Sponsors (2)
The bill improves transparency and identifies near-term GPS/PNT vulnerabilities to spur investments that protect critical services, at the cost of likely higher government spending and a tilt toward military-managed resilience that could sideline civilian or cooperative options and increase geopolitical friction.
Utilities, energy companies, and transportation workers will get identified gaps and timelines for resilient GPS (R–GPS) and redundant PNT, enabling faster, targeted investments to protect critical services.
Military planners and policymakers will receive a clear, unclassified assessment of GPS/PNT vulnerabilities and competitor capabilities within one year, improving operational planning and force readiness.
Taxpayers, state governments, and the public will gain greater congressional oversight and transparency because the bill requires an unclassified report (with a classified annex option) on PNT resilience efforts.
Taxpayers may face higher costs because the assessments could lead to increased defense procurement and program spending to harden GPS/PNT capabilities.
State governments and critical infrastructure operators could see civilian-led or international cooperative PNT solutions deprioritized if the focus shifts toward military-managed resilience approaches.
The explicit naming of specific countries (PRC, Russia, Iran, DPRK) could heighten geopolitical tensions or be used to justify more escalatory military postures abroad, affecting broader national security and diplomatic stability.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Requires DoD to report within one year on GPS/PNT risks, adversary capabilities, redundancy efforts, R‑GPS readiness in 10 years, and a 15‑year terrestrial redundancy framework.
Introduced July 15, 2025 by Margaret Wood Hassan · Last progress July 15, 2025
Requires the Secretary of Defense to deliver an unclassified report (with an optional classified annex) within one year assessing risks to GPS and related positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services, including threats during conflict or attacks on U.S. allies. The report must evaluate adversary capabilities (naming the PRC, Russia, Iran, and DPRK), current DoD efforts to build redundant PNT options (space, terrestrial, and quantum), the Space Force’s Resilient GPS (R‑GPS) program timeline to reach full capacity within 10 years, and a framework for a terrestrial GPS redundancy system that could be operational within 15 years. The bill also defines which congressional committees receive the report and defines “United States ally” to explicitly include NATO members, major non‑NATO allies under 22 U.S.C. 2403(q), and Taiwan.