natural Gas Projects or a successor project. \(3\) Any project in the Arctic region or the Russian Far East carried out after the date of the enactment of this Act. \(b\) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that— \(1\) countries that rely on Russian energy projects, including Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, TurkStream 1 and 2, and the Druzhba pipeline, should work to expeditiously end their dependence on such projects and diversify their sources of energy to exports from other countries, including the United States; and \(2\) the European Union should remain committed to firm deadlines set forth in the RePowerEU Roadmap for the phasing out of energy exported from the Russian Federation. SEC. 8706A. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ROLE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN EVASION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN-ORIGIN PETROLEUM PRODUCTS. \(a\) In General.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written strategy, and provide to those committees an accompanying briefing, on the role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Russian-origin petroleum products that includes an assessment of options— \(1\) to strengthen the enforcement of such sanctions; and \(2\) to expand sanctions designations targeting the involvement of the People's Republic of China in the production, transportation, storage, refining, and sale of Russian-origin petroleum products. \(b\) Elements.—The strategy required by subsection \(a\) shall include— \(1\) a description and assessment of the use of sanctions in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act to target individuals and entities of the People's Republic of China that are directly or indirectly associated with smuggling of Russian-origin petroleum products; \(2\) an assessment of— \(A\) Russian-owned entities operating in the People's Republic of China and involved in petroleum refining supply chains; \(B\) the People's Republic of China's role in Russian petroleum refining supply chains; \(C\) how the People's Republic of China leverages its role in Russian petroleum supply chains to achieve political objectives; and \(D\) what percent of the energy consumption of the People's Republic of China is linked to imported Russian-origin petroleum products; \(3\) a detailed plan for— \(A\) monitoring the maritime domain for sanctionable activity related to the transportation of Russian-origin petroleum products; \(B\) identifying the individuals, entities, and vessels engaging in sanctionable activity related to Russian-origin petroleum products, including— \(i\) vessels— \(I\) transporting petrochemicals of Russian Federation origin; \(II\) conducting ship-to-ship transfers of such petrochemicals; \(III\) with deactivated automatic identification systems; or \(IV\) that engage in “flag hopping” by frequently changing national registries; \(ii\) individuals or entities— \(I\) storing petrochemicals subject to sanctions; or \(II\) refining or otherwise processing such petrochemicals; and \(iii\) through the use of port entry and docking permission of vessels subject to sanctions; \(C\) deterring individuals and entities from violating sanctions by educating and engaging— \(i\) insurance providers; \(ii\) parent companies; and \(iii\) vessel operators; \(D\) collaborating with allies and partners of the United States engaged in the Northern Europe, including through standing or new maritime task forces, to build sanctions enforcement capacity through assistance and training to defense and law enforcement services; and \(E\) using public communications and global diplomatic engagements to highlight the role of smuggling of Russian- origin petroleum products in bolstering the Russian Federation's war efforts in Ukraine and support for other malign activity; and \(4\) an assessment of— \(A\) the total number of vessels transporting Russian-origin petroleum products; \(B\) the total number of vessels smuggling such products destined for the People's Republic of China; \(C\) interference by the People's Republic of China with attempts by the United States, the United Kingdom, or the European Union to investigate or enforce sanctions with respect to Russian-origin petroleum products; \(D\) the effectiveness of the use of sanctions with respect to insurers of entities that own or operate vessels involved in transporting Russian-origin petroleum products; \(E\) the personnel and resources needed to enforce sanctions with respect to Russian-origin petroleum products; and \(F\) the impact of smuggled Russian-origin petroleum products on global energy markets. \(c\) Form.—The strategy required by subsection \(a\) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified index. Subchapter C—Sanctions With Respect to Russian Defense Industrial Base SEC. 8707. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS THAT SELL, LEASE, OR PROVIDE GOODS OR SERVICES RELATING TO THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. \(a\) Report Required.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies, for the period covered by the report each foreign person that the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce, determines has knowingly— \(1\) sold, leased, provided, or facilitated selling, leasing, or providing goods or services relating to the defense industrial base of the Russian Federation, including— \(A\) computer numerical control \(CNC\) tools and associated machinery, software, and maintenance or upgrade services; \(B\) lubricant additives; \(C\) semiconductors and associated manufacturing equipment; \(D\) items on the Common High Priority Items List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce; \(E\) nitrocellulose, wood cellulose, and associated additives and components necessary for the production of propellant or energetics for munitions; \(F\) fiber optic cables with military applications and associated technologies needed to manufacture such cables; \(G\) advanced sensors; and \(H\) any additional items identified by the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, that are critical to the defense industrial base of the Russian Federation; or \(2\) facilitated deceptive or structured transactions to provide the goods and services described by paragraph \(1\). \(b\) Ineligibility for Visas, Admission, or Parole of Identified Persons and Corporate Officers.— \(1\) In general.— \(A\) Visas, admission, or parole.—An alien described in paragraph \(2\) shall be— \(i\) inadmissible to the United States; \(ii\) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and \(iii\) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act \(8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.\). \(B\) Current visas revoked.— \(i\) In general.—The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in paragraph \(2\) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued. \(ii\) Immediate effect.—A revocation under clause \(i\) shall— \(I\) take effect immediately; and \(II\) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien. \(2\) Aliens described.—An alien described in this paragraph is an alien who is— \(A\) identified in a report required by subsection \(a\); \(B\) a corporate officer of a foreign entity identified in that report; or \(C\) a principal shareholder with a controlling interest in a foreign entity described in subparagraph \(A\). \(c\) Blocking of Property of Identified Persons.—The President may exercise all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.\) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of any person identified in a report required by subsection \(a\) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. \(d\) Wind-down Period.—The President may not impose sanctions under this section with respect to a person identified in the first report submitted pursuant to subsection \(a\) if the President certifies in such report that the person has, not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, engaged in good faith efforts to wind down operations that would otherwise subject the person to the imposition of sanctions under this section. Subchapter D—Modifications of Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019 SEC. 8708. MODIFICATIONS OF PROTECTING EUROPE'S ENERGY SECURITY ACT OF 2019. Section 7503 of the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019 \(title LXXV of Public Law 116-92; 22 U.S.C. 9526 note\) is amended— \(1\) in subsection \(a\)\(1\)\(B\)\(v\), by striking “the Nord Stream 2 pipeline” and inserting “the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, or a successor to either such pipeline”; \(2\) in subsection \(e\)— \(A\) by striking paragraph \(4\); and \(B\) by redesignating paragraphs \(5\) and \(6\) as paragraphs \(4\) and \(5\), respectively; \(3\) by amending subsection \(f\) to read as follows: “\(f\) National Security Waiver.— “\(1\) In general.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if— “\(A\) the President— “\(i\) determines such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and “\(ii\) not later than 30 days before the waiver takes effect, submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the waiver and the reasons for the waiver; and “\(B\) a joint resolution prohibiting the waiver is not enacted into law during the 30-day period described in subparagraph \(A\)\(ii\). “\(2\) Consideration of joint resolutions.— “\(A\) In general.—A joint resolution described in paragraph \(1\)\(B\) introduced in either House of Congress shall be considered in accordance with the provisions of section 601\(b\) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 \(Public Law 94-329; 90 Stat. 765\), except that the resolution shall be subject to germane amendments. “\(B\) Consideration of veto messages.—If joint resolution described in paragraph \(1\)\(B\) is vetoed by the President, the time for debate in consideration of the veto message on the resolution shall— “\(i\) in the Senate, be limited to 20 hours; and “\(ii\) in the House of Representatives, be determined in accordance with the Rules of the House.”; and \(4\) in subsection \(h\)— \(A\) by striking paragraph \(2\); \(B\) by striking “terminate” and all that follows through “the date on which” and inserting “terminate on the date on which”; \(C\) by redesignating subparagraphs \(A\) and \(B\) as paragraphs \(1\) and \(2\), respectively, and by moving such paragraphs, as so redesignated, 2 ems to the left; and \(D\) in paragraph \(2\), as redesignated, by striking “; or” and inserting a period. Subchapter E—General Provisions SEC. 8709. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED. The sanctions described in this section that may be imposed with respect to a foreign person are the following: \(1\) Blocking of property.—The President may exercise all of the powers granted to the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \( 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.\) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. \(2\) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.— \(A\) Visas, admission, or parole.—A foreign person that is an alien is— \(i\) inadmissible to the United States; \(ii\) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and \(iii\) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act \( 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.\). \(B\) Current visas revoked.— \(i\) In general.—A foreign person that is an alien is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued. \(ii\) Immediate effect.—A revocation under clause \(i\) shall take effect immediately and automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's possession. SEC. 8709A. EXCEPTIONS; WAIVERS. \(a\) Exceptions.— \(1\) Exception relating to importation of goods.— \(A\) In general.—A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this chapter shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. \(B\) Good.—In this paragraph, the term “good” means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. \(2\) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters agreement and law enforcement activities.—Sanctions under this chapter shall not apply with respect to the admission of an alien to the United States if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary— \(A\) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or \(B\) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States. \(3\) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.— Sanctions under this chapter shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 \(50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.\) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States. \(4\) Humanitarian assistance.— \(A\) In general.—Sanctions under this chapter shall not apply to— \(i\) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, medical devices, humanitarian assistance, or for humanitarian purposes; or \(ii\) transactions that are necessary for or related to the activities described in clause \(i\). \(B\) Definitions.—In this paragraph: \(i\) Agricultural commodity.—The term “agricultural commodity” has the meaning given that term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 \(7 U.S.C. 5602\). \(ii\) Medical device.—The term “medical device” has the meaning given the term “device” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act \(21 U.S.C. 321\). \(iii\) Medicine.—The term “medicine” has the meaning given the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act \(21 U.S.C. 321\). \(5\) Exception for safety of vessels and crew and decommissioning or demolition of vessels.—Sanctions under this chapter shall not apply with respect to— \(A\) a person providing provisions to a vessel otherwise subject to sanctions under this chapter if the provisions are intended for— \(i\) the safety and care of the crew aboard the vessel; \(ii\) the protection of human life aboard the vessel; or \(iii\) the maintenance of the vessel to avoid any environmental or other significant damage; or \(B\) a person providing services to a vessel otherwise subject to sanctions under this chapter if— \(i\) the vessel fails to meet international maritime vessel safety standards; and \(ii\) the services are necessary to ensure the safe decommissioning or destruction of the vessel. \(6\) Annual report.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes each activity that would be sanctionable under this chapter if not covered by an exception under this subsection. \(b\) Waiver.— \(1\) In general.—The President may, on a case-by-case basis and for periods not to exceed 180 days each, waive the application of sanctions imposed with respect to a foreign vessel or a foreign person under this chapter if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, not later than 15 days after such waiver is to take effect, that the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States. \(2\) Certification.—The President shall not be required to impose sanctions under this chapter with respect to a foreign person who has engaged in activity subject to sanctions under this chapter if the President certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional committees that the foreign person— \(A\) is no longer engaging in such activities; or \(B\) has taken and is continuing to take significant, verifiable steps toward permanently terminating such activities. \(c\) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the availability of any existing authorities to issue waivers, exceptions, exemptions, licenses, or other authorization. SEC. 8709B. IMPLEMENTATION. \(a\) Implementation.—The President may exercise all authorities under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704\) for purposes of carrying out this chapter. \(b\) Penalties.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this chapter or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this chapter may be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections \(b\) and \(c\) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1705\) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection \(a\) of that section. SEC. 8709C. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS AUTHORITIES. The requirements and authorities to impose sanctions under subchapters A, B, and C, and any sanctions imposed under those subchapters, shall terminate on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. CHAPTER 2—OTHER MATTERS SEC. 8710. DETERMINATION WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN MILITARY ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF RUSSIAN SHADOW FLEET. \(a\) In General.—The President may determine, at such times as are required under subsection \(b\), whether— \(1\) the Government of the Russian Federation, including through any of its proxies, is engaged in or knowingly supporting an escalation of military measures in the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Sea, or the Straits of Denmark, including to deter members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from inspecting vessels transporting Russian-origin petroleum products or posing a threat to undersea infrastructure to ensure such vessels are adhering to accepted maritime standards; and \(2\) if the President makes a positive determination under paragraph \(1\), whether that escalation increases the risk of an incident at sea, including damage to undersea cable infrastructure. \(b\) Timing of Determinations.—The President may make the determination described in subsection \(a\)— \(1\) not later than 15 days after the date of the enactment of this Act; \(2\) after the first determination under paragraph \(1\), not less frequently than every 30 days \(or more frequently as warranted\) during the 1-year period beginning on such date of enactment; and \(3\) after the end of that 1-year period, not less frequently than every 90 days. \(c\) Report Required.—Upon making a determination under subsection \(a\), the President shall submit a report on the determination to— \(1\) the committees specified in subsection \(d\); \(2\) the majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate; and \(3\) the Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representatives. \(d\) Committees Specified.—The committees specified in this subsection are— \(1\) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and \(2\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. SEC. 8710A. RESOURCES FOR SANCTIONS IMPLEMENTATION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. \(a\) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that sanctions are a vital foreign policy and national security tool, and as such, it is critical that the Department of State and other agencies with responsibilities relating to sanctions across the executive branch— \(1\) are fully staffed, including through the prompt confirmation by the Senate of a qualified head of the Office of Sanctions Coordination of the Department of State; and \(2\) have the resources and infrastructure necessary for the successful development and implementation of sanctions. \(b\) Increasing Resources and Improving Modernization for Sanctions Implementation.—The head of the Office of Sanctions Coordination shall take steps to modernize the sanctions infrastructure and increase resources dedicated to implementing sanctions, including by— \(1\) ensuring the Department of State has necessary subscriptions and access to open-source databases for purposes of making determinations to support the designation of persons for the imposition of sanctions; \(2\) equipping bureaus involved in drafting and reviewing evidentiary packages to support such designations with sufficient technical resources to do so, including an adequate number of workstations that can be used to review classified information; and \(3\) increasing the number of personnel dedicated to making and reviewing such designations. \(c\) Report on Modernizations Efforts.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of the Office of Sanctions Coordination shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report describing steps the Department of State is taking to address challenges in the ability of the Department to support the designation of persons for the imposition of sanctions. \(d\) Authorizations of Appropriation.— \(1\) Office of sanctions coordination.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Office of Sanctions Coordination for each of fiscal years 2026 and 2027 $15,000,000 to carry out this section. \(2\) Office of foreign assets control.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury for each of fiscal years 2026 and 2027 $15,000,000 to carry out this section. SEC. 8710B. MODIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Section 1232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 \(Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2488\) is amended— \(1\) by striking subsections \(c\) and \(d\); and \(2\) by redesignating subsections \(e\) and \(f\) as subsections \(c\) and \(d\), respectively. SEC. 8710C. EMERGENCY APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FUND. \(a\) Emergency Appropriations.