H.R. 5620

119th CONGRESS 1st Session

To provide for the establishment of a task force to identify trade barriers to United States agricultural exports and carry out other related duties.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES · September 30, 2025 · Sponsor: Mr. Crawford · Committee: Committee on Ways and Means

Table of contents

• H.R. 5620
  • SEC. 1. Short title
  • SEC. 2. Findings
  • SEC. 3. Sense of Congress
  • SEC. 4. Agricultural Trade Enforcement Task Force

SEC. 1. Short title

• This Act may be cited as the Prioritizing Offensive Agricultural Disputes and Enforcement Act.

SEC. 2. Findings

• Congress finds the following:
  • Agricultural competitiveness through access to international markets is a vital part of the United States economy.
  • A healthy, well-functioning rules-based trading system is the basis for the success of United States agricultural exports.
  • When foreign governments erect trade barriers this makes it difficult for United States agricultural exporters to compete in the global marketplace while undermining the rules-based trading system.
  • These trade barriers can harm United States farmers, ranchers, workers, and businesses, and they can also lead to higher prices for consumers and a less resilient international trading system.
  • Dispute settlement is available through trade agreements with 165 other countries and there are protectionist trade barriers to United States agricultural exports in many of these countries.
  • Many of these barriers are systemically important. For example, India’s unrestrained use of price support programs violates its commitments under the World Trade Organization (WTO).
  • India recognizes that its price support programs violate its WTO commitments, so instead of reforming its programs, it has repeatedly demanded a permanent exemption from disputes for these programs. Moreover, India has tried to prevent discussions at the WTO of any other significant agricultural trade issue unless it receives such a permanent exemption.
  • The Government of India has repeatedly raised its minimum price supports, which has had negative effects on several commodity markets and most notably has led to its dominance of the global rice trade, with a 40-percent share of the global market since marketing year 2020 through 2021. India is also the world's largest producer of pulses and second largest producer of wheat, peanuts, and cotton.
  • The United States Trade Representative has submitted several counter notifications at the World Trade Organization showing that price supports provided by the Government of India are well beyond the World Trade Organization limit for India of 10 percent of the value of production. For example, the latest counter notification for rice shows support at 87.9 percent in marketing year 2022 through 2023 and for wheat at 67.5 percent for the same period. Other commodities also received support levels well beyond 10 percent commitment limits in previous counter notifications, including 67.9 percent for cotton, 31.7 percent for chickpeas, 41 percent for lentils, and 47.4 percent for pulses.
  • Minor attempts to reform the Indian agriculture subsidy system in the marketing year 2020/2021 failed to produce results. The enacted reforms would not have changed the policies that violate WTO commitments but would have merely provided farmers with opportunities to sell their products outside of the government-run system, but those were ultimately repealed. mandi
  • Dispute settlement is an effective way to provide a neutral assessment of compliance with trade agreement terms and provide the United States a legal framework for enforcement mechanisms to facilitate fair and reciprocal trade.
  • Global agriculture is uniquely susceptible to trade barriers and requires special attention to resolve myriad systemic and economically significant trade violations that impede the development of a resilient, sustainable, and rules-based agricultural trading system.

SEC. 3. Sense of Congress

• It is the sense of Congress that—
  • the United States should accelerate efforts to address foreign trade barriers that harm United States agricultural exports;
  • the Office of the United States Trade Representative and the Department of Agriculture both have a critical role in developing agricultural trade disputes;
  • Congress and the private sector have key roles to play in the development of disputes and agricultural trade enforcement strategy;
  • in the case of India’s minimum price supports, the United States has exhausted other options available through the World Trade Organization short of requesting consultations under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU);
  • there should be a plan and definitive deadlines in place for a request for consultations and establishment of a panel under the DSU;
  • the Office of the United States Trade Representative and the Department of Agriculture should jointly develop a proactive enforcement strategy for addressing systemic and economically significant trade barriers in the agriculture sector, in consultation with Congress and the private sector; and
  • the Office of the United States Trade Representative is the lead agency for United States trade policy.

SEC. 4. Agricultural Trade Enforcement Task Force

• (a) Establishment
  • Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a joint task force to be known as the (referred to in this section as the ). Agricultural Trade Enforcement Task Force``
• (b) Duties
  • (1) In general
    • The Task Force shall—
      • identify trade barriers to United States agricultural exports that are vulnerable to dispute settlement under the World Trade Organization (WTO) or other trade agreements;
      • develop and implement a strategy for enforcing violations of trade agreements related to these trade barriers;
      • identify like-minded trading partners for specific trade barriers that could act as co-complainants or primary complainants on disputes that are systemically or economically important to the United States; and
      • report quarterly to Congress on progress towards resolving cases or filing disputes.
  • (2) Consultation
    • In carrying out its duties under this subsection, the Task Force shall regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with the following:
      • Relevant stakeholders in the private sector, including the agricultural trade advisory committees.
      • Federal departments and agencies that are not represented on the Task Force.
      • Like-minded trading partners that are similarly concerned with trade barriers and are potential participants in the dispute settlement process.
• (c) Membership
  • (1) In general
    • The Task Force shall be comprised of the following members:
      • One or more employees of the Foreign Agricultural Service, who shall be appointed by the Under Secretary for Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs.
      • One or more employees of the Office of the United States Trade Representative, who shall be appointed jointly by the General Counsel for the Office of the United States Trade Representative and the Chief Agricultural Negotiator.
      • One or more employees of other Federal agencies as needed, who shall be appointed jointly by the officials specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
  • (2) Qualification
    • Employees of the Federal agencies specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of paragraph (1) may be appointed as members of the Task Force only if such employees have appropriate expertise in agricultural trade policy and trade enforcement.
• (d) Report
  • (1) In general
    • Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and on a quarterly basis thereafter, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a report on its progress in identifying and addressing trade barriers to United States agricultural exports.