The bill aims to expand and coordinate U.S. support (tools, training, funding, and policy clarity) to help Iranians access secure communications and preserve commercial satellite access, but it requires taxpayer funding, raises legal and diplomatic risks, and may expose users if operational-security and oversight gaps are not fully addressed.
Iranian citizens, journalists, human-rights defenders, and activists will gain wider access to secure communications tools (VPNs, satellite-to-phone, DTC, eSIM-enabled services) plus training and multilingual safety materials that reduce surveillance risk and enable communication during blackouts or emergencies.
U.S.-licensed satellite and direct-to-consumer (DTC) operators are required not to intentionally block coverage over Iran and the State Department is directed to advocate internationally to preserve satellite roaming and market access, protecting connectivity where technically available and safeguarding commercial opportunities.
The bill clarifies and directs interagency review (Treasury, Commerce) so that sanctions and export-control interpretation are less likely to unintentionally block civilian secure-communications technologies, reducing procurement and legal barriers for providers and users.
People in Iran (activists, journalists, dissidents) could face greater risk of surveillance, arrest, or reprisals if distribution of circumvention tools and advocacy is not tightly coupled with robust operational-security practices and safeguards.
Expanded diplomatic, technical, and operational activity to support circumvention and communications could escalate tensions with Iran and provoke diplomatic or retaliatory responses that raise regional and U.S. security risks.
Imposes new costs on taxpayers (including $30 million in new spending and additional administrative burdens across State, Commerce, FCC) that could increase the deficit or crowd out other priorities.
Based on analysis of 8 sections of legislative text.
Directs State to lead U.S. efforts to protect and expand internet access in Iran, restricts U.S. licensees from intentionally blocking satellite/DTC coverage over Iran, creates cybersecurity programs, and funds them.
Introduced February 4, 2026 by Eric Swalwell · Last progress February 4, 2026
Requires the State Department to lead U.S. efforts to promote internet access and digital resilience for people in Iran, update the U.S. strategy on internet freedom, and coordinate with other agencies to ensure sanctions and export controls do not unintentionally block civilian access to tools like Direct‑to‑Cell satellite services, eSIM, and VPNs. Limits U.S.-licensed satellite/DTC operators from intentionally disabling or geo‑blocking coverage over Iran (with narrow exceptions), creates State Department‑run cybersecurity and digital‑safety programs for Iranian journalists and civil‑society actors, and provides funding for those activities for FY2027 and FY2028.