— \(1\) Authorization of appropriation.—There is authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, $200,000,000 to the Secretary for fiscal years 2026 and 2027 for the Countering Russian Influence Fund to provide additional support to Ukraine and allies of the United States in Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of aggression by the Russian Federation, including assistance combating Russian Federation information operations, sabotage activities, cyber threats, and security threats. \(2\) Emergency designation.— \(A\) In general.—The amounts provided under paragraph \(1\) are designated as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 4\(g\) of the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 \(2 U.S.C. 933\(g\)\). \(B\) Designation in the senate and the house of representatives.—This subsection is designated as an emergency requirement pursuant to subsections \(a\) and \(b\) of section 4001 of S. Con. Res. 14 \(117th Congress\), the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2022. \(b\) Report Required.— \(1\) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that contains a description of the activities carried out pursuant to this section. \(2\) Form.—The strategy required by paragraph \(1\) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary. \(c\) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means— \(1\) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and \(2\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. SEC. 8710D. REPORT ON PRESIDENTIAL DRAWDOWN AUTHORITY AND UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE INITIATIVE. \(a\) In General.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 30 days thereafter, the Secretary and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that includes— \(1\) the status of remaining amounts available for Ukraine under the Presidential drawdown authority provided in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 \(Public Law 117-128; 136 Stat. 1211\) and the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act \(Public Law 118-50; 138 Stat. 905\); \(2\) a description of all defense articles and services provided to Ukraine under Presidential drawdown authority, Foreign Military Financing, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative under section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 \(Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1068\); and \(3\) a description of the readiness requirements, valuations, and replenishment calculations used to determine the availability of inventory to transfer to Ukraine. \(b\) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means— \(1\) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and \(2\) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. SEC. 8710E. SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE ARMS SALES. For any letter of offer to sell or license to export defense articles or defense services to Ukraine that would require a numbered certification to Congress required by section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act \(22 U.S.C. 2776\), the President shall not offer such letter of offer or issue such license until 15 days have elapsed from the time such numbered certification is provided to Congress, notwithstanding the requirements of such section for 30 days, and any joint resolution of disapproval shall be eligible for a motion to discharge from the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 5 days after introduction. Subtitle B—Deterring Aggression Against Taiwan SEC. 8711. SHORT TITLE. This subtitle may be cited as the “ \`DETER PRC Aggression Against Taiwan Act' ”. SEC. 8712. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that the United States must be prepared to take immediate action to impose sanctions with respect to any military or non-military entities owned, controlled, or acting at the direction of the Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party that are supporting actions by the Government of the PRC or by the Chinese Communist Party— \(1\) to overthrow or dismantle the governing institutions in Taiwan; \(2\) to occupy any territory controlled or administered by Taiwan; \(3\) to violate the territorial integrity of Taiwan; or \(4\) to take significant action against Taiwan, including— \(A\) conducting a naval blockade of Taiwan; \(B\) seizing any outlying island of Taiwan; or \(C\) perpetrating a significant physical or cyber attack on Taiwan that erodes the ability of the governing institutions in Taiwan to operate or provide essential services to the citizens of Taiwan. SEC. 8713. DEFINITIONS. In this subtitle: \(1\) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means— \(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; \(B\) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; \(C\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and \(D\) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives. \(2\) PRC.—The term “PRC” means the People's Republic of China. \(3\) PRC sanctions task force; task force.—The terms “PRC Sanctions Task Force” and “Task Force” mean the task force established pursuant to section 8714. SEC. 8714. TASK FORCE. \(a\) Establishment.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Coordinator for Sanctions of the Department of State and the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish a task force to identify military or non- military entities that could be subject to sanctions or other economic actions imposed by the United States immediately following any action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an attempt to achieve, or has the significant effect of achieving, the physical or political control of Taiwan, including by taking any of the actions described in paragraphs \(1\) through \(4\) of section 8712. \(b\) Strategy.—Not later than 270 days after the establishment of the PRC Sanctions Task Force, the Task Force shall submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees for identifying proposed targets for sanctions or other economic actions referred to in subsection \(a\), which shall— \(1\) assess how existing sanctions programs could be used to impose sanctions with respect to entities identified by the Task Force; \(2\) develop or propose, as appropriate, new sanctions authorities that might be required to impose sanctions with respect to such entities; \(3\) analyze the potential economic consequences to the United States, and to allies and partners of the United States, of imposing various types of such sanctions with respect to such entities; \(4\) assess measures that could be taken to mitigate the consequences referred to in paragraph \(3\), including through the use of licenses, exemptions, carve-outs, and other approaches; \(5\) include coordination with allies and partners of the United States— \(A\) to leverage sanctions and other economic tools including actions targeting the PRC's financial and industrial sectors to deter or respond to aggression against Taiwan; \(B\) to identify and resolve potential impediments to coordinating sanctions-related efforts or other economic actions with respect to responding to or deterring aggression against Taiwan; and \(C\) to identify industries, sectors, or goods and services where the United States and allies and partners of the United States can take coordinated action through sanctions or other economic tools that will have a significant negative impact on the economy of the PRC; and \(D\) to coordinate actions with partners and allies to provide economic support to Taiwan and other countries being threatened by the PRC, including measures to counter economic coercion by the PRC; \(6\) assess the resource gaps and needs at the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury to most effectively use sanctions and other economic tools to respond to the threats posed by the PRC; \(7\) recommend how best to target sanctions and other economic tools against individuals, entities, and economic sectors in the PRC, which shall take into account— \(A\) the role of such targets in supporting policies and activities of the Government of the PRC, or of the Chinese Communist Party, that pose a threat to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States; \(B\) the negative economic implications of such sanctions and tools for the Government of the PRC, including its ability to achieve its objectives with respect to Taiwan; and \(C\) the potential impact of such sanctions and tools on the stability of the global financial system, including with respect to— \(i\) state-owned enterprises; \(ii\) officials of the Government of the PRC and of the Chinese Communist Party; \(iii\) financial institutions associated with the Government of the PRC; and \(iv\) companies in the PRC that are not formally designated by the Government of the PRC as state-owned enterprises; and \(8\) identify any foreign military or non-military entities that would likely be used to achieve the outcomes specified in section 8712, including entities in the shipping, logistics, energy \(including oil and gas\), maritime, aviation, ground transportation, and technology sectors. SEC. 8715. REPORT. Not later than 120 days after the submission of the strategy required under section 8714\(b\), and semiannually thereafter, the PRC Sanctions Task Force shall submit a classified report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes information regarding— \(1\) any entities identified pursuant to section 8714\(b\)\(8\); \(2\) any new authorities required to impose sanctions with respect to such entities; \(3\) potential economic impacts on the PRC, the United States, and allies and partners of the United States resulting from the imposition of sanctions with respect to such entities; \(4\) mitigation measures that could be employed to limit any deleterious economic impacts on the United States and allies and partners of the United States of such sanctions; \(5\) the status of coordination with allies and partners of the United States regarding sanctions and other economic tools identified under this subtitle; \(6\) resource gaps and recommendations to enable the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury to use sanctions to more effectively respond to the malign activities of the Government of the PRC; and \(7\) any additional resources that may be necessary to carry out the strategies and recommendations included in the report submitted pursuant to section 8714\(b\). Subtitle C—PEACE in Sudan SEC. 8721. SHORT TITLES. This subtitle may be cited as the “ \`Preventing External Aggression and Conflict Escalation in Sudan Act of 2026' ” or the “PEACE in Sudan Act”. SEC. 8722. STATEMENT OF POLICY. It is the policy of the United States— \(1\) to advance and protect the national security of the United States, including by identifying, disrupting, and dismantling the networks and actions of criminal and malign actors who foment and benefit from instability, conflict, humanitarian emergency, state failure, and ungoverned spaces; \(2\) to utilize all available diplomatic and economic tools to secure an end to the war in Sudan; \(3\) to counter— \(A\) malign foreign interference and external military support to parties to the conflict in Sudan; and \(B\) destabilizing regional and domestic actors who seek to benefit from the continued conflict in Sudan; \(4\) to promote efforts to bring about stability and security in Sudan, including by addressing the humanitarian suffering of the Sudanese people and others impacted across Africa; \(5\) to hold perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Sudan accountable for their crimes; \(6\) to advance and protect the internationally recognized human rights of all Sudanese people, regardless of ethnicity, religion, sex, or geographic area of origin; and \(7\) to support the aspirations of the people of Sudan for a political transition process that results in a civilian government that— \(A\) is democratic; \(B\) is accountable; \(C\) respects the internationally-recognized human rights of its citizens; and \(D\) is at peace with itself and its neighbors SEC. 8723. DEFINITIONS. In this subtitle: \(1\) Admission; admitted; alien.—The terms “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the meanings given such terms in section 101\(a\) of the Immigration and Nationality Act \(8 U.S.C. 1101\(a\)\). \(2\) Aid or abet.—The term “aid or abet” means to intentionally assist or encourage a person or persons to commit a crime. \(3\) Appropriate congressional committees.—Except as provided in section 8727, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means— \(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and \(B\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. \(4\) Atrocity.—The term “atrocity” means war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. \(5\) Foreign person.—The term “foreign person” means an individual or entity that is not a United States person. \(6\) Genocide.—The term “genocide” means an offense described in section 1091\(a\) of title 18, United States Code. \(7\) International financial institution.—The term “international financial institution” means— \(A\) the International Monetary Fund; \(B\) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; \(C\) the International Development Association; \(D\) the International Finance Corporation; \(E\) the Inter-American Development Bank Group; \(F\) the Asian Development Bank; \(G\) the Inter-American Investment Corporation; \(H\) the African Development Bank; \(I\) the African Development Fund; \(J\) the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; \(K\) the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency; and \(L\) any multilateral financial institution established after the date of the enactment of this Act that could provide financial assistance to the Government of Sudan. \(8\) Non-state armed group.—The term “non-state armed group” means any entity participating in, supporting, or contributing to the conflict or commission of atrocities that is not an organization of a foreign government, including militia, armed groups, mercenaries, private military contractors, and terrorist organizations. \(9\) Quad.—The term “Quad” means the diplomatic grouping of the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates that has been convening in an effort to mediate an end to the conflict in Sudan. \(10\) Quintet.—The term “Quintet” means the diplomatic grouping of the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the League of Arab States, the European Union, and the United Nations. \(11\) Torture.—The term “torture” has the meaning given such a term in section 2340\(1\) of title 18, United States Code. \(12\) United states person.—The term “United States person” means— \(A\) a United States citizen, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States, or any other individual subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and \(B\) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity. \(13\) War crime.—The term “war crime”— \(A\) has the meaning given such term in section 2441\(c\) of title 18, United States Code; and \(B\) includes sexual violence. SEC. 8724. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND GROUPS IN SUDAN. \(a\) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes— \(1\) a comprehensive analysis of the involvement of foreign governments by supporting, facilitating, or contributing to the conflict and commission of atrocities in Sudan, including— \(A\) providing arms and materiel to the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces; \(B\) the estimated number of affiliated combatants and support personnel in Sudan acting in support of the war effort, including those who are engaged in active fighting, training, and equipping; \(C\) engagement in, or support for, drone and aircraft strikes, and the training of combatants; \(D\) the provision of financial, in-kind, or material support to the Sudanese Armed Forces or the Rapid Support Forces, including intelligence services or information sharing \(E\) the source, frequency, and scope of violations of the United Nations arms embargo outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 \(2004\) and 1591 \(2005\); \(F\) instances of international travel by non-state armed groups from Sudan for purposes other than structured diplomatic negotiations; and \(G\) actions that violate existing United States defense cooperation agreements or designation as a major non-NATO ally of the United States \(as defined in section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2403\)\); \(2\) a comprehensive analysis of the involvement of non- state armed groups in supporting, facilitating, or contributing to the conflict in Sudan and the commission of atrocities in Sudan, which may include— \(A\) the Wagner Group; \(B\) the Sudan Revolutionary Front; \(C\) the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, including its al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade; \(D\) the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Minni Minnawi; \(E\) the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North-al Hilu; \(F\) the Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition; \(G\) the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Abdul Wahid al- Nur; \(H\) the Sudanese Liberation Army, led by Malik Agar; \(I\) the Sudan Liberation Movement - Transitional Council, led by El-Hadi Idris Yahya; \(J\) the Joint Security Forces, including the Justice and Equality Movement; \(K\) Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces, led by Al-Tahir Hajar; \(L\) the Central Reserve Forces; \(M\) the Sudanese Awakening Revolutionary Council, led by Musa Hilal; \(N\) the Sudan Shield Forces; \(O\) the Third Front \(Tamazuj\); \(P\) Army 70; \(Q\) the Tigray Defense Forces; \(R\) the Desert Wolves; \(S\) the Libyan Arab Armed Forces \(also known as the “Libyan National Army”\); and \(T\) the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development; \(3\) an analysis of private and commercial activity facilitating or benefitting from the war economy related to the conflict in Sudan, within or outside Sudan, which may include activity related to— \(A\) port operations; \(B\) aviation \(including airlines and airports\); \(C\) ground transportation services; \(D\) the mining, refining, processing, and trade of gold, gum arabic, and other natural resources; \(E\) private military companies; \(F\) banking and financial services; \(G\) cryptocurrency transactions; \(H\) technology; \(I\) military equipment; and \(J\) weapons manufacturing; and \(4\) an analysis of whether actions taken by a government of a foreign country referred to in paragraph \(1\)— \(A\) involves defense articles or defense services \(as such terms are defined in section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act \(22 U.S.C. 2794\) of United States origin; \(B\) violates the terms of applicable United States or end- user assurances, licenses, or agreements; and \(C\) violates the arms embargo designated by United Nation Security Council Resolutions 1556 \(2004\), 1591 \(2005\), and any successor Security Council Resolution for an arms embargo on all or part of Sudan. \(b\) Form.—The report required under subsection \(a\) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. \(c\) Briefing.—Not later than 15 days after the submission of the report required under subsection \(a\), the Secretary or the Secretary's designee, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees regarding the matters contained in such report. SEC. 8725. REPORT ON ATROCITIES AND GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY-RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUDAN. \(a\) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive report regarding the conduct of, support for, and perpetrators of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in Sudan since April 15, 2023. \(b\) Elements.—The report required under subsection \(a\) shall include a description of— \(1\) any atrocities and other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights committed by the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, non-state armed groups, other entities of the Government of Sudan, and other individuals, which may include— \(A\) the recruitment and use of child soldiers; \(B\) the use of starvation and sexual violence as weapons of war, including systematic rape, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual violence; \(C\) the denial of humanitarian access, including the obstruction of humanitarian assistance or the targeting of aid workers; \(D\) looting, occupation, or destruction of civilian infrastructure, including religious sites, health facilities, residential buildings, and schools; \(E\) violations in the conduct of hostilities, summary executions, the deliberate targeting of civilians, and arbitrary detention; \(F\) the systematic targeting of medical facilities and medical personnel, emergency response rooms, or other humanitarian initiatives; \(G\) the deliberate targeting of places of worship; and \(H\) ethnically motivated violence, including violence against minority non-Arab communities and indigenous ethnic groups of the Nuba Mountains; and \(2\) the sanctions imposed in accordance with the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 \(title III of Public Law 102-182; 22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.