The bill increases predictability, transparency, and external oversight of Fed stress-testing—helping banks, investors, and Congress plan and judge resilience—but it reduces regulatory flexibility, may expose supervisory details to gaming, raises short-term costs, and blocks regulators from formally assessing climate-related financial risks.
Large banks and nonbank financial firms get clearer, public, and more stable rules and scenarios for Federal Reserve stress tests, improving firms' ability to plan capital and compliance.
Taxpayers, investors, researchers, and Congress receive greater transparency and independent oversight of Fed stress tests through public disclosures and recurring GAO reports, improving market information and accountability.
Banks face lower risk of being double-charged for the same risks because the Board is instructed to avoid double-counting between the stress capital buffer and risk-based capital requirements.
Prohibiting climate-related stress tests prevents regulators from requiring firms to test or disclose climate vulnerabilities, increasing the chance that climate-driven financial risks remain unmeasured and that banks, investors, and taxpayers are exposed to unexpected losses.
Making stress-test models, scenarios, or detailed methodologies public could enable sophisticated actors to game capital calculations or reveal supervisory techniques, increasing systemic vulnerability for regulated firms and the financial system.
Requiring material methodological changes to go through notice-and-comment rulemaking can slow regulatory responsiveness, limiting the Fed's ability to adapt stress tests quickly to new or emerging risks.
Based on analysis of 4 sections of legislative text.
Requires the Fed to publish stress-test models and scenarios, restricts climate-related stress tests under section 165(i), and mandates GAO reviews every three years.
Introduced September 10, 2025 by Bill Huizenga · Last progress September 10, 2025
Requires the Federal Reserve Board to publish and lock down key components of its supervisory stress-testing program: the models, assumptions, formulas, and methods used to run stress tests and to set stress capital buffers, with material changes permitted only through notice-and-comment rulemaking. It also requires the Fed to publicly release each stress-test scenario at least 60 days before a test, bars the Fed from conducting climate-related stress tests of bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies under its Dodd-Frank authority, and mandates a GAO evaluation and report on the effectiveness of the Fed’s stress tests every three years.