Sponsors (17)
The bill expands and funds tools, training, and legal authorities to help Iranians access secure communications and preserves U.S. ability to act quickly, but it increases costs, legal and operational complexity for U.S. companies, poses oversight and privacy risks, and carries diplomatic and effectiveness risks that must be managed.
People in Iran (journalists, activists, civil-society members, and everyday users) gain expanded access to secure connectivity (VPNs, direct‑to‑cell satellites, eSIM provisioning, cybersecurity training and vetted tools) that helps them reach uncensored information and communicate safely during shutdowns.
U.S. companies and service providers get clearer guidance and interagency coordination on sanctions/export‑control carve‑outs and legal authorities, reducing legal uncertainty about providing circumvention tools and services to Iranian civilians.
The bill provides dedicated funding ($30 million across FY2027–2028, available until expended) to sustain internet‑freedom and VPN/engagement programs for Iran, allowing multi‑year program implementation without annual lapse pressure.
U.S. companies and service providers face added legal and compliance burdens because maintaining or enabling coverage and distributing circumvention tools can complicate sanctions and export‑control compliance, increasing administrative risk and potential legal exposure.
Supporting and distributing internet‑circumvention tools risks diplomatic escalation or retaliation from Iran, potentially complicating broader U.S. diplomatic objectives and exposing personnel or programs to security risks.
Several provisions (classified annexes, concentrated committee designations, and open‑ended "until expended" funding) could weaken congressional oversight and reduce transparency and annual budgetary control over programs that affect foreign populations and U.S. policy.
Based on analysis of 8 sections of legislative text.
Directs agencies to promote satellite DTC, VPNs, and eSIM access for Iranians, bars intentional geo‑blocking by U.S.‑licensed operators, funds digital‑safety programs, and authorizes $15M/yr for 2027–28.
Introduced February 4, 2026 by Eric Swalwell · Last progress February 4, 2026
Requires U.S. government action to help people in Iran keep online access when the Iranian government disrupts the internet. It directs the State Department to lead updated strategy and coordination with Treasury and Commerce, tells the FCC to bar U.S.-licensed satellite/direct‑to‑cell services from intentionally excluding Iran, funds digital‑safety training and tools (VPNs, encrypted apps, eSIM help) for journalists and civil‑society actors, and authorizes $15 million per year for 2027 and 2028 to carry those programs while preserving U.S. sanctions and export‑control laws.