\) and the continued monitoring of the use of chemical weapons by the Government of Sudan. \(c\) Form.—The report required under subsection \(a\) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. SEC. 8726. STRATEGY. \(a\) In General.—The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop a comprehensive strategy to secure a ceasefire and durable political settlement in Sudan. In developing such strategy, the Secretary shall utilize all economic and diplomatic tools available to the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury, including the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and enhance diplomatic, financial, and legal measures to hold perpetrators of atrocities and other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights accountable. \(b\) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection \(a\) shall include a description of the Secretary's plans— \(1\) to help end the conflict in Sudan, which may include— \(A\)\(i\) determining the key actors who must be involved in diplomatic negotiations to end the war; \(ii\) supporting their sustained and credible participation in such negotiations; \(iii\) assessing the appropriate staffing needed within the Department of State's Office of Sudan Affairs, including locally employed staff and staff based in Ethiopia and Kenya, to engage on coordinated diplomatic efforts to end the war in Sudan; \(B\) establishing a timeline for using diplomatic engagement, intelligence diplomacy, security cooperation, and foreign assistance, as appropriate, to secure the support of allies and partners in finding diplomatic paths to end the conflict in Sudan; and \(C\) coordinating with the Quintet, the Quad, and other international partners— \(i\) to end the armed conflict in Sudan; \(ii\) to protect civilians in Sudan; \(iii\) to hold accountable perpetrators of atrocities and other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights; and \(iv\) to seek an enduring diplomatic resolution to the conflict; \(2\) to cripple the war economy and abettor network; \(3\) to collaborate with the Secretary of the Treasury to hold perpetrators of atrocities in Sudan accountable for their crimes; \(4\) to counter foreign influence and military support to the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, which exacerbates the conflict in Sudan; and \(5\) to promote stability and alleviate human suffering in Sudan, which may include— \(A\) securing guarantees for unrestricted humanitarian access to vulnerable populations and the implementation of protection measures, including measures to provide trauma- informed care and prevent human trafficking, sexual violence, and the recruitment of child soldiers; and \(B\) analyzing— \(i\) how to most effectively leverage diplomatic and assistance tools and incentivize strategic burden-sharing with international partners to improve the humanitarian conditions in Sudan; \(ii\) requirements for rebuilding essential infrastructure that has been destroyed in the conflict, including health systems, education, and civilian infrastructure, and the role to be played by the international community in such efforts; \(iii\) how to engage in diplomatic efforts to ensure support for humanitarian relief and recovery in Sudan from international donors, including foreign governments and multilateral organizations; and \(iv\) how the United States, and other partners can work to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian aid workers and journalists in Sudan; \(6\) to implement a comprehensive diplomatic approach toward engagement with the countries bordering Sudan, in addition to Kenya and Uganda, and regional institutions to address the issues detailed in paragraphs \(1\) through \(5\); and \(7\) to identify potential opportunities for United States economic engagement and investment in a post-conflict Sudan and the broader region that could support diplomatic efforts to end the conflict, which may include— \(A\) identifying opportunities for United States private sector investment in Sudan's recovery and reconstruction, including in sectors such as agriculture, energy, critical minerals, infrastructure, and financial services; \(B\) assessing mechanisms through which the United States Government, including through the United States International Development Finance Corporation and the United States Trade and Development Agency, may support United States private sector actors seeking to engage in Sudan and the broader region; \(C\) evaluating opportunities to deepen trade and investment ties with countries neighboring Sudan as part of a broader regional economic strategy that advances United States interests and promotes stability for the region; and \(D\) analyzing the manner in which United States economic engagement in Sudan and the region can support the durability of a credible peace agreement or cessation of hostilities, and advance an economic order that prioritizes transparency, accountability, and the long-term interests of the people of Sudan. \(c\) Submission.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy developed pursuant to subsection \(a\) in an unclassified form, which shall include the information described in subsection \(b\) and may include a classified annex. \(d\) Briefing.—Not later than 15 days after submitting the strategy required under subsection \(a\), and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary, or the Secretary's designee, shall brief the appropriate congressional committees regarding— \(1\) the status of the implementation of such strategy; and \(2\) any changes or updates based on evolving conditions in Sudan. SEC. 8727. ASSESSMENT OF ELIGIBILITY OF ARMED ACTORS IN SUDAN FOR DESIGNATION AS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED GLOBAL TERRORISTS. \(a\) Defined Term.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means— \(1\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and \(2\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. \(b\) In General.—The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall conduct an assessment to determine whether any armed actor in Sudan meets the criteria for designation as a specially designated global terrorist, consistent with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.\). \(c\) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a classified report containing— \(1\) the results of the assessment conducted pursuant to subsection \(b\); and \(2\) a description of action the Secretary has planned based on such results. SEC. 8728. SANCTIONS. \(a\) In General.—The President may impose the sanctions described in subsection \(b\) with respect to any foreign person the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act— \(1\) to be responsible for, complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in or facilitated— \(A\) actions that threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Sudan; \(B\) the supply, sale, or transfer of arms or any related materiel, or any assistance, advice, or training related to military activities to— \(i\) the Sudanese Armed Forces; \(ii\) the Rapid Support Forces; or \(iii\) non-State armed groups operating in Sudan; \(C\) the use or recruitment of child soldiers; \(D\) directing, leading, or enabling the presence of foreign military forces or non-state armed groups in Sudan that have engaged in actions that threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Sudan; \(E\) aiding or abetting Sudanese Armed Forces or Rapid Support Forces by— \(i\) providing financial or material support or a safe haven; or \(ii\) contributing to the concealment of their crimes; \(F\) actions that obstruct, undermine, delay, or have the purpose or effect of undermining a political process aimed at securing a ceasefire, peace, or political resolution to the conflict in Sudan; \(G\) the commission of atrocities or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights \(as defined in section 1262 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act \(subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 10101\); \(H\) the smuggling or trafficking of natural resources from or through Sudan, including gold and gum arabic; \(I\) actions that constitute a violation of the arms embargo under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 \(2004\) and 1591 \(2005\), including facilitating financial transactions in furtherance of such actions or facilitating any export, reexport, transshipment, or transfer in furtherance of such actions; \(J\) the targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the commission of acts of violence \(including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence\), abduction, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge or aid provided by domestic or international actors; \(K\) the obstruction of activities of, or attacks on, the United Nations, bilateral or multilateral diplomatic missions, or international humanitarian organizations, or their personnel; \(L\) the operation of private military companies that are contributing to violence against civilians in Sudan; \(M\) the obstruction of the delivery or distribution of, or access to, humanitarian assistance, including by force, intimidation, theft, coercion, or bureaucratic means; \(N\) significant efforts to impede investigations or prosecutions of alleged gross abuses of internationally recognized human rights in Sudan; or \(O\) actions or policies that obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede, or pose a significant risk of obstructing, undermining, delaying, or impeding, the formation or operation of a civilian government; \(2\)\(A\) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of— \(i\) any activity described in this section; \(ii\) any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section; or \(B\) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of \(directly or indirectly\) any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section; or \(3\) forms an entity for the purpose of evading sanctions that would otherwise be imposed pursuant to this section. \(b\) Sanctions; Exceptions.— \(1\) Sanctions.— \(A\) Asset blocking.—Notwithstanding section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1701\), the President may exercise all of the powers granted to the President by such Act to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person the President determines meets 1 or more of the criteria described in subsection \(a\) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. \(B\) Prohibitions on financial transactions.— Notwithstanding the requirements under section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1701\), the President may exercise all powers granted to the President by such Act to the extent necessary— \(i\) to prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credit to the foreign person; or \(ii\) to prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which the foreign person has any interest. \(C\) Aliens inadmissible for visas, admission, or parole.— \(i\) Visas, admission, or parole.—An alien is described in this clause if the Secretary or the Secretary of Homeland Security \(or a designee of either such Secretary\) knows, or has reason to believe the alien— \(I\) meets any of the criteria described in subsection \(a\); and \(II\)\(aa\) is inadmissible to the United States; \(bb\) is ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; or \(cc\) is otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act \(8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.\). \(ii\) Current visas revoked.— \(I\) In general.—The issuing consular officer, the Secretary, or a designee of the Secretary, in accordance with section 221\(i\) of the Immigration and Nationality Act \(8 U.S.C. 1201\(i\)\), shall revoke any visa or other entry documentation issued to an alien described in clause \(i\) regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation was issued. \(II\) Effect of revocation.—Each revocation under subclause \(I\) shall— \(aa\) take effect immediately; and \(bb\) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's possession. \(2\) Penalties.—Any person that commits, attempts to commit, conspires to commit, or causes the commission of an action described in subsection \(a\) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections \(b\) and \(c\) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1705\) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection \(a\) of such section. \(3\) Implementation.—The President— \(A\) may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704\) to carry out this section; and \(B\) shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as may be necessary to carry out this section. \(4\) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters agreement.—Sanctions described in paragraph \(1\)\(B\) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations. \(5\) Exception to comply with intelligence and law enforcement activities.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to— \(A\) the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 \(50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.\) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States; or \(B\) to carry out or assist any authorized law enforcement activities of the United States. \(6\) Exception for humanitarian assistance.— \(A\) Definitions.—In this paragraph: \(i\) Agricultural commodity.—The term “agricultural commodity” has the meaning given such term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 \(7 U.S.C. 5602\). \(ii\) Medical device.—The term “medical device” has the meaning given the term “device” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act \(21 U.S.C. 321\). \(iii\) Medicine.—The term “medicine” has the meaning given the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act \(21 U.S.C. 321\). \(B\) In general.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to— \(i\) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, medical devices, humanitarian assistance, or for humanitarian purposes; or \(ii\) transactions that are necessary for or related to any activity described in clause \(i\). \(7\) Exception relating to the importation of goods.— \(A\) Good.—In this paragraph, the term “good” means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. \(B\) In general.—A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. SEC. 8729. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR SUDAN. Section 7204\(d\) of the Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 \(division G of Public Law 118-159; 22 U.S.C. 10001 note\) is amended by striking “2 years” and inserting “5 years”. SEC. 8730. ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. \(a\) Restrictions.—Except as provided in subsections \(b\) and \(c\), the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director or the appropriate head of the respective international financial institutions— \(1\) to use the voice and vote of the United States in those institutions to oppose any premature, new, long-term reconstruction or capacity-building support for Sudan, including support that would benefit a foreign person or entity described in section 8728\(a\); and \(2\) to work with other key donor countries to develop a coordinated policy for lending to the Government of Sudan in a post-conflict scenario, including firm benchmarks and preconditions for lending. \(b\) National Security Waiver.—The President may waive application of subsection \(a\) if the President determines such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States. \(c\) Exception for Lifesaving Humanitarian Projects That Directly Support Basic Human Needs.—The advocacy otherwise required under subsection \(a\)\(1\) shall not apply to a specific loan or extension of financial assistance that has the sole purpose of supporting lifesaving humanitarian projects that directly support basic human needs, including emergency food, shelter, health, water, sanitation, and hygiene. SEC. 8731. SUDAN BUSINESS RISK ADVISORY. Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall update its Sudan Business Risk Advisory, which was originally issued in May 2022 and updated in May 2023, which may include— \(1\) updates to the information regarding gold from Sudan as a mineral from a conflict-affected area, including the role of foreign governments in the supply chain for Sudanese gold; \(2\) information with respect to the supply chain for Sudanese gum arabic, its role in fueling the conflict in Sudan, and nefarious actors involved in smuggling gum arabic through Chad, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan; and \(3\) risks associated with conducting business with entities connected to the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, or non-state armed groups; SEC. 8732. UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT AT THE UNITED NATIONS WITH RESPECT TO SUDAN. The United States Mission to the United Nations shall assess— \(1\) the need for additional coordination between the United States, the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and other partner countries' sanctions regimes; \(2\) if the mandate of the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Sudan \(established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1591 \(2005\) and most recently extended by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2791 \(2025\)\) is sufficient to enable it to fully and accurately report to the United Nations Security Council on issues related to war, including with respect to violations of the United Nations arms embargo; and \(3\) the need to work with other United Nations Security Council members to expand the United Nations arms embargo for Sudan. SEC. 8733. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN. \(a\) Prohibition.—Except as provided in subsection \(b\), United States assistance may not be furnished to Sudan if such assistance— \(1\) provides financial or capacity building support directly to Government of Sudan institutions; \(2\) supports debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative to restructure, reschedule, or cancel the sovereign debt of Sudan; or \(3\) is security assistance. \(b\) National Security Waiver.—The President may waive application of subsection \(a\) if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States. \(c\) Annual Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture and other relevant departments and agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that details all United States foreign assistance to Sudan. SEC. 8734. ANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL ASSETS HELD BY ARMED ACTORS IN SUDAN. \(a\) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes— \(1\) a list of all countries and foreign banking institutions that hold assets on behalf of senior officials in the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, and the General Intelligence Service; and \(2\) how foreign actors are profiting from the war in Sudan through various business sectors. \(b\) Form.—Each report required under subsection \(a\) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. SEC. 8735. TERMINATION. The requirements under sections 8724, 8725, 8726, 8730, 8733, and 8734 shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after the Secretary submits to the appropriate congressional committees a certification that— \(1\) a credible and durable peace agreement, cessation of hostilities, or other end to hostilities has been achieved and verified by the Secretary; and \(2\) the Rapid Support Forces, the Sudanese Armed Forces, and any other body or institution of the Government of Sudan are no longer committing atrocities. SEC. 8736. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. Nothing in this subtitle may be construed to authorize the use of military force. SEC. 8737. SUNSET. This subtitle shall cease to have any force or effect beginning on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. Subtitle D—SCAM Act/Scam Compound Accountability and Mobilization SEC. 8741. SHORT TITLE. This subtitle may be cited as the “Scam Compound Accountability and Mobilization Act”. SEC. 8742. FINDINGS. Congress finds the following: \(1\) Transnational cyber-enabled fraud, particularly such fraud that is perpetrated from scam compounds in Southeast Asia, is a growing threat to citizens of the United States, national security, and global economic interests. \(2\) The Federal Bureau of Investigation reported $17,697,074,980 in losses in the United States due to cyber- enabled fraud during 2025, including schemes commonly perpetrated by transnational criminal organizations that are operating scam compounds. \(3\) Annual global losses due to cyber-enabled fraud are estimated at between $40,000,000,000 and $65,000,000,000, but the actual amount is likely higher since many instances are not reported. \(4\) Transnational criminal organizations responsible for a large proportion of these scam compounds— \(A\) are affiliated with the People's Republic of China; \(B\) are actively spreading propaganda on behalf of the People's Republic of China; \(C\) are promoting unification with Taiwan; and \(D\) have brokered projects for the Belt and Road Initiative. \(5\) Transnational criminal organizations have lured hundreds of thousands of human trafficking victims from an estimated 80 countries to scam compounds, which are located primarily in Burma, Cambodia, and Laos, for purposes of forced criminality. \(6\) Transnational criminal organizations are expanding scam compounds internationally, including in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and the Pacific Islands. \(7\) Money laundering, human trafficking, and fraudulent recruitment related to such scam compounds have occurred in Southeast Asia, Europe, North America, and South America. SEC. 8743. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that— \(1\) the United States should redouble efforts to hold the perpetrators and enablers of scam compound operations accountable, including those involved in related money laundering, human trafficking, and fraudulent recruitment, by employing effective tools, such as targeted financial sanctions, visa restrictions, asset seizures, and forfeiture; \(2\) to enhance effective international cooperation and responses against cyber-enabled fraud originating from scam compounds internationally, the United States Government should work with partner governments, multilateral institutions, civil society experts, and private sector stakeholders to improve information sharing, strengthen preventative measures, raise public awareness, and increase coordination on law enforcement investigations and regulatory actions; and \(3\) victims and survivors of human trafficking, including for the purpose of forced criminality, require victim- centered and trauma-informed protection and support to ensure they are not inappropriately prosecuted, penalized, or otherwise punished solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked, consistent with section 102\(b\)\(19\) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 \(22 U.S.C. 7101\(b\)\(19\)\). SEC. 8744. STATEMENT OF POLICY. It shall be the policy of the United States— \(1\) to comprehensively combat the transnational criminal organizations operating scam compounds and exploiting workers, including through human trafficking such as forced criminality, to perpetrate large-scale online scams against the people of the United States; and \(2\) to bolster international law enforcement cooperation with nations in Southeast Asia and in other regions where scam compounds and associated financial and operational infrastructures are located to combat transnational crime, including scam compounds, human trafficking, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering. SEC. 8745. DEFINITIONS. \(a\) In General.—In this subtitle: \(1\) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means— \(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; \(B\) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; \(C\) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; \(D\) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; \(E\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; \(F\) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; \(G\) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and \(H\) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. \(2\) Cyber-enabled fraud.—The term “cyber-enabled fraud” means the use of the internet or other technology to commit fraudulent activity, including illicitly obtaining money, property, data, identification documents, or authentication features, or creating counterfeit goods or services. \(3\) Enabling country.—The term “enabling country” means a country where— \(A\) government authorities actively or implicitly permit, enable, or perpetuate scam compound operations; or \(B\) ineffective law enforcement or a failure to enact legislation intended to prevent facilitating services from reaching scam compounds or transnational criminal organizations enables scam compound operators to obtain facilitating services. \(4\) Forced criminality.—The term “forced criminality” means a form of forced labor for the purpose of causing the victim to engage in criminal activity, which may include cyber-enabled fraud. \(5\) Forced labor.—The term “forced labor” has the meaning given the term severe forms of trafficking in persons in section 103\(11\)\(B\) of the Sanctioning Harborers And Dodgers Of Western Sanctions Act of 2026 \(22 U.S.C. 7102\(11\)\(B\)\). \(6\) Relevant foreign assistance programs.—The term “relevant foreign assistance programs”— \(A\) means foreign assistance programs funded by the United States Government to provide assistance for one or more foreign countries for the purpose of combating scam compound operations and related transnational criminal organizations as well as combatting associated human trafficking; and \(B\) excludes intelligence activities, including activities authorized by the President and reported to Congress in accordance with section 503 of the Sanctioning Harborers And Dodgers Of Western Sanctions Act of 2026 \(50 U.S.C. 3093\). \(7\) Human trafficking.—The term “human trafficking” has the meaning given the term severe forms of trafficking in persons in section 103\(11\) of the Sanctioning Harborers And Dodgers Of Western Sanctions Act of 2026 \(22 U.S.C. 7102\(11\)\). \(8\) Human trafficking victim.—The terms “human trafficking victim” and “victim of human trafficking” mean a person subject to an act or practice described in section 103\(11\) of the Sanctioning Harborers And Dodgers Of Western Sanctions Act of 2026 \(22 U.S.C. 7102\(11\)\). \(9\) Impacted country.—The term “impacted country” means a country that is a significant— \(A\) transit location for victims of human trafficking to scam compounds; \(B\) source location for victims of human trafficking for scam compounds; or \(C\) target of cyber-enabled fraud originating from scam compounds. \(10\) Scam compound.—The term “scam compound” means a physical installation where a transnational criminal organization carries out cyber-enabled fraud operations, using victims who may be exploited through human trafficking, including forced criminality. \(11\) Transnational criminal organization.—The term “transnational criminal organization” means a group of persons that— \(A\) includes one or more foreign person; \(B\) engages in or facilitates an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity involving the jurisdictions of at least two foreign states or one foreign state and the United States; and \(C\) threatens the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. \(12\) Strategy.—The term “Strategy” means the strategy to counter scam compounds and hold transnational criminal organizations and human traffickers accountable described in section 8746. \(b\) Rule of Construction.—The definitions under this section are exclusive to this subtitle and may not be construed to affect any other provision of United States law. SEC. 8746. STRATEGY TO COUNTER SCAM COMPOUNDS AND HOLD TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN TRAFFICKERS ACCOUNTABLE. \(a\) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy, with a classified annex if necessary, that— \(1\) is designed— \(A\) to shut down scam compounds and prevent their further proliferation; \(B\) to disrupt and dismantle— \(i\) transnational criminal organizations and human traffickers involved in exploiting workers in and fraudulently recruiting workers to scam compounds; and \(ii\) the financial, operational, and technological infrastructure that enables such criminal enterprises to execute their scams and crimes; and \(C\) to hold accountable corrupt officials and non-state actors enabling scam compounds; \(2\) is global in scope and fosters cooperation among officials from affected regions; and \(3\) may prioritize efforts focused on countries where scam compound operations are most prevalent, including Southeast Asia. \(b\) Objectives.—The Strategy shall provide for and incorporate the following objectives: \(1\) Reducing the ability of transnational criminal organizations to operate scam compounds in Southeast Asia and wherever else they may propagate. \(2\) Building the capacity, of efforts related to digital forensics, anti-money laundering, anti-corruption, and border patrol, of trusted foreign law enforcement partners to degrade, disrupt, and shut down scam compounds and prevent their proliferation. \(3\) Supporting victims of human trafficking, including those exploited in forced criminality under the direction of the Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. \(4\) Preventing fraudulent recruitment and human trafficking in scam compounds, including by— \(A\) engaging private sector entities operating internet platforms or other services that could be abused or exploited to perpetrate fraudulent recruitment, human trafficking or cyber-enabled fraud; \(B\) raising awareness among at-risk populations to identify common fraudulent recruitment strategies and improve due diligence and self-protection measures; \(C\) urging governments to monitor and enforce laws against fraudulent and unlawful recruitment practices; and \(D\) sharing information and building capacity among foreign counterparts, including law enforcement border and port officials, and other anti-trafficking authorities, as well as civil society organizations to identify and protect potential human trafficking victims. \(5\) Advocating for the thorough review of countries implicated in scam compound operations at the Financial Action Task Force \(FATF\) or FATF-style regional bodies. \(6\) Examining existing authorities and procedures of the United States Government for assisting defrauded United States persons in recovering and returning their stolen assets. \(7\) Using sanctions, visa restrictions, and other accountability and behavior change measures, in coordination with allies and partners to the greatest extent possible, against enabling countries, transnational criminal organizations, human traffickers, and related third-party facilitators of scam compound operations. \(8\) Investigating and highlighting the People's Republic of China's involvement in the origin and perpetuation of scam compounds, including through links between Chinese Communist Party officials and criminal organizations, deepening regional security influence, and selective crackdowns that incentivize the targeting of Americans. \(9\) Investigating the Burmese military's involvement in allowing, ignoring, and profiting from scam compounds in Burma, and the importance of resolving the instability and violence in Burma to stop the unfettered operation of scam compounds in Burma. \(10\) Harnessing offensive cyber capabilities to degrade scam compound operations. \(11\) Integrating data collection, analysis, and response mechanisms across Federal, State, and local agencies, including by assessing if any existing relevant Fusion Centers could be leveraged to combat the operations of scam compounds. \(12\) Convening like-minded foreign allies and partners to combat scam compounds, including by establishing similar task forces or working groups, compiling and sharing data, and collaborating regarding the indictment of key actors and enablers. \(c\) Contents.—The Strategy shall— \(1\) include a comprehensive problem statement identifying the structural vulnerabilities exploited by transnational criminal organizations operating scam compounds; \(2\) develop a comprehensive list of enabling countries and impacted countries; \(3\) identify all active executive branch relevant foreign assistance programs and as well as diplomatic efforts underway to address scam compounds, transnational criminal organizations connected to scam compounds, and related money laundering, and human trafficking including forced criminality, including efforts with enabling countries and impacted countries; \(4\) identify relevant foreign assistance resources needed to fully implement the Strategy and any obstacles to the response of the Federal Government to scam compounds, including coordination with partner governments, to address the human trafficking, including forced criminality, and money laundering that facilitates and sustains scam compound operations; and \(5\) include indicators that measure the success of the Strategy, including achieving the objectives described in subsection \(b\), which may include the number of persons sanctioned, the number of arrest warrants or indictments issued, the number of arrests made, the amount of United States losses mitigated, the number of victims of trafficking in persons identified and protected, and the reduction in the number of active scam compounds, in comparison to the previous year. \(d\) Limitation.—Nothing in the Strategy may affect, apply to, or create obligations related to past, present, or future criminal or civil law enforcement or intelligence activities of the United States or the law enforcement activities of any State or subdivision of a State. SEC. 8747. ESTABLISHING A TASK FORCE TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGY. \(a\) In General.—Not later than 90 days after submitting the Strategy pursuant to section 8746\(a\), the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall establish or designate an interagency task force \(referred to in this section as the “Task Force”\)— \(1\) to coordinate the implementation of the Strategy; \(2\) to conduct regular monitoring and analysis of scam compound operations internationally; and \(3\) to track and evaluate progress toward the objectives, activities, and performance indicators of the Strategy. \(b\) Information Sharing.—To ensure proper coordination and effective interagency action, each Federal department or agency represented on the Task Force shall fully share— \(1\) all relevant data with the Task Force; and \(2\) all information regarding the department's or agency's plans, before and after final agency decisions are made, on all matters relating to actions regarding combating scam compounds. \(c\) Consultation.—The Task Force, or representatives of the Task Force, should— \(1\) consult with State and local law enforcement entities and stakeholder organizations in the United States that have firsthand expertise in reporting and combating cyber-enabled fraud and recovering stolen assets; \(2\) consult regularly with nongovernmental organizations in the United States with expertise in countering trafficking in persons or anti-corruption, as appropriate; \(3\) develop partnerships with relevant private sector actors for the purpose of better disrupting the enabling infrastructure of scam compounds, operations, and syndicates; and \(4\) engage civil society organizations to better understand the complexity of the scam compound problem in each country and the broader economic, political, and governance challenges that are exacerbating the problem. \(d\) Congressional Consultation.—The Task Force shall consult regularly with the appropriate congressional committees on its efforts to implement the Strategy, including potential updates to the strategy. \(e\) Annual Reviews and Reports.—Not later than 1 year after the establishment of the Task Force, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the Task Force shall— \(1\) conduct a status review of the Strategy and the overall state of scam compounds operated by transnational criminal organizations that includes— \(A\) a list of enabling countries and impacted countries; \(B\) an estimate of the amount of money that has been stolen from United States nationals through scams emanating from scam compounds; \(C\) an estimate of the amount of the stolen money described in subparagraph \(B\) that was intercepted, seized, or returned as a result of United States Government action; \(D\) an analysis of the role that human trafficking plays in scam compounds around the world; \(E\) a list of known scam compounds operating across Southeast Asia; and \(F\) a description of if, where, and how scam compounds and operations have proliferated outside of Southeast Asia across other regions of the world; and \(2\) submit the results of such review in a public report to the appropriate congressional committees, which may contain a classified annex. \(f\) Task Force Termination.—The Task Force shall terminate on the date that is 6 years after the date on which the Task Force is established. SEC. 8748. STRENGTHENING TOOLS TO DISMANTLE SCAM COMPOUNDS AND HOLD TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS ACCOUNTABLE. \(a\) Imposition of Sanctions With Respect to Actors in Scam Compound Operations.—Beginning on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may impose the sanctions described in subsection \(b\) with respect to any foreign person the President determines— \(1\) has materially assisted in, or provided financial or technological support to, or provided significant goods or services in support of, the activities of international scam compounds or enabling services, including but not limited to fraudulent recruitment, human trafficking \(including forced criminality\), cyber-enabled fraud, or money-laundering; or \(2\) owned, controlled, directed, or acted for, or on behalf of, a significant scam compound operation or enabling service, including but not limited to fraudulent recruitment, human trafficking \(including forced criminality\), cyber- enabled fraud, or money-laundering. \(b\) Sanctions Described.— \(1\) Asset blocking.—The President may exercise all powers granted to the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.\) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection \(a\), including, to the extent appropriate, the vessel of which the person is the beneficial owner, if such property or interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. \(2\) Visas, admission, or parole.— \(A\) In general.—An alien described in subsection \(a\) is— \(i\) inadmissible to the United States; \(ii\) ineligible for a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and \(iii\) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act \(8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.\). \(B\) Current visas revoked.— \(i\) In general.—An alien described in subsection \(a\) is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation was issued. \(ii\) Immediate effect.—A revocation under clause \(i\) shall take effect immediately and automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's possession. \(c\) Exceptions.— \(1\) Exception to comply with international obligations.— Sanctions described in subsection \(b\)\(2\) shall not apply with respect to the admission of an alien if admitting or paroling such alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations. \(2\) Exceptions for human trafficking victims.—Sanctions described in subsection \(b\) shall not apply with respect to a person determined by the President to be a victim of trafficking in persons within a scam compound, consistent with section 102\(b\)\(19\) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 \(22 U.S.C. 7101\(b\)\(19\)\). \(d\) Implementation; Penalties.— \(1\) Implementation.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704\) to carry out this section. \(2\) Penalties.—The penalties set forth in subsections \(b\) and \(c\) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1705\) shall apply to any person who violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of any prohibition of this section, or an order or regulation prescribed under this section, to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in section 206\(a\) of such Act \(50 U.S.C. 1705\(a\)\). \(e\) Intelligence and Law Enforcement Activities.—Sanctions authorized under this section shall not apply with respect to— \(1\) any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 \(50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.\); or \(2\) any authorized intelligence or law enforcement activities of the United States. \(f\) Semiannual Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for 7 years, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that identifies— \(1\) all foreign persons the President has sanctioned pursuant to this section; and \(2\) the dates on which such sanctions were imposed. \(g\) Form.—The report required under subsection \(f\) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. \(h\) Exception Relating to Importation of Goods.— \(1\) In general.