Sponsors (2)
The resolution strengthens U.S. scrutiny and policy leverage against PRC efforts to internationalize the yuan and opaque lending practices—potentially improving financial stability and debt transparency—while risking higher compliance costs, market friction for U.S. businesses and households, and strains on multilateral cooperation.
Financial institutions and regulators would get clearer authority and justification to monitor and counter PRC efforts to internationalize the yuan, strengthening oversight of global payment networks and U.S. financial-system resilience.
Developing-country borrowers and U.S. policymakers would face greater pressure for transparent debt terms and restructuring around PRC opaque lending and Belt and Road finance, which could reduce hidden sovereign-debt risks that ripple to U.S. economic interests.
Financial firms and U.S. traders would benefit from heightened attention to risks from yuan internationalization and alternative payment rails, supporting policies to protect trade-settlement stability and continuity of cross-border commerce.
Financial institutions, exporters, and importers could face stricter export controls or sanctions tied to the framing of PRC financial activity as a security threat, increasing compliance costs and administrative burdens.
Middle-class households and small businesses may see higher market uncertainty and potentially increased borrowing costs if heightened bilateral financial confrontation escalates market volatility.
State governments and international financial institutions could face strained cooperation if the resolution emphasizes PRC culpability without new multilateral data-sharing, complicating coordinated IMF/World Bank responses to global debt issues.
Based on analysis of 1 section of legislative text.
Makes formal findings that certain PRC financial actions, including swap lines, CIPS expansion, Belt and Road lending, and a digital yuan, pose risks to U.S. economic and national security.
Official title: Supporting the United States dollar as the reserve currency of the world and combating the economic influence of the People's Republic of China.
Introduced April 30, 2026 by Theodore Paul Budd · Last progress April 30, 2026
Declares congressional findings that the U.S. dollar remains central to global finance but has lost reserve share since 1999, and asserts that a package of People’s Republic of China (PRC) financial policies and tools — including alleged shadow reserves, an allegedly undervalued yuan, large Belt and Road lending, swap lines, cross-border payment infrastructure, and a digital yuan — pose risks to U.S. economic and national security and could weaken U.S. leverage in crises in the Indo-Pacific.