Sponsors (3)
Want to know what is actually in this bill?
This is not an official government website.
Copyright © 2026 PLEJ LC. All rights reserved.
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Introduced March 12, 2025 by James Lankford · Last progress March 12, 2025
Requires the U.S. government to identify Chinese universities that support the People’s Liberation Army or participate in China’s military‑civil fusion and then restricts federal relationships with entities that partner with those institutions. It blocks Department of Defense RDT&E money and certain classified‑facility approvals for entities contracting with listed institutions, allows visa denials for students/employees of listed institutions, and bars Department of Education K–12 funding to U.S. schools that contract with China‑domiciled entities. It also prohibits federal RDT&E funds to entities that contract with either the listed Chinese institutions or Commerce’s Entity List, authorizes U.S.–Taiwan educational partnerships/grants for Mandarin and cultural programs, and makes a small technical edit to Higher Education Act text.
Defines “appropriate committees of Congress” to mean, for the Senate: the Committee on Armed Services; the Select Committee on Intelligence; and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions; and for the House of Representatives: the Committee on Armed Services; the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; and the Committee on Education and the Workforce.
Defines “institution of higher education domiciled in the People’s Republic of China” to mean an institution that is under the control or supervision, in whole or in part, of either (A) the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China or (B) the State Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense of the People’s Republic of China.
States that the term “K–12 education” has the meaning given in section 5002(10) of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020, which is codified at 15 U.S.C. 9401(10).
The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, must identify each institution of higher education domiciled in the People’s Republic of China that provides support to the People’s Liberation Army, is involved in implementing the People’s Republic of China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy, or participates in the People’s Republic of China’s defense industrial base.
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of each entity identified under subsection (a).
Who is affected and how:
Institutions of higher education: U.S. and foreign universities that partner with or host joint research with PRC‑domiciled universities identified as supporting the PLA or Military‑Civil Fusion will face direct funding and access consequences. U.S. universities that maintain active partnerships with listed Chinese institutions may lose eligibility for DoD RDT&E cooperation via their partners, and could encounter limits on exchange activities and student flows.
Department of Defense research recipients and defense contractors: Any entity that holds contracts or research partnerships with listed Chinese institutions (or with China‑domiciled entities on the Commerce Entity List) becomes ineligible for DoD RDT&E funds, potentially disrupting existing subcontracting chains and collaborative projects. Companies must audit subcontractors and partners for ties to listed institutions.
K–12 schools and education providers: Elementary and secondary schools with contracts with entities domiciled in the PRC would lose federal K–12 funding. Schools and local education agencies will need to review vendor relationships and curriculum/provider contracts for ties to PRC‑domiciled entities.
Visa applicants and international students/employees: Nonimmigrant applicants in categories affected by INA subsections (F and J types) who are students or employees of listed institutions may be denied U.S. visas, reducing mobility for affected scholars and possibly limiting campus exchange programs.
Classified facility applicants and parent companies: Organizations seeking approval to host or store classified information must certify no active research partnerships with listed institutions; that certification creates compliance obligations and potential denial of classified access where concerns exist.
Federal agencies and compliance costs: DNI, DoD/DCSA, State, Education, and DOJ/Commerce (via Entity List coordination) will have operational burdens for identification, verification, compliance reviews, and enforcement. Agencies and private entities will incur administrative and legal costs to assess partnerships, amend contracts, and implement screening and certification processes.
Research ecosystem and international collaboration: The measures create legal and financial barriers to certain U.S–China academic and research collaborations, which may chill legitimate scientific partnerships and slow joint projects. At the same time, the bill promotes U.S.–Taiwan educational partnerships and Mandarin/cultural programming, shifting some educational collaboration toward Taiwan.
Diplomatic and trade implications: The targeted restrictions on Chinese‑domiciled partners and references to the Commerce Entity List could increase U.S.–China tensions and complicate relations around academic exchange, visas, and trade in controlled technologies.
Legal and equity risks: Entities and individuals affected may challenge listing decisions or the application of funding/visa restrictions. There is also risk of overbroad disruption where institutions have indirect or historical ties to listed entities rather than active defense partnerships.
Overall effect: The legislation sharply narrows federal research and education relationships with entities connected to PRC‑domiciled institutions deemed linked to military programs or subject to export control lists, reallocates some support toward Taiwan partnerships, and creates cross‑agency compliance and enforcement obligations with potential operational, legal, and diplomatic consequences.
Expand sections to see detailed analysis
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Introduced in Senate