—A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property pursuant to subsection \(b\) shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. \(2\) Defined term.—In this subsection, the term “good” means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. \(i\) Waiver.— \(1\) In general.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person or a foreign financial institution if the President determines that such waiver is in the national interest of the United States. \(2\) Report.—Not later than 15 days before granting a waiver pursuant to paragraph \(1\), the President shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes— \(A\) the name of the individual or institution that is benefitting from such waiver; and \(B\) if the beneficiary is an individual, a detailed justification explaining how the waiver serves the national security interests of the United States. \(3\) Form.—The report required under paragraph \(2\) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. SEC. 8749. REDRESS TO VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL SCAM COMPOUND OPERATIONS. \(a\) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing an assessment of existing forfeiture law that— \(1\) outlines challenges or limitations to providing financial redress to victims of international scam compound operations; \(2\) offers recommendations to amend existing forfeiture law to enable the Department of Justice to use assets forfeited as a result of law enforcement activities targeting international scam compound operations to provide financial redress to United States citizen victims of scam operations; and \(3\) offers recommendations for the administration of such a redress mechanism. \(b\) Form.—The report required under subsection \(a\) shall be submitted in an unclassified form. SEC. 8750. SATELLITE IMAGERY ACCESS TO MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES RELATED TO SCAM COMPOUNDS TO DISCOVER THE PRESENCE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING. \(a\) Access to Satellite Imagery.—The Secretary is authorized to provide nongovernmental organizations, nonprofit organizations, and intergovernmental entities access to current and archival high-resolution satellite imagery to help advance efforts to combat scam compounds, forced criminality, and human trafficking, including monitoring and documenting observable activities at scam compounds in Southeast Asia, which may be associated with human trafficking, including forced labor or forced criminality. \(b\) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes— \(1\) any terms and conditions applicable with respect to the access authorized under subsection \(a\); and \(2\) a list of each organization or entity that has been provided access pursuant to subsection \(a\). \(c\) Form.—The report required under subsection \(b\) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. SEC. 8751. SUNSET. This subtitle shall cease to be effective beginning on the date that is 7 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. Subtitle E—Strategic Subsea Cables SEC. 8761. SHORT TITLE. This subtitle may be cited as the “Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026”. SEC. 8762. DEFINITIONS. In this subtitle: \(1\) Agency.—The term “agency” has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code. \(2\) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means— \(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and \(B\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. \(3\) Appropriate federal agencies.—The term “appropriate Federal agencies” means the following: \(A\) The Department of Commerce. \(B\) The Department of Defense. \(C\) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. \(D\) The Department of State. \(E\) The Federal Communications Commission. \(F\) The Department of the Treasury. \(G\) The Department of Justice. \(H\) Any additional Federal agencies, as determined by the President. \(4\) Critical undersea infrastructure.—The term “critical undersea infrastructure” refers to both subsea communications infrastructure and subsea energy infrastructure. \(5\) Interagency committee.—The term “interagency committee” means the entity established under section 8765\(b\). \(6\) Non-federal entity.—The term “non-Federal entity” means any nongovernmental entity that is an individual, organization, or business involved in the operation, maintenance, repair, or construction of critical undersea infrastructure, including critical undersea infrastructure owners. \(7\) Sabotage.—The term “sabotage” means actions, or preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause defective production, operation, or damage to critical undersea infrastructure, including the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of data transmitted via subsea communications infrastructure. \(8\) Subsea energy infrastructure.—The term “subsea energy infrastructure” means a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, including— \(A\) to transmit electricity, including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations; \(B\) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure; and \(C\) associated landing stations and facilities. \(9\) Subsea communications infrastructure.—The term “subsea communications infrastructure” has the same meaning as “submarine cable system”, as defined in section 1.70001\(h\) of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, and any subsequent update to such meaning. CHAPTER 1—INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. 8763. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: \(1\) Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a growing threat to United States and allied security and economic prosperity. \(2\) In recent years, numerous critical undersea infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including— \(A\) in January 2022, the reported damage to subsea communications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, home of SvalSAT, the largest commercial satellite ground station on Earth; \(B\) in September 2022, the reported damage to 3 of the 4 trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea; \(C\) in February 2023, the reported damage to subsea communications infrastructure connecting the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait; \(D\) in October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to- Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline spanning the Gulf of Finland, in addition to the reported damage to subsea communications cables connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia; \(E\) in November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland- to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea communications cables and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea communications cable in the central Baltic Sea; \(F\) in December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland- to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea communications cables in the Gulf of Finland; \(G\) in January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans- Pacific Express subsea communications cable connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan; \(H\) in February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea communications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait; \(I\) in January 2026, the reported damage to subsea communications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea linking Liepaja and Sventoji; and \(J\) in January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel named the Fitburg. \(3\) In February 2024, NATO Defense Ministers established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to coordinate information and threat intelligence sharing among private and public sector actors to protect critical undersea infrastructure. \(4\) In January 2025, following critical undersea infrastructure sabotage in the Baltic Sea in December 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization \(NATO\) launched Baltic Sentry to strengthen the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. \(5\) On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the development and deployment of an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated surveillance approach. \(6\) The Association of Southeast Asian States \(ASEAN\) published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to “build a secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable network” and “to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair, maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine cables, between ASEAN Member States”. \(7\) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners. Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific region. SEC. 8763A. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that— \(1\) critical undersea infrastructure represents vital strategic and economic links between the United States and its partners and allies; \(2\) according to NATO, “undersea cables carry an estimated $10 trillion in transfers every day; two-thirds of the world's oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported by sea; and around 95 percent of global data flows are transmitted via undersea cables”; \(3\) since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been a marked increase in high-profile suspected sabotage incidents resulting in damage to critical undersea infrastructure, especially across Northern Europe and East Asia; \(4\) the United States Government has an important role to play in advancing United States interests in international bodies that oversee the protection of critical undersea infrastructure, including promoting network resilience and redundancy, and advancing regulations in support of these goals; \(5\) the United States Government should play a more active role in NATO initiatives such as the NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, allied maritime security efforts such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, Indo-Pacific initiatives, including the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, and international organizations such as the International Cable Protection Committee \(ICPC\), in order to advance United States national security and economic interests; \(6\) the United States should lead efforts to promote the deployment of resilient critical undersea infrastructure networks, enhance situational awareness, strengthen preparedness, and formalize collective responses among allies and partners through enhanced information sharing and coordination; and \(7\) while critical undersea infrastructure owners and other associated private sector stakeholders carry significant responsibility in safeguarding this infrastructure, the United States Government and allied foreign governments need to play a greater role. SEC. 8763B. ENHANCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT WITH RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO SAFEGUARD UNITED STATES INTERESTS. \(a\) In General.—The Secretary, in coordination with the interagency committee, as appropriate, shall seek to increase United States Government engagement with relevant international bodies to advance United States national security and economic interests as it relates to critical undersea infrastructure. \(b\) Report.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following: \(1\) A description of how increased United States Government engagement with relevant international bodies, including in coordination with the United States domestic subsea cable industry, could support United States national security objectives as it relates to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. \(2\) A description of key objectives for promoting and protecting United States national security interests within relevant international bodies. \(3\) A description of how the People's Republic of China entities leverage their engagement with relevant international bodies to further their strategic interests. \(4\) A description of how encouraging other countries and regional bodies to engage with relevant international bodies can better ensure coordinated, consistent global subsea communications infrastructure policies. \(5\) A description of international bodies relevant for critical undersea infrastructure where the United States should increase its diplomatic engagement. SEC. 8763C. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE. \(a\) In General.—The President, in coordination with the Secretary and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection \(c\) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage or facilitates acts of sabotage against critical undersea infrastructure, including— \(1\) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly— \(A\) commits acts of sabotage; or \(B\) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support, security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and \(2\) any foreign person that the President determines knowingly— \(A\) owns, operates, or manages the vessel or entity described in paragraph \(1\); \(B\) provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity; \(C\) facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support a vessel or entity described in paragraph \(1\); \(D\) provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, a vessel described in paragraph \(1\) for the purpose of evading sanctions; \(E\) provides documentation, registration, or flagging services for a vessel described in paragraph \(1\) for the purpose of evading sanctions; or \(F\) serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior leadership of such a vessel or entity. \(b\) Sanctions Described.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following: \(1\) Blocking of property.—The President may exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.\) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection \(a\), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. \(2\) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.— \(A\) Visas, admission, or parole.—An alien described in subsection \(a\) shall be— \(i\) inadmissible to the United States; \(ii\) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and \(iii\) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act \(8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.\). \(B\) Current visas revoked.— \(i\) In general.—The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection \(a\) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued. \(ii\) Immediate effect.—A revocation under clause \(i\) shall— \(I\) take effect immediately; and \(II\) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien. \(c\) Implementation; Penalties.— \(1\) Implementation.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704\) to carry out this section. \(2\) Penalties.—The penalties provided for in subsections \(b\) and \(c\) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \(50 U.S.C. 1705\) shall apply to any person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of any prohibition of this section, or an order or regulation prescribed under this section, to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in section 206\(a\) of such Act \(50 U.S.C. 1705\(a\)\). \(d\) Exceptions.— \(1\) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters agreement and law enforcement activities.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole of an alien to the United States if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary— \(A\) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or \(B\) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States. \(2\) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.— Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 \(50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.\) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States. \(3\) Exception relating to importation of goods.— \(A\) In general.—A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. \(B\) Good defined.—In this paragraph, the term “good” means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. \(4\) Exception for humanitarian assistance.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to— \(A\) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, medical devices, or humanitarian assistance, or for humanitarian purposes; or \(B\) transactions that are necessary for or related to the activities described in subparagraph \(A\). \(5\) Exception for safety of vessels and crew.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to a person providing provisions to a vessel otherwise subject to sanctions under this section if such provisions are intended for the safety and care of the crew aboard the vessel, the protection of human life aboard the vessel, or the maintenance of the vessel to avoid any environmental or other significant damage. \(e\) Definitions.—In this section: \(1\) Admission; admitted; alien.—The terms “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act \(8 U.S.C. 1101\). \(2\) Agricultural commodity.—The term “agricultural commodity” has the meaning given that term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 \(7 U.S.C. 5602\). \(3\) Foreign person.—The term “foreign person” means an individual or entity that is not a United States person. \(4\) Medicine.—The term “medicine” has the meaning given the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act \(21 U.S.C. 321\). \(5\) Medical device.—The term “medical device” has the meaning given the term “device” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act \(21 U.S.C. 321\). \(6\) United states person.—The term “United States person” means— \(A\) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; \(B\) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; or \(C\) any person in the United States. \(f\) National Security Interests Waiver.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees— \(1\) a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and \(2\) a report explaining the basis for the certification. SEC. 8763D. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. \(a\) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence \(ODNI\), in coordination with the Secretary, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following: \(1\) A description, with respect to the applicable reporting period, of the subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and maintenance capabilities of the People's Republic of China \(PRC\) and the Russian Federation. \(2\) An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research \(GUGI\) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including— \(A\) a description of GUGI operations and capabilities in deep water and littoral infrastructure surveillance, seabed warfare, and sabotage, including recent activity trends and development of new weapons systems; \(B\) a description of GUGI's use of ostensibly civilian research vessels to conduct critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, seabed warfare, and potential sabotage; \(C\) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions; and \(D\) a list of suspected GUGI research or scientific vessels, including vessel names and International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity numbers, and related equipment that are suspected of engaging in dual- use operations and probing of critical undersea infrastructure. \(3\) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and activities of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation \(GRU\), including— \(A\) a description of GRU operations and capabilities related to physical, electronic, and cyber surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure and maritime logistics; \(B\) a description of the use of Russian civilian merchant and fishing vessels by the GRU, including a list of fishing and merchant vessel names and International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity Numbers believed to be involved in surveillance or sabotage activities; and \(C\) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions. \(4\) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and activities of the People's Liberation Army, the PRC Coast Guard, the China Ship Scientific Research Center, HMN Technologies, and other PRC-based entities, including unmarked or dual-use maritime militia or commercial vessels related to surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including— \(A\) a description of recent capability developments related to surveilling or sabotaging critical undersea infrastructure, including for both deep-sea and littoral purposes; and \(B\) a description of the PRC's use of ostensibly civilian fishing, merchant, and research vessels for sabotage or surveillance of critical undersea infrastructure, including in the Indo-Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. \(5\) An assessment of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the PRC on surveillance or sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including— \(A\) any current or planned operational coordination against United States or allied and partner nation targets; \(B\) any joint research, development, testing, or evaluation of critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare capabilities; \(C\) any technology transfers or joint training related to critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare; and \(D\) any coordination in procurement of advanced technologies related to critical undersea infrastructure, surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare, or circumvention of sanctions against the Russian Federation. \(6\) A list of instances during the previous calendar year in which the United States, or allies and partners of the United States, documented anomalous behavior from vessels, either flagged, crewed, or operated by the PRC or Russia, around critical undersea infrastructure, including— \(A\) any official United States Government response to counter the anomalous behavior; and \(B\) any coordinated diplomatic action with allies and partners. \(7\) An assessment of the extent to which PRC-based entities are involved in laying, maintaining, and repairing United States-invested cables. \(b\) Initial and Subsequent Reports.