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Download official House Record PDFReturn to issue contextMr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1224, I call up the bill (S. 1318) to direct the American Battle Monuments Commission to establish a program to identify American-Jewish servicemembers buried in United States military cemeteries overseas under markers that incorrectly represent their religion and heritage, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1224, an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of text of Rules Committee Print 119-27, modified by the amendment printed in Part C of House Report 119-628, is adopted, and the bill, as amended, is considered read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:
S. 1318
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Foreign Intelligence
Accountability Act”.
SEC. 2. CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEW OF FBI QUERIES.
(a) Requirement.—Subsection (f)(3) of section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1881a) is amended—
(1) in subparagraph (D)—
(A) by redesignating clauses (iv) through (vi) as clauses
(v) through (vii), respectively;
(B) by inserting after clause (iii) the following new
clause:
“(iv) Monthly civil liberties review.—A requirement that
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on a monthly basis,
provides to the Civil Liberties Protection Officer within the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence the written
statements regarding each United States person query
submitted in the previous month under clause (iii).”;
(C) in clause (vi), as so redesignated, by striking
“(iv)” and inserting “(v)”; and
(D) by conforming the margin of clause (vii), as so
redesignated, to the margin of the other clauses; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
“(E) Civil liberties reviews and investigations.—
“(i) Civil liberties protection officer.—The Civil
Liberties Protection Officer within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence shall review each written
statement regarding a United States person query submitted
under subparagraph (D)(iv) to determine whether the query
meets the standards required by the procedures adopted under
paragraph (1). If the Civil Liberties Protection Officer
determines that the query did not meet such standards or
there exists possible abuses of civil liberties and privacy,
the Civil Liberties Protection Officer shall refer the query
to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
“(ii) Inspector general of the intelligence community.—
The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
determine whether each query referred under clause (i)
constitutes a violation of laws, rules, or regulations or an
abuse of authority.”.
(b) Conforming Amendments.—The National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—
(1) in section 103D (50 U.S.C. 3029)—
(A) in subsection (b)—
(i) in paragraph (6), by striking “; and” and inserting a
semicolon;
(ii) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (8); and
(iii) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new
paragraph (7):
“(7) review each written statement submitted to the Civil
Liberties Protection Officer under section 702(f)(3) of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1881a(f)(3)); and”; and
(B) in subsection (c), by inserting before the period at
the end the following: “, and, based on the reviews
specified in paragraph (7) of such subsection, shall make
referrals to the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community under section 702(f)(3) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(f)(3))”; and
(2) in section 103H(g)(3)(A) (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)(A)), by
inserting after “and safety” the following: “(including
with respect to referrals from the Civil Liberties Protection
Officer pursuant to section 702(f)(3) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1881a(f)(3))”.
SEC. 3. CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF PROHIBITION ON
QUERIES.
(a) In General.—Section 709 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881h) is amended—
(1) in the heading, by striking “unauthorized disclosure”
and inserting “unauthorized disclosure and other actions”;
(2) in subsection (a)—
(A) by striking “if that person knowingly” and inserting
the following: “if that person—”
“(1) knowingly”;
(B) by striking “party.” and inserting “party;”; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
“(2) while serving as an employee or officer of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, knowingly and willfully
violates the querying procedures adopted under section
702(f)(1)(A) relating to United States person queries; or
“(3) knowingly and willfully falsifies or materially
misrepresents complying with the procedures or requirements
for querying information acquired under section 702(a).”;
and
(3) in subsection (b)—
(A) by striking “offense in this section” and inserting
the following: “offense—
“(1) in paragraph (1) of subsection (a)”;
(B) by striking “title 18” and inserting “title 18,
United States Code”;
(C) by striking “both.” and inserting “both; and”; and
(D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(2) in paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (a), shall be
fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not
more than 5 years, or both.”.
(b) Table of Contents Amendment.—The table of contents at
the beginning of such Act is amended by striking the item
relating to section 709 and inserting the following new item: “Sec. 709. Penalties for unauthorized disclosure and other actions.”.
SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSONS UNDER
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
“(o) Fourth Amendment Requirement for Targeting United
States Persons.—
“(1) Prohibition on targeting united states persons.—In
accordance with subsection (b), no officer or employee of the
United States Government may intentionally target a United
States person for an acquisition under section 702.
