Summary

Creates a whole-of-government effort to identify, analyze, and disrupt growing cooperation among four named U.S. adversary states by directing six Cabinet-level and intelligence leaders to stand up departmental “adversary alignment” task forces, require interagency coordination, and order a classified intelligence assessment on current and projected bilateral and multilateral cooperation among those states. It declares U.S. policy to use sanctions, export controls, information exposure, and partner coordination to limit the adversaries’ joint capabilities and prepares for possible simultaneous or cascading threats. Requires each designated department/office to form a task force and point of contact within 60 days, deliver internal reports within 180 days, and have the task-force heads meet quarterly; directs the Director of National Intelligence to deliver a classified report within 60 days assessing cooperation, risks to U.S. diplomacy, military operations, intelligence collection, technology transfers, and economic tools over a five-year trajectory. The measure is administrative and analytic in nature—no new appropriations are specified—but could lead to expanded use of sanctions, export controls, and operational changes affecting federal agencies, military planners, financial institutions, researchers, and some private-sector contractors and exporters.

• Directs six senior executive-branch leaders (State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, DNI, CIA) to create departmental 'adversary alignment' task forces and name points of contact within 60 days.
• Requires task forces to include experts on the four named adversary states and to report operational impacts and organizational recommendations to agency heads and Congress within 180 days.
• Mandates a classified DNI report within 60 days analyzing current and projected cooperation among the adversary states and the risks to U.S. diplomacy, military, intelligence, and economic tools over five years.
• Declares U.S. policy to disrupt cooperation among the adversaries by threatening and using sanctions and export controls, exposing cooperation, and sharing information with allies and partners.
• Emphasizes interagency coordination: the six task-force heads must meet at least quarterly to synchronize efforts.
• Does not appropriate new funds or change statutory sanction/export-control authorities; implementation would rely on existing agency resources and authorities.
• Targets areas including technology transfers, alternative payment systems, joint military activity, disinformation/cyber coordination, and economic circumvention that could erode U.S. advantages.
• Could increase scrutiny and compliance burdens for entities involved in dual-use research, exports, defense contracting, and international technology partnerships.