—The initial report required under subsection \(a\) shall cover the period between January 1, 2022, through the date of the enactment of this Act. Subsequent reports required by subsection \(a\) shall cover the previous calendar year for the reporting period. \(c\) Classification.—The report required under subsection \(a\) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. SEC. 8763E. REPORT ON POTENTIAL SABOTAGE OF CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE. \(a\) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes the assessment of the intelligence community, including dissents from individual agencies, of the likely cause and, if applicable, the attribution of the following instances of reported sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure: \(1\) In January 2022, the reported damage to the subsea communications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard. \(2\) The September 2022 sabotage of three of the four trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea, including— \(A\) an assessment of the activities of Russian military vessels, including those with undersea warfare capabilities, at any of the Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading up to the incident; \(B\) a description of any Russian civilian or military vessels intercepted or diverted from the blast sites in the aftermath of the sabotage or vessels or underwater unmanned vehicles that gained access to the blast sites; \(C\) an assessment of the technical feasibility of a small group of divers conducting the Nord Stream sabotage using the rental boat “Andromeda” in the weather and sea conditions present at the time; \(D\) an assessment of whether the Russian Federation's documented practice of recruiting or coercing Ukrainians or other third country nationals to conduct sabotage operations on land targets is applicable to a maritime context; \(E\) an assessment of the fees and penalties for failure to honor gas delivery contracts that Gazprom or other Russian entities potentially faced due to the throttling of gas deliveries via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in 2021; \(F\) an assessment of the insurance implications for Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as its insurers and Western financiers, depending on the identity of the perpetrator; \(G\) a description of the law enforcement investigations by regional governments, the scope of their investigations, and their outcomes; \(H\) an assessment of whether any Russian vessels documented in close proximity to the Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading up to or immediately after the incident, including those with undersea surveillance or warfare capabilities, were present at other suspected sabotage sites either before or after the incident in question; and \(I\) any information on potential attribution received from allied or partner nation communications through diplomatic or intelligence channels. \(3\) In February 2023, the reported damage to subsea communications infrastructure connecting the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait. \(4\) In October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to- Estonia Baltic connector natural gas pipeline, in addition to subsea communications infrastructure connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia. \(5\) In November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland- to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea communications cable and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea communications cable in the central Baltic Sea. \(6\) In December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland- to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea communications cables in the Gulf of Finland. \(7\) In January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans- Pacific Express subsea communications infrastructure connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. \(8\) In February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea communications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait. \(9\) In January 2026, the reported damage to subsea communications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea connecting Liepaja and Sventoji. \(10\) In January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel called the Fitburg. \(b\) Form.—The report required by subsection \(a\) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. SEC. 8763F. ENGAGING FOREIGN PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE. \(a\) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that— \(1\) as international critical undersea infrastructure expands, there are increasing challenges to the proper installation, maintenance, repair, and protection of international subsea cables that have the potential to undermine United States and foreign partner national security interests; \(2\) the United States is uniquely positioned to provide technical, material, and other forms of support to international partners to enhance the resilience of international critical undersea infrastructure; \(3\) the United States Government should enhance its diplomatic efforts to work alongside trusted allies to help foreign governments improve efforts to quickly and effectively install, maintain, repair, and protect international critical undersea infrastructure; and \(4\) given the importance of critical undersea infrastructure to United States and allied energy security and prosperity, adversaries are increasingly prioritizing capabilities designed to target United States and allied subsea energy infrastructure. \(b\) Commitment of Personnel and Resources.—The Secretary shall devote sufficient personnel and resources towards— \(1\) engaging with foreign countries, in coordination with other relevant Federal agencies, to improve security and reduce barriers to the installation, monitoring, maintenance, and repair of critical undersea infrastructure; and \(2\) working with allies and partners to improve response times to address critical undersea infrastructure sabotage, including, as appropriate, by improving the coordination of cable repair vessel deployments. \(c\) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next 5 years, the Secretary, in coordination with other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that outlines efforts by the United States Government in the prior calendar year to work with international allies and partners to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers to the monitoring, maintenance, repair, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure, including— \(1\) a list of current foreign policies or laws that create barriers to United States-led efforts to install, maintain, repair, and protect critical undersea infrastructure; and \(2\) progress made in the previous calendar year as a result of United States engagement with allies and partners. CHAPTER 2—DEPARTMENT OF STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE EXPERTISE SEC. 8764. EXPANDING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE-RELATED EXPERTISE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. \(a\) In General.—The Secretary shall assign not fewer than four full-time equivalent individuals, of which not fewer than two individuals shall be assigned to the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy to cover subsea communications infrastructure, in order to support the Department of State's interagency engagement on matters related to critical undersea infrastructure, including— \(1\) critical undersea infrastructure protection and resilience; \(2\) coordination with United States allies and partners; and \(3\) United States engagement in international bodies that cover critical undersea infrastructure. \(b\) Assignment.—The Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy may not dual-hat currently employed personnel in meeting the minimum hiring requirement outlined in subsection \(a\). \(c\) Notification.—Not later than 15 days after fulfilling the hiring requirement in subsection \(a\), the Secretary shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. \(d\) International Cooperation on Critical Undersea Infrastructure Sabotage.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how the United States Government plans to prioritize diplomatic engagement within relevant international bodies to spur increased information sharing between allied and partner governments and relevant private sector companies regarding threats to, and the sabotage of, critical undersea infrastructure. CHAPTER 3—SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR SEC. 8765. IMPROVING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COORDINATION OF SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE. \(a\) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings: \(1\) According to a December 2024 United States Federal Government white paper, “There currently exists no forum in which the full scope of the \[subsea\] cable industry can effectively collaborate with the U.S. government to identify and address shared challenges.”. \(2\) United States Federal Government responsibilities for the protection of subsea communications infrastructure, damage reporting, information and intelligence sharing, and emergency response are overseen by various government actors through a multitude of mechanisms spanning several Federal departments and agencies. \(3\) In order for the subsea cable industry to align with United States economic and security interests and help industry prepare security risk mitigation measures, the United States Government must provide the industry a clearer concept of operations, assessed risks to cable supply chain and infrastructure, enhanced and standardized security measures, defined lines of effort in cases of emergency, and definitive cost analysis. \(b\) Establishment.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency committee \(referred to in this subtitle as the “interagency committee”\) comprised of the heads of the appropriate Federal agencies, or their designees, to lead United States Government efforts to— \(1\) protect and improve the resilience of subsea communications infrastructure; \(2\) effectively collaborate with non-Federal entities, including relevant members of the subsea cable industry, to identify and address shared challenges to subsea communications infrastructure security and resilience; \(3\) coordinate United States Government policies to improve subsea communications infrastructure security and resilience; and \(4\) address other matters related to subsea communications infrastructure deemed appropriate and necessary by the President. \(c\) Coordination.—The President shall direct the interagency committee to conduct an overview of the United States Federal Government's operational authorities for subsea communications infrastructure security and resilience. The overview shall include an interagency concept of operations for partnering with non-Federal entities, including subsea communications infrastructure owners and operators, to secure and repair subsea communications infrastructure systems in a variety of crisis scenarios; and \(d\) Analysis of Subsea Communications Infrastructure Sabotage.— \(1\) In general.—The President shall direct the heads of the appropriate Federal agencies to develop strategies to coordinate closely within the interagency process and with subsea communications infrastructure industry stakeholders to review sabotage and other threats to subsea communications infrastructure, including by leveraging analysis from industry-wide data, to— \(A\) identify trends; \(B\) refine attributions, particularly in cases of subsea communications infrastructure sabotage; \(C\) identify high-risk geographic areas for subsea communications infrastructure construction; \(D\) identify Federal Government functions and private sector engagement methods to support the security of subsea communications infrastructure; and \(E\) inform future risk mitigation efforts to reduce damage to subsea communications infrastructure. \(2\) Strategy elements.—The strategies required under paragraph \(1\) shall include— \(A\) resourcing requirements; \(B\) coordination with United States allies and partners and relevant subsea communications infrastructure industry stakeholders; and \(C\) the necessary technical expertise to make attributions for subsea communications infrastructure sabotage. \(e\) Report.—Not later than 30 days after establishing the required interagency committee under subsection \(b\), the President shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following elements: \(1\) Any resources required to sufficiently staff the interagency committee and United States Federal agencies overseeing the objectives outlined in subsection \(b\). \(2\) A detailed plan for how the interagency committee will advance the objectives outlined in subsection \(b\). SEC. 8765A. STRENGTHENING INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS ON SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE. \(a\) Public-private Sector Information Sharing.—Consistent with the necessary protections of classified information, the sourcing of relevant intelligence material, and privacy and civil liberties, all appropriate Federal agencies shall, with the approval of the interagency committee and in direct coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, including, as appropriate, with intelligence sharing partnerships with trusted allies, in support of the installation, maintenance, repair, and protection of subsea communications infrastructure, issue procedures to establish and promote— \(1\) the timely sharing of classified information regarding subsea communications infrastructure sabotage, any indications of potential sabotage, and other threats to subsea communications infrastructure held by members of the interagency committee with non-Federal entities that possess the necessary security clearances; \(2\) the timely sharing between the interagency committee and non-Federal entities of information related to subsea communications infrastructure sabotage, information relating to indications of potential sabotage, or authorized uses under this subtitle, in the possession of the interagency committee that may be declassified and shared at an unclassified level; \(3\) the timely sharing by the interagency committee to non- Federal entities, and the voluntary, cooperative sharing by non-Federal entities to the interagency committee, of unclassified, including controlled unclassified, information regarding subsea communications infrastructure sabotage, indications of potential sabotage, and other threats to subsea communications infrastructure; \(4\) the timely sharing by the interagency committee to non- Federal entities, and the voluntary cooperative sharing by non-Federal entities to the interagency committee, when and if appropriate, of information relating to indications of potential subsea communications infrastructure sabotage or authorized uses under this title, held by the interagency committee or non-Federal entities about subsea communications infrastructure sabotage, in order to prevent or mitigate any potential adverse effects from such sabotage; and \(5\) the timely release of funds to meet cost, schedule, and performance metrics. \(b\) Development of Procedures.—The procedures developed in accordance with this section shall— \(1\) ensure the interagency committee has and maintains the capacity to identify and inform subsea communications infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential subsea communications infrastructure sabotage in real time to the appropriate Federal agencies or non-Federal entities consistent with the protection of classified information; \(2\) incorporate, whenever possible, existing processes, roles, and responsibilities of members of the interagency committee and non-Federal entities for information sharing, including subsea communications infrastructure-specific information sharing and analysis entities; and \(3\) require members of the interagency committee and other appropriate Federal agencies which are sharing subsea communications infrastructure sabotage indicators or defensive measures to employ any applicable security controls to defend against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such information. \(c\) Submission to Congress.—The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the interagency committee, shall— \(1\) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, submit to Congress the procedures required under subsection \(b\); and \(2\) not later than one year after submitting such procedures, and annually thereafter for 5 years, submit to Congress a report on the implementation and execution of information sharing with private sector actors in the previous year pursuant to subsection \(a\). Subtitle F—Tech PATH/U.S. Technology Procurement and Access to Trusted Hardware SEC. 8771. SHORT TITLES. This subtitle may be cited as the “United States Technology Procurement and Access to Trusted Hardware Act of 2026”. SEC. 8772. DEFINITIONS. In this subtitle: \(1\) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means— \(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and \(B\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. \(2\) Foreign country of concern.—The term “foreign country of concern” has the meaning given the term “covered nation” in section 4872\(f\) of title 10, United States Code. \(3\) Foreign government partner.—The term “foreign government partner” includes international organizations. \(4\) International organizations.—The term “international organizations” has the meaning given the term in section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act \(22 U.S.C. 288\). \(5\) Trusted cyber and digital technologies.—The term “trusted cyber and digital technologies” means technologies, including equipment, services, hardware, or software used in information and communications technology networks, for which the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, has determined— \(A\) the provider, supplier, or manufacturer is not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the influence of a foreign country of concern; and \(B\) do not pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons. \(6\) Pax silica initiative.—The term “Pax Silica initiative” refers to the Department of State-led diplomatic, economic security, and supply chain initiative, announced on December 11, 2025, to strengthen cooperation among the United States, allied countries, partner countries, industry, and other relevant stakeholders for the purpose of developing and securing trusted supply chains and infrastructure necessary for artificial intelligence, semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, and other technologies determined by the Secretary to be essential to United States national security, economic security, and technological competitiveness. SEC. 8773. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that— \(1\) foreign government partners are increasingly turning towards strategic competitors like the People's Republic of China to procure cyber and digital technologies due to their low-cost, acceptable efficacy, ease and speed of acquisition, and support for associated training and maintenance; \(2\) foreign government partner procurement of cyber and digital technologies from suppliers aligned with strategic competitors of the United States poses significant and distinct risks, including— \(A\) supply chain vulnerabilities created by dependence on strategic competitors whose governments may compel access to data, networks, or systems, undermining the cybersecurity and strategic autonomy of the procuring government; \(B\) the erosion of interoperability and alignment with United States cybersecurity frameworks, standards, and best practices, reducing the ability of foreign government partners to operate securely alongside United States systems and those of United States allies; and \(C\) the adoption of digital governance practices that are inconsistent with United States economic and national security interests; \(3\) United States foreign government partners consistently signal strong demand for trusted cyber and digital technologies from United States suppliers; \(4\) United States initiatives such as Pax Silica should facilitate technology procurements by building enduring technology partnerships between foreign government partners and United States suppliers, including by— \(A\) assisting foreign government partners in navigating regulatory, logistical, and technical hurdles to trusted cyber and digital technology procurement; \(B\) providing foreign government partners with strategic direction from the United States Government; \(C\) incorporating foreign government partner needs into program development from the outset; and \(D\) maintaining long-term engagement with foreign government partners throughout the procurement cycle of trusted cyber and digital technologies; and \(5\) as the United States seeks to maintain its global competitive edge in critical and emerging technologies, including advanced cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, advanced telecommunications, and robotics, it is in the interest of the United States Government to establish policies and procedures that streamline foreign government partners' ability to procure trusted and reliable technologies from the United States and United States allies and partners. SEC. 8774. UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY PROCUREMENT PROGRAM. \(a\) Establishment.—There is established in the Department of State the United States Cyber and Digital Technology Procurement Program \(referred to in this subtitle as the “Program”\), which shall be administered by the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy, and which may support Pax Silica and other related initiatives. To the maximum extent practicable, the Program shall seek to serve as a demand- driven mechanism in response to cyber and digital technology needs as determined by the participating foreign government partner. \(b\) Purposes.—The purposes of the Program shall include the following: \(1\) To streamline foreign government partner procurement of trusted cyber and digital technologies, including commercial off-the-shelf technologies, consistent with United States export control laws, including cybersecurity standards appropriate to relevant policy goals of the United States. \(2\) To establish long-term cyber and digital technology procurement pipelines with United States providers, including after the termination of the Program. \(3\) To identify the appropriate United States Government financing mechanisms to address challenges associated with affordability of trusted cyber and digital technologies. \(4\) To provide a comprehensive package to foreign government partners, with the support of and in coordination with United States industry technical experts, as appropriate, to navigate trusted cyber and digital technology procurement requirements, to understand technical and system complexity, to assess absorptive capacity, and to identify foreign government partner-specific logistical and export control challenges, including by— \(A\) designing and implementing procurement, deployment, and technical knowledge transfer that enable the participating foreign government partner to modernize and secure systems; \(B\) providing clear guidelines for United States and trusted foreign supplier entry and eligibility; \(C\) conducting assessments related to the participating foreign government partner's workforce or technological requirements, including any gaps in absorptive capacity, including— \(i\) feasibility studies to identify, design, and implement the deployment of trusted cyber and digital technology solutions; and \(ii\) sustainability assessments to determine the participating foreign government partner's ability to procure and invest in trusted cyber and digital technologies, including the ability to sustain such investments in the long-term; \(D\) providing capacity building to ensure that the participating foreign government partner obtains the relevant skills for requirements identification and assessment, integration of United States procurements into existing operating environments, research and procurement, logistics, deployment, and configuration to ensure a long-term arrangement with United States suppliers; and \(E\) assisting the participating foreign government partner in developing a long-term strategy to procure and budget for trusted cyber and digital technology procurements, including beyond the end of the Program's lifecycle. \(5\) To assess the risks and tradeoffs of foreign government partners adopting cyber and digital technologies from foreign countries of concern and prioritize foreign government partners for outreach efforts based on that risk assessment. \(c\) Covered Cyber and Digital Technologies.—In implementing the Program, the Secretary shall, in coordination with the participating foreign government partner and United States industry technical experts, as appropriate, prioritize the following trusted cyber and digital technologies, as well as any other trusted cyber and digital technologies designated by the Secretary pursuant to subsection \(d\): \(1\) Software and its associated subscriptions and licensing, including— \(A\) operating systems; \(B\) enterprise management software; \(C\) cloud-based storage solutions and compute access; \(D\) industrial control and automation software, including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition \(SCADA\), distributed control systems \(DCS\), and programmable logic controller \(PLC\) programming environments; \(E\) digital twin, simulation, and modeling software; and \(F\) cloud and edge orchestration platforms for robotic and operational technology \(OT\) device management. \(2\) Hardware, including— \(A\) processors; \(B\) human-machine interfaces \(HMIs\) and operator consoles; \(C\) networking equipment, including switches, routers, and gateways; \(D\) industrial networking equipment; \(E\) biotechnology equipment, including genomic sequencers and related hardware; and \(F\) other related technologies. \(3\) Cybersecurity products, including— \(A\) firewalls; \(B\) intrusion detection and prevention systems; \(C\) Security Information and Event Management \(SIEM\) systems; \(D\) threat intelligence and monitoring systems; \(E\) endpoint detection systems; \(F\) Security Operations Centers \(SOC\); \(G\) secure authentication systems; and \(H\) cybersecurity training and consulting services. \(4\) Telecommunications equipment, including— \(A\) subsea fiber-optic cable and associated equipment; \(B\) cellular equipment, including open radio access network \(ORAN\) equipment; \(C\) satellite-enabling infrastructure; and \(D\) broadband infrastructure, including fiber optic network equipment. \(5\) Equipment and related products to enable the adoption of artificial intelligence \(AI\) solutions, including— \(A\) compute; \(B\) storage; \(C\) memory; \(D\) models, including both closed- and open-weight models; \(E\) AI model licenses; \(F\) edge AI capabilities, including next-generation smartphone technology and relevant mobile operating systems; and \(G\) AI model applications. \(d\) Annual Review of Covered Cyber and Digital Technologies.—The Secretary shall conduct an annual assessment to identify the inclusion or removal of technologies under subsection \(c\) based on the national security risk to the United States of a foreign country of concern gaining significant market share of such technology within a foreign government partner country. \(e\) Risk Mitigation Requirements.—The Secretary shall— \(1\) before approving a partnership under the Program— \(A\) conduct, and submit to the appropriate congressional committees, an initial assessment of cyber and digital technology misuse and diversion risks, including— \(i\) the foreign government partner's export control enforcement capacity; \(ii\) the foreign government partner's history of technology transfer to foreign countries of concern, including permitting remote access to technology; and \(iii\) investments by foreign countries of concern in the foreign government partner's critical sectors; \(B\) establish monitoring and mitigation requirements proportional to the risk assessed under paragraph \(1\); \(C\) include end-use monitoring provisions in all Program agreements; and \(D\) coordinate with the intelligence community and the Department of Defense regarding counterintelligence and national security risks; and \(2\) on an annual basis for the duration of a partnership under the Program, update and submit to the appropriate congressional committees the assessment required by paragraph \(1\) in order to continually assess the conditions described in clauses \(i\), \(ii\), and \(iii\) of paragraph \(1\)\(A\), including any improvements in such conditions. \(f\) Foreign Government Partner Contribution.—For any partnership with a foreign government partner under the Program, the Secretary shall, to the maximum extent practicable, seek to ensure cost-sharing with the foreign government partner to facilitate the foreign government partner's long-term buy-in and sustained procurements of trusted cyber and digital technologies. \(g\) Additional Interagency Coordination.—In implementing the Program, to address challenges associated with affordability, financing, technical evaluations, procurement requirements, and long-term capacity building, the Secretary shall, on a case-by-case basis, coordinate, as appropriate, with the relevant Federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce, the United States International Development Finance Cooperation, and the United States Trade and Development Agency. \(h\) Use of Funds.—Funds made available to carry out the Program shall be used— \(1\) to provide assistance or financing— \(A\) to foreign government partner civilian government agencies; or \(B\) to law enforcement or military agencies, only if such entities are the owners and operators of the foreign government partner's civilian critical infrastructure; and \(2\) to develop blended finance mechanisms, co-developed with the participating foreign government partner, that partners with fund managers, project developers, third-party investors, infrastructure providers, and other private partners to advance the objections outlined in subsection \(b\). \(i\) Partner Disqualification.— \(1\) Prohibition on the use of funds.—No funds shall be made available under this subtitle to— \(A\) a foreign country of concern; or \(B\) any country, entity, or person— \(i\) upon which sanctions are imposed by the United States Department of the Treasury; or \(ii\) that is an entity or person on the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations. \(2\) Vetting.—The Secretary shall vet foreign government partners to determine whether there is credible information that such partner— \(A\) has committed serious human rights abuses or engaged in corruption, as defined by section 1 of Executive Order 13818 \(50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of persons involved in serious human rights abuse or corruption\), or is determined to be ineligible for assistance pursuant to section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2378d\); and \(B\) uses or is likely to use technologies outlined in subsection \(c\) and supported by this subtitle to engage in— \(i\) violations of human rights; \(ii\) targeted or bulk surveillance in violation of rule of law principles or fundamental freedoms; \(iii\) the monitoring of journalists, activists, human rights defenders, opposition parties, or political dissidents; \(iv\) internet shutdowns or to limit or control elections or protests; \(v\) political censorship or the targeting and suppression of political speech or political opponents; \(vi\) denial of access to technology or services based on race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or other discriminatory factors; and \(vii\) acts of transnational repression. \(3\) Disqualification.—Any foreign government partner determined by the Secretary to engage in the activities described in paragraph \(2\)\(B\) shall be ineligible for support or assistance under this subtitle. \(j\) Regional Technology Officers.—The Secretary shall, to the maximum extent practicable, leverage the Department of State's Regional Technology Officer Program, pursuant to section 9508 of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 \(22 U.S.C. 10305\), to assist United States overseas missions in identifying foreign government partners to participate in the Program. \(k\) Foreign Commercial Officers.—As appropriate, the Secretary shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, seek to leverage the Foreign Commercial Officer Program to assist United States overseas missions in identifying foreign government partners to participate in the Program. \(l\) Congressional Notification Requirement.—Not later than 15 days before amounts from the Cyberspace, Digital Connectivity, and Related Technologies \(CDT\) Fund are obligated for purposes of carrying out this section, the Secretary shall submit notification of such obligation to— \(1\) the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate; \(2\) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; \(3\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives; and \(4\) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. \(m\) Annual Report.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes— \(1\) a complete list of participating foreign government partners in the Program; \(2\) progress and results achieved in the previous calendar year; \(3\) the overall amount of purchases or investments each foreign government partner has made since initial participation in the Program; \(4\) specific trusted cyber and digital technologies provided to participating foreign government partners, including— \(A\) the name of the provider company or companies; \(B\) the total value of the procurements; \(C\) description of the capability; and \(D\) how the procured capability addresses the original request submitted by the foreign government partner, if applicable; \(5\) next steps for each participating foreign government partner in their respective Program pipeline; \(6\) any challenges for a foreign government partner's participation in the Program, including how those challenges are being addressed; and \(7\) how risks related to technology transfer, if applicable, are being mitigated. \(n\) Authorization of Appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated $500,000,000 for fiscal year 2026 through fiscal year 2031 to the Cyberspace, Digital Connectivity, and Related Technologies \(CDT\) Fund under section 592 of the Foreign Assistance Act for Fiscal Year 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2349cc-1\) for purposes of carrying out this section. \(o\) Sunset.—The Program and its associated authorities established under this section shall terminate on the date that is eight years after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 8775. OFFICE OF UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY PROCUREMENT. \(a\) Designation of Responsibility.—The Secretary shall designate an existing office within the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy of the Department of State, or newly establish an Office of United States Technology Procurement \(referred to in this subtitle as the “Office”\), which shall be responsible for administering the Program. \(b\) Personnel.— \(1\) Composition.—The Office shall be comprised of a Director, a Deputy Director, and such other staff as the Secretary deems appropriate. \(2\) Staffing.—The Office shall include personnel with demonstrated expertise or experience in performing the following functions: \(A\) Grant design and management. \(B\) Program monitoring, evaluation, and learning. \(C\) Cyber and digital technology commercialization, deployment, or procurement. \(3\) Director.—The Director of the Office shall fulfill the following responsibilities: \(A\) Identify, on an annual basis, specific strategic priorities for the Program consistent with United States national security priorities and objectives. \(B\) In coordination with the other relevant officials, select and approve all partnerships with foreign government partners under the Program. \(C\) Conduct oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the Program, including long-term outcome assessments, to ensure the Program advances United States foreign policy and national security interests and to ensure monitoring, evaluation, and learning results directly inform future grant decisions. \(D\) Ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that all Program activities are carried out in coordination with other Federal efforts to promote the United States technology stack overseas. \(E\) Compiling and submitting the list required by section 1284\(m\). \(4\) Deputy director.—The Deputy Director of the Office may have responsibility for policy and programming to assist the Director, particularly with respect to coordination with other United States departments and agencies. \(c\) Authorization of Appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated $2,000,000 for fiscal years 2026 through 2028 for the purposes of implementing the Office. SEC. 8776. EXPANDING NECESSARY TECHNOLOGY AND RELATED EXPERTISE AT UNITED STATES OVERSEAS MISSIONS. \(a\) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that, for the United States Government to successfully implement the Program, it is vital that the United States recruit and retain the necessary talent to facilitate such partnerships. \(b\) In General.—The Secretary shall, to the maximum extent possible, take measures to ensure that United States overseas missions in countries that are participating in the Program host at least one full-time personnel with demonstrated proficiency in matters related to cybersecurity, technology, and other related expertise to sufficiently carry out the Program. SEC. 8777. EXTENDING AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE REGIONAL TECHNOLOGY OFFICER PROGRAM. Subsection \(d\) of section 9508 of the Department of State Authorization Act of 2022 \(22 U.S.C. 10305\) is amended by striking “2027” and inserting “2032”. SEC. 8778. PRESERVING MARKET-BASED COMPETITION FOR CYBER AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES. \(a\) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to support market-based mechanisms for the export and adoption of United States cyber and digital technologies abroad, and to oppose state-directed or state-controlled economic models that risk to displace or crowd out private- sector competition in cyber and digital technology markets. \(b\) In General.—Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to permit the Secretary, in coordination with other relevant Federal agencies, in carrying out the program outlined in section 1284\(a\)— \(1\) to unduly interfere with, or seek to substitute for, market-based competition among United States cyber and digital technology providers; \(2\) to condition access to program support on the acceptance of commercial terms, partnerships, or business arrangements that United States cyber and digital technology providers would not voluntarily accept in an arm's length commercial transaction; or \(3\) to require foreign government partners to receive approval from the United States Government for procurements from United States cyber and digital technology providers pursued outside the Program, except as otherwise required by any other regulations or Federal law. \(c\) Cyber and Digital Technology Small Business Owners.— Notwithstanding subsection \(a\), in carrying out the Program, the Secretary may provide targeted assistance, including capacity-building support and the facilitation of foreign government partner engagement, to United States small businesses and companies that lack the global reach, existing relationships, or resources to compete independently in foreign government partner procurement markets, provided that such assistance does not confer an unfair competitive advantage over other United States cyber and digital technology providers. SEC. 8779. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT. Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every two years until the termination of the Program's authorities, the Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a review of the Program. The review shall include an assessment of the Department of State's implementation of the Program, including— \(1\) the Department of State's capacity to implement the Program, including personnel and budgetary resources; \(2\) whether the Department of State has established the necessary processes and procedures to successfully achieve the Program objectives outlined in section 8774; \(3\) the Department of State's ability to conduct appropriate monitoring and evaluation of Program implementation; \(4\) any technologies added or removed from the list under section 8774\(c\) of covered cyber and digital technologies; and \(5\) any other elements deemed necessary by the Comptroller General of the United States. SEC. 8780. FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER TECHNOLOGY CAREER TRACK FEASIBILITY STUDY AND REPORT. Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall— \(1\) conduct a study to determine the feasibility and advisability of establishing a dedicated technology policy career track or “cone” for Foreign Service officers; and \(2\) submit a report containing a summary of the results of such study to the appropriate committees of Congress. SEC. 8780A. DERIVATION OF FUNDS. Amounts made available to carry out this subtitle shall be derived from amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of State. Subtitle G—Countering China's Control of the Caucasus Act SEC. 8791. SHORT TITLE. This subtitle may be cited as the “Countering China's Control of the Caucasus Act of 2026”. SEC. 8792. REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS. \(a\) Report on Russian and Chinese Intelligence Assets in Georgia.— \(1\) Defined term.—In this section, the term “relevant congressional committees” means— \(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; \(B\) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; \(C\) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; \(D\) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; \(E\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; \(F\) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; \(G\) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and \(H\) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. \(2\) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a classified report, as appropriate, to the relevant congressional committees that meets the requirements set forth in paragraph \(3\). \(3\) Contents.—The report required under paragraph \(2\) shall— \(A\) be prepared consistent with the protection of sources and methods; \(B\) examine the penetration of Russian and Chinese intelligence elements and their assets in Georgia; and \(C\) examine the potential intersection of Russian and Chinese influence and cooperation in Georgia. \(b\) 5-Year United States Strategy for Bilateral Relations With Georgia.— \(1\) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the relevant congressional committees a detailed strategy that— \(A\) outlines specific objectives for enhancing bilateral ties which reflect the current domestic political environment in Georgia; \(B\) includes a determination of the tools, resources, and funding that should be available to achieve the objectives outlined pursuant to subparagraph \(A\) and an assessment of whether Georgia should remain a top recipient of United States funding in the Europe and Eurasia region; \(C\) includes a determination of the extent to which the United States should continue to invest in its partnership with Georgia; and \(D\) includes a determination of whether the Government of Georgia remains committed to expanding trade ties with the United States and Europe and whether the United States Government should continue to invest in Georgian projects. \(2\) Form.—The report required under paragraph \(1\) shall be submitted in unclassified form, with a classified annex. Subtitle H—Saving Lives and Taxpayer Dollars Act SEC. 8793. ANNUAL REPORT. \(a\) Short Title.—This section may be cited as the “Saving Lives and Taxpayer Dollars Act”. \(b\) In General.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through December 31, 2030, the Secretary, in coordination with the head of the relevant Federal department or agency responsible for administering assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.\) or under the Food for Peace Act \(Public Law 83-480; 7 U.S.C. 1721 et seq\) shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes any foreign assistance product or commodity that, despite all reasonable efforts to prevent contamination, spoilage, or expiration or, having reached the end of a product's useful life under the laws of the United States or of the recipient country, was destroyed during the reporting period. \(c\) Contents.—The report required under subsection \(b\) shall include, for each product or commodity that was contaminated, spoiled, expired, or reached the end of its useful life and was destroyed— \(1\) a description of the reasonable efforts made to prevent waste and ensure the product or commodity reached the intended beneficiaries; \(2\) the reason the product or commodity could not be made available to the intended beneficiaries, including a description of any relevant domestic laws or regulations of the intended beneficiary country that impeded or prohibited the delivery, donation or sale of such product or commodity prior to its spoilage, expiration date, or the date on which the product reached the end of its useful life; \(3\) the purpose of the product or commodity and the geographic locations of the intended beneficiaries of such product or commodity; \(4\) the procured and market value of the products or commodity; and \(5\) the cost incurred to destroy the product or commodity, as applicable. \(d\) Definitions.—In this section: \(1\) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means— \(A\) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; \(B\) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; \(C\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and \(D\) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. \(2\) Foreign assistance product or commodity.—The term “foreign assistance product or commodity” means any product or commodity provided by the United States Government under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.\) or under the Food for Peace Act \(Public Law 83-480; 7 U.S.C. 1721 et seq.\), including food, specialized nutrition products, medicines, vaccines, and medical supplies and devices that are procured, acquired, managed, controlled, or held in warehouse, ships, shipping containers, or any other storage facility, by the United States Government or an implementing partner of the United States Government. \(3\) Reporting period.—The term “reporting period” means— \(A\) with respect to the initial report required under subsection \(b\), the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on the date on which such report is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees; and \(B\) with respect to all subsequent reports required under subsection \(b\), the period beginning on the day after the date on which the prior report was submitted pursuant to subsection \(b\) and ending on the date on which the next report is submitted. Subtitle I—Reporting on Syria SEC. 8794. REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE. \(a\) Report Required.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the foreign assistance strategy of the United States in support of United States-Syria policy and provides comprehensive details on foreign assistance programs \(including humanitarian and nonhumanitarian efforts\) inside Syria paused or canceled since January 2025. \(b\) Elements.—The report required under subsection \(a\) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements: \(1\) A listing of any United States foreign assistance program currently operating in Syria, including a description of the scope of each program and how each program serves United States objectives in Syria. \(2\) A description of efforts to leverage international donors, multilateral organizations, charities, or other external funders to fill gaps, where they exist. \(3\) An accounting of all sustained and ongoing humanitarian and foreign assistance programs inside Syria, including a comprehensive description of each project, any supporting organizations, relevant details related to funding, performance metrics, progress towards meeting United States objectives, and other relevant details, as needed. SEC. 8794A. STRATEGY ON ISIS-RELATED DETAINEE AND DISPLACEMENT CAMPS IN SYRIA. Section 1262 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 \(Public Law 118-31\) is amended— \(1\) in subsection \(e\)\(1\), by inserting “, and annually thereafter through January 2029,” after “Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act”; and \(2\) in subsection \(f\)\(1\)— \(A\) in the matter preceding subparagraph \(A\), by striking “January 31, 2025” and inserting “January 31, 2029”; and \(B\) in subparagraph \(A\), by striking clause \(ii\) and inserting the following: “\(ii\) an assessment of the status of all United States efforts, including via foreign assistance, to encourage and facilitate repatriation and reintegration of all individuals from such camps, consistent with all relevant domestic and applicable international laws;”. SEC. 8794B. STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH SYRIAN AUTHORITIES AND FOR EVALUATING SECURITY AT THE UNITED STATES MISSION. \(a\) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that— \(1\) the United States should take measures to expand its engagement with Syrian authorities in support of mutual national security interests, such as combating terrorism, eliminating chemical weapons, and mitigating Captagon smuggling; and \(2\) the Department of State should take measures to evaluate and mitigate known security vulnerabilities at the United States mission in Damascus in support of eventually reopening the embassy compound for official usage. \(b\) Report Required.— \(1\) In general.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until January 1, 2029, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the strategy of the United States to establish and sustain deepened engagement with Syrian authorities and assesses in detail the security conditions at the United States mission in Damascus and any known security preparations to re-establish operations on the compound. \(2\) Elements.—The report required under paragraph \(1\) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements: \(A\) A strategy to strengthen and sustain broader United States engagement with Syrian authorities, which includes policy objectives, staffing plans domestically and overseas, regional engagement efforts, and efforts to engage Syrians, including activists, political groups, and civil society organizations. \(B\) A detailed accounting of progress made on the engagement strategy, including meetings, travel, staffing patterns and changes, and notable gaps or areas where additional engagement is needed. \(C\) A comprehensive assessment of security conditions at the United States mission in Damascus, any notable changes or progress made towards hardening security, and any progress towards re-establishing a permanent presence or re-opening the embassy. SEC. 8794C. STRATEGY TO ENSURE THE ENDURING DEFEAT OF ISIS IN SYRIA. \(a\) Strategy Required.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy to combat and prevent the further resurgence of ISIS and its affiliates in Syria. \(b\) Elements of the Strategy.—The strategy required under subsection \(a\) shall include the following elements: \(1\) A summary of the United States national security interests in Syria and the impact a resurgence of ISIS would have on those interests. \(2\) A comprehensive assessment of current training and support programs by agency or department, specifically focused on countering ISIS and other terrorist organizations, including nonlethal assistance, training, and organizational capacity for the Syrian authorities and others to counter gains by ISIS and its affiliates. \(3\) A detailed description of United States Government efforts to support, develop, and expand the capacity of Syrian authorities to combat ISIS and prevent its return. \(4\) An estimate of the number of current, active ISIS members in Iraq and Syria, including an assessment of those being held in detainee camps or prisons. \(5\) A comprehensive plan to repatriate or secure ISIS detainees currently being held in Syria and Iraq, including— \(A\) repatriation, transfer, prosecution, and intelligence- gathering; \(B\) coordinating a whole-of-government approach with other countries and international organizations, including INTERPOL, to ensure secure chains of custody and locations of ISIS foreign terrorist fighter detainees; \(C\) coordinating technical and evidentiary assistance to foreign countries to aid in the successful prosecution of ISIS foreign terrorist fighter detainees; and \(D\) all multilateral and international engagements led by the Department of State and other agencies that are related to the current and future handling, detention, and prosecution of ISIS foreign terrorist fighter detainees; \(E\) engagement with international partners on legal, tenable mechanisms for repatriating foreign fighters; and \(F\) a plan for how funds in appropriations Acts will support disarmament, demobilization, disengagement, deradicalization, and reintegration of current and former members and affiliates of ISIS and their family members. \(6\) A description, which may be in classified form, of ISIS senior leadership and infrastructure and efforts to target leadership figures. \(7\) A comprehensive description of the activities of the United States Government, utilizing social media and other communication technologies, to counter ISIS's propaganda and influence and its ability to use such technologies to recruit fighters domestically and internationally, including through private technology companies and a description of how such activities are being coordinated across the United States Government. \(8\) A description of the steps taken by the United States Government, including through the use of economic sanctions to deny financial resources to ISIS and its affiliates, in conjunction with international partners and financial institutions. \(9\) A description of United States Government efforts to support credible war crimes prosecutions against ISIS fighters. \(10\) A plan to ensure the delivery of humanitarian and reintegration assistance. \(c\) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means— \(1\) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and \(2\) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. Subtitle J—Additional Authorities SEC. 8795. REPEALS OF SYRIA SANCTIONS STATUTES. \(a\) Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003.—The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 \(Public Law 108- 175; 22 U.S.C. 2151 note\) is repealed. \(b\) Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012.—The Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012 \(title VII of Public Law 112-158; 22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq.\) is repealed. SEC. 8796. ESTABLISHMENT OF UKRAINE LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE. \(a\) Establishment.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall establish a joint interagency task force, to be known as the “Ukraine Lessons Learned Task Force” \(referred to in this section as the “Task Force”\). \(b\) Purposes.—The purposes of the Task Force are— \(1\) identifying, evaluating, and synthesizing key battlefield innovations, operational practices, and defense strategies employed by Ukraine in its resistance to Russian aggression; \(2\) assessing the relevance of such lessons to United States military doctrine, training, logistics, acquisition, and strategic planning; \(3\) recommending specific changes or pilot programs to integrate such lessons into United States defense systems; \(4\) identifying vulnerabilities in United States systems highlighted by Ukraine's experience, including through joint operations such as Operation Spider Web; and \(5\) coordinating with NATO allies and Ukrainian defense counterparts, as appropriate. \(c\) Reporting Requirements.— \(1\) Annual report to congress.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the congressional defense committees a report that includes— \(A\) a summary of the findings and assessments conducted by the Task Force; \(B\) recommendations for changes to doctrine, training, acquisition, or organizational structure; \(C\) an overview of any pilot programs or implementation actions taken in response to such recommendations; and \(D\) a classified annex with detailed assessments, to the extent necessary. \(2\) Public version.—An unclassified version of the report required under paragraph \(1\) that excludes sensitive and classified information shall be made available to the public through a public website. \(d\) Integration Into Military Training and Strategy.—The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall ensure that relevant findings from the Task Force are— \(1\) incorporated into professional military education curricula, including at the National Defense University, service academies, and war colleges; \(2\) reflected in joint and service-specific training exercises and war games; and \(3\) considered in the development of future operational concepts and planning scenarios. \(e\) NATO and Allied Coordination.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall coordinate with NATO allies— \(1\) to share and compare assessments of lessons learned from Ukraine's defense; \(2\) to promote interoperability in defense innovation; and \(3\) to explore the establishment of a multilateral “Defense Innovation Lessons Hub” or similar mechanism. \(f\) Sunset.—This section shall cease to have any force or effect beginning on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 8797. POLAND DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION PROGRAM. \(a\) Establishment.—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall establish a program to expand cooperation between the defense industrial bases of the United States and Poland to expand co-production capacity, enhance supply chain resilience, and support operational readiness for United States and allied forces. The program shall seek to— \(1\) enhance bilateral cooperation between the United States and Poland; \(2\) reduce barriers to co-production between the United States and Poland; and \(3\) strengthen NATO's deterrence capability, including against malign influence from the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China. \(b\) Elements.—The program established pursuant to subsection \(a\) may also include the following: \(1\) Co-production of munitions, ground combat systems, air combat systems and other critical defense articles. \(2\) The establishment and expansion of forward repair, maintenance, and sustainment capabilities in Poland. \(3\) The identification and authorization of technology transfer necessary to establish co-production of co- sustainment capabilities in Poland that support the Armed Forces in Poland and NATO's deterrence capabilities. \(4\) The development of redundant and resilient supply chains to carry out the objectives described in paragraphs \(1\) through \(3\) of subsection \(a\). \(5\) Actions to identify and mitigate barriers to defense industrial base cooperation, including barriers relating to export controls, technology transfer, or contracting practices. \(c\) Authorities.—In carrying out the program established pursuant to subsection \(a\), the Secretary of Defense shall coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies, including the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, in order to— \(1\) enter into contracts, cooperative agreements, and other bilateral agreements \(including under section 4022 of title 10, United States Code\); and \(2\) provide technical assistance, training, and equipment relating to defense industrial base cooperation. \(d\) Industry Engagement.—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall seek to coordinate with appropriate counterparts of Poland to convene an annual industry roundtable consisting of United States and Polish defense companies, with the goal of expanding cooperation and engagement across sectors and between government and industry with respect to activities to implement the program established pursuant to subsection \(a\). \(e\) Report.—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall annually for a period of 5 years submit to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on— \(1\) any additional legislative authorities required to carry out the program established pursuant to subsection \(a\) or any of the elements described in subsection \(b\); and \(2\) any regulatory or policy barriers to achieving the objectives described in paragraphs \(1\) through \(3\) of subsection \(a\). ## Official source - [Download the official section PDF](https://api.govinfo.gov/packages/CREC-2026-06-24/granules/CREC-2026-06-24-pt1-PgS3681-4/pdf)