“(2) Order requirements for targeting united states
persons.—In accordance with the other provisions of this Act
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, with respect to
a United States person, the United States Government may
seek—
“(A) an order authorizing electronic surveillance in
accordance with title I;
“(B) an order authorizing a physical search in accordance
with title III;
“(C) an order authorizing an acquisition in accordance
with section 703, 704, or 705; or
“(D) a warrant issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure by a court of competent jurisdiction.”.
SEC. 5. ATTENDANCE PROCEDURES FOR MEMBER ACCESS TO THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT OF
REVIEW.
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Attorney General shall—
(1) revoke the procedures issued by the Attorney General on
or before December 31, 2025, pursuant to section 5(d) of the
Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (Public Law
118-49; 50 U.S.C. 1803 note); and
(2) issue new procedures that comply with such section and
ensure the access of the Members of Congress and staff
specified in such section to any proceeding of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court or any proceeding of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.
SEC. 6. REQUIREMENT FOR ATTORNEY APPROVAL OF FBI QUERIES
USING UNITED STATES PERSON QUERY TERM.
Section 702(f)(3)(A)(i) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(f)(3)(A)(i)) is
amended by striking “supervisor (or employee of equivalent
or greater rank) or”.
SEC. 7. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AUDIT OF TARGETING
PROCEDURES UNDER SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) Audit.—The Comptroller General of the United States
shall conduct an audit of the targeting procedures used for
acquisitions under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a), including the
technical mechanisms, implementation, and operations used by
the Federal Government for targeting capabilities.
(b) Report.—Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit
to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate a report containing the results
of the audit required by subsection (a), including an
analysis of whether the targeting procedures as implemented
are appropriately limiting targeting under section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1881a) to non-United States persons located outside of the
United States.
SEC. 8. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITIES OF TITLE VII OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) Extension of Repeal Date of Title VII.—Section 403(b)
of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-261), as
most recently amended by Public Law 119-84, is further
amended—
(1) in paragraph (1) (50 U.S.C. 1881 note) by striking
“April 30, 2026” and inserting “April 30, 2029”; and
(2) in paragraph (2) (18 U.S.C. 2511 note), in the matter
preceding subparagraph (A), by striking “April 30, 2026”
and inserting “April 30, 2029”.
(b) Effective Date.—The amendments made by this section
shall take effect on the earlier of the date of the enactment
of this Act or April 29, 2026.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for 1 hour, equally divided among and controlled by the chair and the ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary, or their respective designees, and the chair and the ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, or their respective designees.
The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Jordan), the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Raskin), the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Crawford), and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Himes) each will control 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
General Leave
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and to insert extraneous material on S. 1318.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?
There was no objection.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, it ain't the same FISA. When we were in this Chamber 2 years ago debating a reauthorization of FISA 702, the program was significantly different than it is today.
In 2021, the FBI reported conducting nearly 3 million U.S. person queries. An audit of those queries found that 278,000 times, they did not comply with the rules, didn't follow the rules. FBI agents ran queries on protesters, donors to congressional campaigns, public officials, journalists, colleagues, and even ex-girlfriends.
Intelligence and Securing America Act. The House Judiciary Committee, the House Intelligence Committee, all of Congress, put together that law that contained 56 different reforms, things like new training and approval requirements before a U.S. person query could even take place, audit requirements, accountability measures for those who misused the program, and enhanced reporting and transparency requirements such as allowing certain Members of Congress and staff to attend FISA court proceedings.
We are beginning to see the effect of those reforms. In the year after RISAA was passed, the FBI reported conducting 9,089 U.S. person queries. Of those roughly 9,000 queries, just 127 did not comply with the rules.
Think about it: from 278,000 to 127. That is real improvement. That is a different program. Most of those 127 were due to errors like typos, clerical errors.
Today, every single U.S. person query conducted by the FBI is audited to ensure compliance with applicable requirements and legal standards. The results of those audits and other information are provided to Congress on an annual, semiannual, and quarterly basis.
reforms. The legislation in front of us, for example, adds the Civil Liberties Protection Officer within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who will conduct a monthly review of FBI U.S. person queries.
this 30-day look back on how the queries are going, are they following the rules, and what took place in those actual searches.
general of the intelligence community for further investigation. That is, again, a couple more layers of accountability.
knowingly conduct improper queries and those who lie about conducting improper queries.
just some other agent or supervisor, approve any U.S. person search before they are conducted.
