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Updated 3 hours ago
Last progress November 12, 2025 (3 months ago)
Bans certain “connected vehicles” from being used on Department of Defense property when those vehicles were designed, made, or supplied by entities tied to a foreign entity of concern and pose security risks. The Secretary of Defense must publish a list of prohibited vehicles by January 1, 2027, brief Congress with an implementation plan by June 1, 2027, review the list at least yearly, and begin enforcement on January 1, 2028. The required implementation plan must name a lead DoD office and explain how the Department will identify affected vehicles, assess risks, coordinate internally and with partners, and enforce the prohibition. The law imposes timing and reporting requirements but does not specify new funding in the text provided.
Effective January 1, 2028, no connected vehicle on the Secretary of Defense’s prohibited list may be operated on a military installation or on any other property of the Department of Defense.
Not later than January 1, 2027, the Secretary of Defense must establish and publish on a publicly available Department of Defense website a list of prohibited connected vehicles.
The list must include connected vehicles that (A) are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign entity of concern, and (B) pose one or more of the specified risks (sabotage/subversion risk to information and communications technology and services; catastrophic effects on critical infrastructure or the digital economy; or unacceptable risk to national security or safety of United States persons).
In creating the prohibited list, the Secretary must incorporate existing Federal rules for identifying prohibited connected vehicles.
The Secretary shall review the prohibited list not less frequently than once each year and may add, remove, supplement, or amend entries as appropriate.
Agencies and operations: The Department of Defense must create a program to identify, assess, and block covered connected vehicles from DoD property. That will require staffing, cross-component coordination, and likely new or reallocated administrative effort for vetting vehicles, updating base access rules, and enforcing the ban. The specified deadlines (public list by Jan 1, 2027; briefing June 1, 2027; ban effective Jan 1, 2028) create a short planning and implementation window.
DoD personnel and visitors: Service members, civilian DoD employees, contractors, and visitors who bring or use connected vehicles on bases will be affected. Some personnel may need to stop using or switch vehicles on installations, or prove that a vehicle is not tied to a covered foreign entity.
Contractors and suppliers: Companies that manufacture, supply, or retrofit connected vehicles will need to assess their supply chains and affiliations. Those tied to designated foreign entities of concern could be excluded from DoD sites and procurement opportunities for on-site vehicle use.
Security and operations: The ban aims to reduce cyber, data-exfiltration, location-tracking, or other supply-chain risks linked to foreign-controlled connected vehicle tech. It should strengthen on-site security but will impose logistical and compliance costs on DoD and affected parties.
Funding and enforcement: The section sets planning and reporting duties but does not specify funding or detailed enforcement mechanisms; actual cost and enforcement design will depend on DoD implementation decisions and possible future appropriations.
Broader effects: The policy targets DoD property only. It could influence contractor procurement decisions and industry practices even outside military sites, but it does not directly change civilian law or commercial markets in the text provided. Potential trade or diplomatic reactions could occur if specific foreign suppliers or countries are affected.
Last progress July 10, 2025 (7 months ago)
Introduced on July 10, 2025 by Elissa Slotkin
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.