Sponsors (5)
Condemns Russia’s ballistic missile attacks on Ukraine and calls for stronger U.S. support to defend Ukraine. The resolution urges the President to identify and transfer U.S. air defense systems (including PATRIOTs), approve allied reexports of air defense equipment, and continue security assistance such as training, advisory support, and intelligence to help Ukraine withstand ballistic attacks.
Between January and May 2025, hundreds of Ukrainian civilians were killed and injured in Russian ballistic missile attacks; the Palm Sunday attack on Sumy killed 35 civilians and injured 113; an April attack on a playground in Kryvyi Rih killed 20 people (including 9 children) and injured 75.
The Government of Russia used ballistic missiles against civilian infrastructure, destroying over half of Ukraine’s power generation capacity and leaving hospitals, schools, and families without power while risking nuclear catastrophe.
North Korea reportedly supplied Russia with approximately 250 ballistic missiles since fall 2024, and Ukrainian air defense reports indicate Russia used North Korean KN–23 missiles in 6 out of 9 ballistic attacks on Ukraine in May 2025.
The range, speed, and power of Russia’s ballistic missiles, including various short-, air-, and intermediate-range missile types, have allowed Russia to terrorize the people of Ukraine and damage infrastructure relied on by civilians.
Although Ukraine has produced domestic air defenses and used Western help to counter drones and cruise missiles, defense against Russian ballistic missile attacks requires sophisticated systems—primarily the United States Army’s PATRIOT air defense system—supported by a network of short- and medium-range systems across Ukraine.
Primary direct beneficiaries would be the people of Ukraine if additional air defense systems reduce civilian casualties and protect critical infrastructure. Ukraine’s military would gain capability against ballistic missile threats, improving survivability of population centers and power systems. U.S. and allied defense industries could see increased demand for air defense systems and related logistics/support services. U.S. foreign policy and defense personnel would be affected administratively and operationally through planning, logistics, training, intelligence-sharing, and potential forward deployments or sustainment work. Congressional and executive authorities would need to coordinate on export approvals and any funding or drawdown authorities; because this is a non-binding resolution, it does not itself appropriate funds but could increase political pressure on the Administration to act, with subsequent budgetary and diplomatic effects. There is also a diplomatic and escalation risk: transferring high-end systems and facilitating reexports may draw criticism from adversaries and could be politically contentious domestically.
Last progress June 5, 2025 (8 months ago)
Introduced on June 5, 2025 by Charles Ellis Schumer
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (text: CR S3256)