That does not mean our job is over. The Judiciary Committee will continue to conduct aggressive oversight of FISA, and we will continue to work on some things that we think can be helpful in the future.
Again, today is not 2024. I urge my colleagues to support the bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.
{time} 1600
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I urge all of our colleagues, with constitutional patriotism still beating in their hearts after this tortured and demeaning and visibly transactional process we have seen today, to oppose the legislation.
administration and the next administration to keep abusing the sweeping FISA section 702 surveillance authority to spy on American citizens' private communications and to violate the privacy rights of the people.
this bill. It has no warrant requirement for queries of U.S. citizens. It has no probable cause requirement. It provides for no judicial oversight of these government queries.
It subjects U.S. citizens to completely subconstitutional standards, avoiding the Fourth Amendment entirely. It is in a parallel universe from the Constitution—or perhaps I should say a perpendicular universe to the Constitution.
magistrate—between the government and a search of persons and their things. This 3-year blank check to Trump, Patel, and company leaves the executive branch free to conduct these searches with self-reporting and self-policing as the sole protection against their abuse of the section 702 program.
Without any meaningful guardrails, this U.S. person information collected under foreign intelligence standards that have nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment is ripe for abuse. It has been systematically abused to spy on American citizens in the past, and it will be used in exactly the same way by Kash Patel and Todd Blanche in the future if we pass this bill.
about a New York Times article, which focused on the fact that he had used FBI SWAT teams and jets to chauffeur his girlfriend around the country at taxpayer expense.
What did he do? He didn't decide to change his policy on how he uses the people's resources. Instead, he had his agents query FBI databases for dirt on the reporter.
Was the FISA section 702 program one of the databases he searched? The FBI says no. He just searched every other database at the FBI. We have no idea because they don't have to go to a judge before searching an American citizen's information.
balance against Kash Patel. We only know about the fact that it even happened because a reporter got the information. Otherwise, we wouldn't even have known anything about it.
every section. Section 702 authorizes the government to collect information from electronic communication companies in the U.S. about non-U.S. persons who are physically outside the U.S. When the government gets communications to and from these foreign targets, it also incidentally collects large amounts of information about American citizens.
detailed a historical pattern of noncompliant queries at the FBI. Improper searches swept in elected officials, political campaign donors, Black Lives Matter protesters, and many others.
names, the names of their relatives, and even the names of former romantic partners.
sound the alarm about how the FBI is currently abusing FISA, violating the law and flouting the safeguards Congress imposed 2 years ago to snoop on Americans' private communications. The administration is deliberately keeping this opinion totally classified in a basement SCIF here at the House.
reauthorization, which I strongly supported and voted for—unlike my friend Chairman Jordan—those reforms relied on internal watchdogs and required agencies to track and report the use of section 702 data to spy on Americans.
Trump administration, the watchdogs are all but gone. After returning to the White House, President Trump quickly removed the internal watchdogs charged with verifying FBI's representations that the reforms are working; he illegally fired a majority of the members of the independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; and his Department of Justice reassigned other key compliance personnel. The watchdogs have been removed from the scene of the crimes.
percent in 2024 and 2025. Even if those claims are true—and I seriously doubt it—that is an admission that the FBI has illegally accessed the data of thousands of American citizens.
abuses that Kash Patel and Todd Blanche are willing to identify themselves and self-report. How can we believe these numbers when the administration has returned all the watchdogs to the pound? They are no longer there.
authorities to spy on Americans, so what makes us think that a 3-year blank check renewal will lead to self-correction?
Kash Patel's FBI to self-report abuses of our civil liberties to Tulsi Gabbard's DNI is like asking Donald Trump to self-report his collection of millions of dollars from foreign governments directly to the U.S. Congress. That is actually the law under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Yet, he has never once come to ask for our permission for him to keep a foreign government emolument, whether pocketed through the Trump Hotels, the Trump golf courses, or the other Trump enterprises in crypto coins and scams, and so on.
government Emoluments Clause, go ahead and vote for self-reporting under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. For me, I am sticking with the Fourth Amendment and the Constitution. Under our Constitution, it is judges, not FBI agents or government lawyers, who must protect our privacy and our civil liberties.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren).
Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to reauthorizing FISA section 702 without meaningful reform.
surveillance apparatus, trampling civil rights, and disregarding the rule of law, Congress should be strengthening oversight, not rubberstamping warrantless surveillance.
communications, it must get a warrant. That is what the Constitution requires, and it is what the American people demand.
a warrant requirement. Instead, we are trying to jam through another extension of warrantless surveillance without meaningful reforms.
including my bipartisan Government Surveillance Reform Act, introduced with Representative Davidson, along with Senator Wyden and Senator Lee in the other body.
rights. That is a false choice. We can protect the country and protect Americans' constitutional right to privacy. Congress should do both.
Mr. Speaker, oppose this bill so we can get meaningful reform.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
{time} 1610
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, FISA section 702 can be a powerful tool against foreign threats, but without significant guardrails against abuse, it is also a massive threat to the privacy and civil liberties of all Americans. That is why I must oppose this legislation.
major reforms to section 702, and I was looking forward to working with my colleagues again to strengthen these protections during this reauthorization.
not represent real reform. In particular, the supposed new warrant requirement is nothing more than a restatement of current law and completely misses the point of reform.
under section 702. That is not the problem. The problem is what to do with the massive amounts of U.S. person information that is swept up along with foreign communications.
under strict protocols. Yet we know that these protocols are violated all the time.
government wants to search the 702 database for U.S. person information. That is what this debate is about, and that is the bare minimum demanded by the Fourth Amendment.
The Trump administration's argument appears to be: Trust us. However, that is not good enough for any administration, and especially not for this administration, which has already shown a shocking disregard for Americans' civil liberties.
Mr. Speaker, we should get this right. We should work together, as we have in the past, to strike the right balance between security and liberty. We should put in a probable cause warrant requirement. Until then, vote “no” on this legislation.
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. Jayapal).
Ms. JAYAPAL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this bill to reauthorize FISA with no reforms. I have long worked on bipartisan reforms that protect the privacy of Americans, and, frankly, I am sad that some of my colleagues across the aisle who were part of that struggle have caved to Donald Trump.
out there, outside of Congress, want us to reform FISA so that the government does not spy on them. That has never been more necessary than right now as Donald Trump and Stephen Miller openly use domestic surveillance to suppress our rights.
their AI technology never be used to facilitate domestic mass surveillance targeting Americans. Law enforcement has used Americans' sensitive data to punish women seeking reproductive care, and ICE has deliberately used data to suppress First Amendment activity.
Mr. Speaker, this bill continues to allow the FBI to spy on you and offers zero reforms. Vote “no.”
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, the key point is this: Under this bill, FBI agents can still collect, search, and review Americans' communications without any review from a judge. It is the heart of the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Speaker, that search warrants have to be based upon probable cause, and you have to go to a judge to get a search warrant before you can invade the private expectations of the people in their places and in their things.
own compliance with the law. Asking Kash Patel to self-report his abuses to Tulsi Gabbard does nothing to protect the civil liberties of Americans.
That is not how our Constitution was designed. The whole reason we have the courts involved is to make sure that the executive branch doesn't get to be its own check and balance against itself.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I would just point out that I think one of the reasons they attack Mr. Patel so darned much is because crime is down in the country. He is actually doing his job.
because he is the guy who uncovered what they were doing 10 years ago when he was a staffer here on the House Intelligence Committee. It was Kash Patel who told us that the dossier, paid for by the Clinton campaign, was a bunch of garbage. Yet that is exactly what Mr. Comey used for the other part of FISA, title 1, to go get a warrant to spy on the other party's campaign.
Maybe that is why they like to attack Director Patel so much. But I think he is bringing down crime in our country, and I applaud him for that.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, Kash Patel has been using government resources to chauffeur his girlfriend all over the country. Then when it was learned by the press that he was doing that, there was an article about it.
When he got mad about it, rather than say: Well, yeah, maybe there is a problem using an FBI SWAT team to shepherd my girlfriend around the country. Instead of changing the policy, he decided to go after the reporter and search the databases on the FBI.
This is while we are debating FISA.
