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Last progress November 12, 2025 (3 months ago)
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Last progress December 18, 2025 (2 months ago)
Creates a Defense Department–led security cooperation initiative — the Partnership — to strengthen the defense industrial bases of the United States and allied and partner countries in the Indo‑Pacific by improving supply‑chain resilience, supporting co‑development and R&D, and building partner industrial capacity. The Secretary of Defense, working with the Secretary of State, must establish and run the Partnership, carry out authorized activities and funding uses, deliver required plans and reports on specified timelines, and may engage listed example partner countries; the authority is limited by a termination date set in the text.
Establish and maintain a security cooperation initiative (the "Partnership") to strengthen cooperation among the defense industrial bases of the United States and allied and partner countries in the Indo‑Pacific region.
Objective: Enable the production and supply of material necessary to equip the Armed Forces of the United States and the military forces of allied and partner countries to achieve (A) objectives in the most recent national security strategy report submitted under section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3043), (B) policy guidance of the Secretary of Defense under section 113(g) of title 10, and (C) the future‑years defense program under section 221 of title 10.
Objective: Strengthen the collective defense industrial base by expanding capability, capacity, and workforce, including enhancing supply chain security, interoperability, and resilience among participating countries.
Objective: Identify and mitigate industrial base vulnerabilities across partner countries.
Objective: Advance research and development activities to provide systems that help ensure technological superiority for U.S. and allied/partner military forces.
Primary direct impacts: U.S. defense contractors, suppliers, and the defense industrial base will gain new opportunities for cooperative projects, co‑development, and joint R&D with allied and partner firms; domestic and partner‑country manufacturers and advanced‑technology firms may win contracts, subcontracts, or R&D partnerships. The defense manufacturing workforce and advanced‑manufacturing training programs could benefit from targeted workforce development and capacity‑building activities. Department of Defense and Department of State offices will incur planning, program management, and reporting responsibilities. Allied and partner governments named as example participants may receive technical assistance, joint programs, and capacity investments that strengthen their industrial base.
Secondary effects: universities, research labs, and non‑defense firms working on dual‑use technologies may participate in R&D and prototyping. Strengthening regional supply chains could reduce operational risk for military logistics but may raise export‑control, industrial‑security, and intellectual‑property coordination needs. Budgetary impact depends on whether Congress provides appropriations to implement the authorized activities; the statute authorizes uses but does not itself guarantee funding. Geopolitical implications include closer industrial ties among partners in the Indo‑Pacific; implementation will require careful coordination on export controls, procurement rules, and partner vetting.
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Last progress July 24, 2025 (7 months ago)
Introduced on July 24, 2025 by Andy Kim