Sponsors (5)
The bill increases resilience of local electric distribution and supply-chain security for many customers by requiring state planning and supplier coordination, but it shifts costs and administrative/compliance burdens onto states, utilities (especially smaller ones), and potentially diverts grant funds away from physical projects.
Electricity customers, utilities, and state governments will get stronger local distribution resilience and faster recovery after storms or attacks because state energy offices must plan for distribution-system risks.
Utilities and state governments will coordinate supply-chain and equipment-supplier considerations, reducing the risk of outages caused by faulty or compromised components.
Smaller electric utilities and rural communities will face new compliance, data-sharing, and coordination burdens to participate in expanded planning requirements.
State governments and taxpayers may incur higher administrative costs and federal grant funds could be used more for plan development rather than direct resilience projects.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Requires State energy security plans to define and address local distribution system security and add weather, physical-attack, and supply-chain risks, plus mitigation/response/recovery methods.
Requires State energy security plans to explicitly define and address security for local electric distribution systems (utility-owned lines and equipment at 100 kV or less) and to add weather-related threats, supply-chain risks, and risks of physical attacks on distribution and bulk-power systems to the hazards they must consider. States must include risk mitigation methods for responding, mitigating, and recovering from those hazards and coordinate with equipment suppliers; plan submission becomes a required step for eligibility, though the Secretary need not approve submissions.
Introduced January 27, 2026 by Robert E. Latta · Last progress January 27, 2026