Sponsors (2)
The bill improves transparency and preparedness for GPS/PNT threats—helping civilian infrastructure, military planners, and policymakers—but risks higher taxpayer costs, staff diversion, and potential exposure of sensitive vulnerabilities if information is not handled carefully.
Operators of civilian infrastructure (airlines, shipping, power grids, state and local emergency services) get clearer visibility into GPS/PNT threats and timelines for terrestrial backups, enabling better contingency planning and reducing disruption risk.
Congress and federal policymakers receive unclassified findings on PNT risks and mitigation options, enabling more informed, targeted investment and legislative action on resilience.
Military leaders and allies gain a clearer assessment of GPS risks, redundancy timelines, and competitor capabilities (PRC, Russia, Iran, DPRK), improving operational preparedness and allied burden-sharing.
Implementing the report's likely recommendations (expanded terrestrial or space-based PNT) could require significant new defense-related spending, increasing costs borne by taxpayers.
Publishing an unclassified report that outlines vulnerabilities and mitigation timelines could, if not carefully redacted, reveal information adversaries might exploit and thereby raise security risks.
Preparing the comprehensive assessment will consume DoD staff time and resources, potentially diverting personnel and attention from other operational programs.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Requires DoD to report within 1 year on GPS/PNT risks, adversary threats, resilience programs, and a 10–15 year redundancy roadmap.
Official title: Require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on risks to the Global Positioning System and associated positioning, navigation, and timing services.
Introduced July 15, 2025 by Margaret Wood Hassan · Last progress July 15, 2025
Requires the Secretary of Defense to deliver an unclassified assessment (with optional classified annex) within one year that evaluates risks to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) and associated PNT services, including threats from competitor nations, the consequences of GPS loss for the U.S. and its allies, and current DoD programs to build redundant space- and ground-based PNT capability. The report must assess specific adversary capabilities, the Space Force’s Resilient GPS program’s ability to reach full capacity within 10 years, and provide a framework for a full-scale terrestrial PNT redundancy system that could be operational within 15 years. This is a reporting and planning requirement — it does not itself authorize spending or create new programs, but it directs the Department of Defense to analyze vulnerabilities and lay out timelines and frameworks for building resilient alternatives to GPS-based positioning, navigation, and timing services.