If you need any more vivid demonstration, Mr. Speaker, of the danger of allowing law enforcement officials to govern themselves and to regulate whether or not they are violating the Constitution, check that out. We may disagree a lot about this FBI director's record. That is not directly relevant to this point.
people in the office before, Mr. Speaker. Let's legislate in a way that is consistent with the Constitution of the United States.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, the reason why we have to hold fast to the Constitution is precisely because we are all imperfect beings. I stood strongly for FISA 702 last time without the necessity of a search warrant because of all the reforms that I believed that the Biden administration would engage in, and they basically engaged in them.
dismantled all of the safeguards we put in and just chased the watchdogs out of the FBI. That is why we must stick very closely to the Constitution, as my good friend, the chairman of the committee, argued the last time we debated this. He has convinced a lot of people that we need to stick to the Constitution. I am sorry we are not on the same side today.
regulate themselves. That is why law enforcement officers across the country, FBI, have to go to a judge to get a Fourth Amendment search warrant before they invade somebody's privacy unless there is exigency, unless there is an emergency, and we have accounted for that. We can deal with that problem.
Let's stick with the Constitution.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, FISA, as we all know, is a critical program. It is important for our government to understand what bad guys are planning to do to our citizens and to our Nation and to have this program in place. That is why it is critical we reauthorize it.
years ago, but over the last several years. The Judiciary Committee has been involved in the oversight in making sure this program is done the way it should be done and protecting Americans' liberties. There are 56 different reforms
Today's program is different. It is different. We should reauthorize it because FISA is critical. Today, there is training and checks on the front end before a search can be done of a U.S. person. There is transparency for the whole process in how it all works. There is accountability on the back end if you don't do it right. Mr. Speaker, this bill now says that accountability includes criminal penalties if you don't do it right.
pass it soon because they have been shutting down the government, the Department of Homeland Security, for what, 74 days now?
Let's get this done.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Meuser). The gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Crawford) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Himes) each will control 15 minutes.
{time} 1620
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 1318, the Foreign Intelligence Accountability Act. This legislation makes further reforms to section 702, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and reauthorizes the authority for 3 years.
community to gather foreign intelligence on foreign targets based overseas. Targets of 702 are terrorists, hackers, and spies living abroad. No U.S. citizen anywhere in the world can be targeted under section 702.
I want to be very clear on this point. Section 702 is not a backdoor surveillance tool that allows the government to collect and review an American's emails or other electronic communications. The only U.S. person data collected is if the terrorist, spy, or hacker targeted under 702 is talking to an American or about an American. In that case, only the communications held in the foreign target's accounts are collected.
law already requires the government to get a warrant under different FISA authorities.
reported on by the NSA were supported by section 702, and more than one-quarter of all NSA reporting contains 702 information; 90 percent of synthetic drug disruptions enabled by the CIA were supported by section 702; and 63 percent of the intelligence products in the President's daily brief contained section 702 information.
Reauthorizing FISA 702 is essential. In 2024, Congress reauthorized section 702 through legislation known as RISAA. This legislation included 56 reform measures that restricted FBI U.S. person queries, implemented greater FBI accountability for any noncompliance, mandated greater transparency across the IC and FISC, and included key reforms to address abuses related to traditional FISA like we all witnessed in the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane investigation.
U.S. person queries from 2022 to 2025, 119,300 down to 7,400. At the same time, the FBI's compliance rate increased to 99 percent, equivalent to other IC agencies.
and accountability, rebuilding trust will not happen quickly. For that reason, working with Chairman Jordan and House leadership, I have met with all unique groups across the Republican Conference over the past several months to identify additional key reforms and to develop a consensus product.
perfect in everyone's eyes, but this bill makes measurable reforms to strengthen accountability and safeguards while maintaining the criticality of the foreign intelligence tool.
Specifically, the bill before us: clarifies that no U.S. person can be a target of 702 collection, and any targeting of a U.S. person requires a warrant; establishes criminal penalties for intentional abuse of FISA 702 queries and any false statements to the FISC; mandates new procedures to allow Members to observe FISC hearings; requires an FBI attorney review all FBI U.S. person queries; orders an independent audit by the Government Accountability Office on 702 targeting procedures; and establishes an outside review and authentication process of all FBI U.S. person queries by mandating the ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer review FBI query justifications.
reauthorization for FISA 702. The bottom line is that the importance of this tool to U.S. national security cannot be overstated, and for that reason, it is essential for Congress to reauthorize this authority.
adversaries. We have U.S. military personnel and citizens being targeted overseas. We have foreign terrorist organizations recruiting Americans and plotting attacks on the homeland.
intelligence community and military to mitigate and defeat these threats. In fact, if the 702 tool had existed prior to 2001, we may have been able to prevent September 11 from happening.
