Sponsors (7)
The bill increases congressional control to block IMF support to regimes Congress deems culpable of genocide or terrorism, at the cost of reducing executive flexibility and potentially slowing U.S. influence and timely multilateral financial responses in crises.
U.S. taxpayers: prevents automatic IMF allocations of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to governments Congress considers culpable of genocide or terrorism unless Congress enacts a law authorizing such allocations.
Congress and legislative staff: preserves and strengthens congressional oversight by requiring statute to authorize U.S. votes on certain IMF SDR allocations, keeping international financial commitments subject to legislative approval.
U.S. foreign policy actors (President, Treasury) and crisis responders: constrains executive flexibility to vote at the IMF and could delay or block rapid multilateral financial responses during international crises.
U.S. taxpayers and global financial stability: may reduce U.S. influence at the IMF and slow timely provision of global liquidity when congressional approval is required, undermining crisis mitigation and economic stability.
Designated foreign governments, diplomatic actors, and humanitarian organizations: tying SDR restrictions to terrorism/genocide labels could politicize IMF resource distribution and complicate diplomacy and humanitarian responses.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Requires congressional authorization before U.S. officials may vote to allocate IMF SDRs to countries that committed genocide within 10 years or are designated as repeat supporters of terrorism.
Introduced March 26, 2025 by John Neely Kennedy · Last progress March 26, 2025
Prohibits U.S. officials from voting to allocate International Monetary Fund Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to any IMF member whose government committed genocide within the prior 10 years or that, as of enactment, is designated for repeatedly supporting international terrorism — unless Congress passes a law specifically authorizing the vote. The change amends U.S. voting authority on SDR allocations to require case-by-case congressional approval for countries meeting those criteria, limiting executive or agency-level discretion in IMF voting on these allocations.