Declares that any international agreement produced by the World Health Assembly/International Negotiating Body on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response must be treated as a treaty and submitted to the Senate for advice and consent (two-thirds) before the United States can agree to or implement it. It expresses the Senate’s preference that the President not accept or implement such an agreement if it cannot win two‑thirds support in the Senate and records findings and concerns about the WHO and the INB negotiating process. The measure does not create funding or new programs; it sets a binding procedural rule for how the executive branch must treat and approve future WHO pandemic-related instruments negotiated under the INB, limiting executive flexibility by requiring Senate ratification for adoption or implementation by the U.S.
On May 18, 2020, President Donald Trump sent a letter to WHO Director‑General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.
The May 18, 2020 letter announced that U.S. contributions to WHO would be halted because of alleged WHO mismanagement of COVID‑19 and lack of independence from the People’s Republic of China.
The May 18, 2020 letter stated the United States would withdraw from WHO if WHO did not commit to substantive improvements within 30 days.
The May 18, 2020 letter cited specific instances of WHO mismanagement, including unjustified delays informing member states about a potentially serious disease outbreak in Wuhan, China.
The May 18, 2020 letter also cited repeated grossly inaccurate or misleading claims about the virus’s transmissibility and about the Government of China’s handling of the outbreak.
Who is affected and how
United States federal government and executive branch: Negotiators and agencies involved in WHO and INB discussions will face a formal constraint — any INB-originated instrument presented as a WHO convention or agreement must be treated as a treaty and sent to the Senate for ratification before the U.S. can implement it. This limits the President’s ability to adopt binding international obligations by executive agreement in this area.
U.S. Senate: Gains an explicit, statutory basis to expect treaty submissions and to require two‑thirds vote for approval of INB-originated pandemic instruments; it becomes the gatekeeper for U.S. participation in those specific WHO instruments.
U.S. diplomatic relations and international negotiations: Other WHO member states and the WHO may encounter reduced U.S. negotiating flexibility and potential delays in U.S. commitment, which could complicate consensus-building and implementation timelines for global pandemic measures.
Public health community and health-sector entities: International pandemic rules or cooperative measures negotiated at WHO that require rapid, coordinated action could be delayed or not implemented by the U.S. if Senate ratification is not achieved, potentially affecting global and domestic pandemic preparedness and response coordination.
U.S. public and patients: If the United States declines or delays agreement to INB-originated instruments because two‑thirds Senate support is lacking, Americans could be affected indirectly through reduced participation in coordinated global surveillance, information sharing, or resource-pooling arrangements intended to prevent or mitigate pandemics.
Overall effect
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Last progress June 5, 2025 (8 months ago)
Introduced on June 5, 2025 by Ron Johnson
Updated 1 week ago
Last progress June 26, 2025 (7 months ago)