I urge all my colleagues to vote “yes” on S. 1318. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in support of S. 1318, the Foreign Intelligence Accountability Act.
has been indefensible. Two weeks ago, when we walked off the floor after legislation to reauthorize 702 failed, Democrats made clear there was an open door to negotiate a bipartisan package of real reforms, perhaps one that would even pass on suspension in this Chamber. I have been discussing this issue for months now with the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Raskin, and it is clear to me that there is a path to a bill that could do more than squeak through and only by attaching unrelated legislation that may not pass the Senate.
legislation because in my decade on the House Intelligence Committee, I have seen countless, countless instances where the intelligence obtained through section 702 quite literally saved lives. Section 702 is the single most important foreign intelligence collection authority we have, and every day it is used by apolitical professionals throughout the IC and apolitical professionals at the FBI to keep Americans safe here and abroad. There is no way to replace the value that section 702 provides, and the loss of this authority would be devastating.
responsible choice is reauthorization. As President Biden's Intelligence Advisory Board put it: “If Congress fails to reauthorize section 702, history may judge the lapse of section 702 authorities as one of the worst intelligence failures of our time.”
array of reforms than those in this package. For example, 2 weeks ago, I proposed an amendment to the base bill in the Rules Committee that would have created a judicial process for U.S. person queries conducted by the FBI in the 702 database. I want to be clear that we have seen no evidence—let me say that again, we have seen no evidence that this administration is misusing section 702, but nonetheless, we must remain hypervigilant, given the other abuses that we have seen from this administration.
before the FBI could access the results of a query it conducted involving a U.S. person. I regret that my amendment as well as a range of other ideas from Members on both sides of the aisle were not considered as part of this process.
that 2
than 70 percent of the Democratic Caucus, passed the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act. That bill 2 years ago contained over 50 major reforms, the bulk of which were intended to address the longstanding and unacceptable issues of compliance at the FBI. Since enactment, the evidence shows that those reforms have been highly successful, with far fewer U.S. person queries conducted and with a compliance rate at the FBI of 99 percent.
of the FBI and the DOJ. I don't trust Director Patel any more than my Democratic colleagues do.
by the shock troops sent here to stop the peaceful transfer of power. I sat there for half an hour as police officers with guns drawn tried to defend our democracy, so I take a back seat to no one in my concern about the abuses of this administration.
professional and apolitical staff, not Kash Patel, the professional and apolitical staff, who are there at the Department of Justice Office of Intelligence, largely the same group of public servants who performed this work under President Biden, and their findings are validated not just by the Attorney General or Tulsi Gabbard or Kash Patel, but by independent oversight, the DOJ's inspector general, the staff of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court on an annual basis, and the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees of both Chambers.
We are not trusting this administration. We are verifying in all three branches of government. If we saw the slightest hint that these authorities were being abused, I wouldn't be standing here today to support this bill.
proposals. These proposals are modest and well short of what I would like, but they are meaningful. Most importantly, the legislation requires that all U.S. person queries of the 702 database by FBI be reviewed by ODNI's Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer, and that any improper queries be referred from there to the IG of the intelligence community. This adds yet another layer of oversight of FBI on top of internal oversight, DOJ oversight, which I may not trust, court oversight, which I do trust, and congressional oversight which, yes, I do trust, since I am involved in that. The legislation also adds new criminal penalties for FBI employees who intentionally improperly use section 702.
approve a U.S. person query, building on a reform we made in 2024, which required preapproval from either an FBI lawyer or an FBI supervisor. Now, a lawyer is likely to be compliance focused rather than operations focused the way a supervisor would be, and will be especially careful and cautious before approving a proposed U.S. person query.
{time} 1630
These are modest reforms, but they are not nothing. When viewed in combination with the 50-plus reforms of 2024, Congress will have built a substantial oversight structure around 702 to prevent abuse.
Section 702 is not a dragnet. It is not an authority that can be used to surveil Americans. It does not contain any commercially acquired information. It does not use artificial intelligence to analyze collected data. Despite the fact that we have heard this word a lot today, it is not unconstitutional. A Federal court certifies this program every single year.
determines constitutionality, to be unconstitutional, we might have heard that from the courts at some point in the last 18 years in which they have been certifying this authority.
in all three branches of government, and this bill makes those guardrails marginally and modestly stronger. It is without question the most important foreign intelligence tool we have.
Mr. Speaker, for those reasons, despite my frustration with the process that has led us here, I will vote “yes,” and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood).
