Sponsors (2)
The resolution increases U.S. awareness of and potential responses to PRC influence in Latin America—supporting targeted security and economic measures—while risking diplomatic friction with local governments and limiting some academic and cultural exchanges.
State governments and U.S. policymakers are alerted to expanded PRC influence in Latin America, enabling more targeted diplomatic, intelligence, and security responses.
Financial institutions and state governments may gain support for U.S. competitive financing or investment programs because the resolution highlights PRC investments and loans in the region.
State and local governments that pursue Chinese investment may face strained relations with the U.S. government as PRC engagement is characterized as a security threat.
Students and schools/universities may see reduced academic and cultural cooperation (for example, Confucius Institutes and journalist exchanges) if such programs are framed as PRC influence operations.
Based on analysis of 1 section of legislative text.
Makes official findings that the PRC has greatly expanded security, economic, diplomatic, media, and institutional engagement across Latin America and the Caribbean and documents specific loans, projects, and influence operations.
Official title: Expressing concern about the increasing influence of the People's Republic of China in Latin America and the Caribbean and calling for strengthened United States economic, security, and diplomatic engagement in the region.
Introduced April 30, 2026 by Jeanne Shaheen · Last progress April 30, 2026
Declares that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has sharply expanded its security, economic, diplomatic, media, and institutional engagement across Latin America and the Caribbean, and lists specific loans, investments, projects, and influence activities as findings. The preamble quantifies trade growth, cites major financing and infrastructure projects, and raises concerns about PRC arms sales, training, influence operations, media outreach, and institutional footprints (e.g., Confucius Institutes), and names countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.