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of S. 1318, the Foreign Intelligence Accountability Act, and I thank Chairman Crawford for his leadership and steadfast support for reauthorization of FISA 702.
the committee's task force on FISA reforms, and I think it is important to clarify what FISA 702 is and what it isn't.
FISA 702 cannot be used to target U.S. persons, period. Under current Federal law, it is illegal to target U.S. persons under this authority. Section 702 only allows for the collection on foreigners located overseas and who are reasonably believed to possess certain types of foreign intelligence information.
Committee colleagues and spent over a year working to address unacceptable section 702 abuses by the FBI with the goal of preserving constitutional liberties afforded to all U.S. persons, ensuring events like Crossfire Hurricane never happen again, and holding the FBI accountable.
America Act, RISAA, targeted 56 reforms and meaningful changes to the FBI. It is the largest reform to the FBI in a generation. The Department of Justice Inspector General's Office has confirmed today that the FBI has implemented all 56 of these requirements.
account, holding the FBI accountable; increasing criminal penalties on agents and analysts, making the FBI more compliant with what they have to do; reforming the FISC, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; and a number of other reforms that are working.
expire would result in risking national security and making the United States less safe for American families.
Venezuela, the Israeli hostages who were recovered from the tunnels in Hamas, taking out Iran's nuclear capabilities and the success we have had there, the taking out of drug cartel bosses in Mexico, going back to the first administration and what happened with Soleimani and al- Baghdadi, and many other instances that we can't talk about here, all of it derived from FISA 702.
the chief terrorism prosecutor in the U.S. Department of Justice. I know firsthand how FISA can be used for the proper prosecution of terrorists and non-U.S. citizens who want to harm America. Putting people in jail who want to hurt America would not happen but for FISA and section 702.
U.S. Government to better protect U.S. military forces abroad, disrupt malicious hackers targeting U.S. infrastructure like emergency medical services and transportation services, and thwart potential efforts by terrorist groups that may be plotting attacks on our homeland.
Mr. Speaker, the bottom line is that FISA is an indispensable national security tool. We ought to support this bill to protect America and our citizens, and I urge its adoption.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the time remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Connecticut has 8 minutes remaining.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the former majority leader of the House of Representatives.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, when I was majority leader in 2008, Mr. Blunt, who was then in the leadership of the Republican Party, Senator Kit Bond, and Senator Jay Rockefeller, who co-chaired the Intel Committee in the United States Senate, and I worked together in a very difficult context.
information
from the telecoms. The telecoms had given them information, and there were really no firewalls as to what that information was.
come up with legislation which would solve the problem of making sure that we were secure as a country and that the privacy of our citizens was secure. We think we accomplished that objective.
In fact, the leadership in the Senate voted for it. President Obama, then a Member of the Senate, voted for it. Ms. Pelosi, Mr. Clyburn, and I voted for it, along with others. The Republicans were overwhelmingly for it.
In September 2012, we did it again. Ms. Pelosi, Mr. Hoyer, and Mr. Clyburn voted for it. We did it again in January 2018, and Pelosi, Hoyer, Clyburn, Ryan, McCarthy, and Scalise all voted for it.
bipartisan Presidential buy-in to the necessity to have this legislation adopted to keep Americans safe while also adopting significant reforms in 2008 and some reforms thereafter to provide for the privacy protections to the American people.
It is a balance, but it is a balance that I think we have achieved. I think we ought to pass this legislation. I urge my colleagues to do so.
Nation is protected in the first instance against threats from terrorist groups and foreign adversaries. Our intelligence services have the difficult task of catching threats before they materialize and are providing critical information to national security leaders.
occurred after our national security agencies failed to identify, track, and coordinate known threats. Twenty-five years later, we have learned these lessons, and we continue to grapple with essential questions about how to balance the needs of our national security with protecting Americans' liberties.
committee, led by Ranking Member Himes, were diligent in pushing for reforms to section 702 that would make those protections stronger for Americans while still delivering the tools needed. This bill does not include all the reforms.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. HOYER. None of the bills that we consider have all the things we would like to have in them, but in testimony from Avril Haines, who headed up the DNI under the Biden administration, she believes this is absolutely essential. Other members of the Obama administration and the Biden administration believe this legislation is essential.
having worked on this since 2008, to adopt this legislation and make America as safe as we possibly can.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the time remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Arkansas has 8 minutes remaining.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hill), the distinguished chairman of the Financial Services Committee and member of HPSCI.
Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman and Mr. Himes, too, for their joint leadership on this important task that we have before us today.
Mr. Speaker, here on the eve of 25 years since September 11, we come to this House floor to, once again, ensure that we have the tools in place to protect the homeland from foreign attacks.
the United States Government collects the electronic communications from foreign nationals outside the U.S. It allows the U.S. to collect that intelligence on bad actors to prevent the reoccurrence of 9/11, but there is a lot of misinformation about section 702, Mr. Speaker.
{time} 1640
First, it is used to surveil foreign nationals abroad. It is not targeted at Americans.
Secondly, it is not warrantless surveillance. There is a fundamental misunderstanding of this program.
Warrant requirements are created under the Fourth Amendment. They apply inside the United States. This is not a program that operates within the boundaries of the United States. It targets foreign nationals outside of the United States.
This is so important, as demonstrated by Mr. Hoyer, that we have clear, active protections on how this program is used to target foreign nationals with those protections to protect Americans' privacy under the Fourth Amendment. This bill is that balance, as described by the gentleman from Connecticut and my colleague from Arkansas.
Mr. Speaker, let's put America's safety first. Let's keep the homeland security paramount. It is critical. Let's support and pass S. 1318. I urge my colleagues to join me in that effort.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Raskin), my good friend and the ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, yes, it is foreign intelligence, which is why when it comes to U.S. persons—U.S. citizens—the Fourth Amendment has to apply. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), my distinguished colleague, said that the legislation is bipartisan.
I tell you what else was bipartisan—in fact, unanimous: the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Everybody got behind that. We are assured that there is reporting, but it is self-reporting. The distinguished ranking member says that it is by nonpolitical staff.
everybody at the FBI who they considered insufficiently loyal to MAGA and to Donald Trump and for those who worked on the January 6 case.
point. Well, the courts are telling us right now that the FBI has been secretly breaking the law. Last month, the FISC court found that many of the government's 702 searches violated Federal law. We should be paying close attention to that as we move forward.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Fitzpatrick), the distinguished chair of the CIA Subcommittee on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Speaker, of all of the debates that we have had on this House floor, I have yet to be so perplexed as I am with this one. There is so much conflation going on between title I, traditional FISA, and title VII, section 702. There is so much conflation over the collection of evidence versus the querying of already lawfully collected data. Everybody in this Chamber has been talking past each other for years on this issue.
The Fourth Amendment applies to the collection of evidence. That has been the case from the very founding of our country. This so-called warrant requirement, Mr. Speaker, what they are asking for is a double warrant requirement. A warrant requirement is on the collection of evidence.
already lawfully collected data. That is a secondary warrant requirement, the first time in American history that we would ever be doing such a thing. That would shut down the law enforcement system. You would have to expand the Federal judiciary by a factor of 100 to keep up with that work, and it would put us on pre-9/11 footing. We cannot do that.
report card is in. There are zero abuses. Even though that is the case, we still went further in this bill before the House today and reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment protections will always apply to 702 queries, in addition to all of the other reforms.
this tool because I can promise you that if we were having this debate a week after 9/11, there wouldn't be a single soul on this floor voting against this bill.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to take just a minute here to address the question of the Fourth Amendment. Every Member in this Chamber swears an oath to support the Constitution, and it is important in this debate to remember that all of us care profoundly about the Fourth Amendment. I think it is wrong to suggest that the opposite is the case.
I want to draw an analogy for people who may be watching. In the law enforcement context, which is more familiar to most Americans than 702 is, a probable cause Fourth Amendment warrant is required. You have to get from the judge a Fourth Amendment warrant to take, for example, a wiretap on somebody that you suspect of selling fentanyl.
selling fentanyl, and law enforcement goes in front of a judge and gets a warrant to wiretap Bill Smith.
The police don't need another warrant on Joe Smith. That has been incidentally collected, and no court has ever held that Joe Smith's admission and incidental collection requires the Fourth Amendment for that to be used as evidence in court, which is the argument that the opponents of U.S. person queries are making.
I am not here to say that this is uncontroversial. We have to be obsessed with the protection of Americans' data, but let's not suggest that this is unconstitutional because it has had annual reviews by a Federal court. You might have thought that in 18 years, if a Federal court had thought that this was unconstitutional, they might not have certified. Let us not say that this authority should be subject to a radically different standard than a typical law enforcement warrant would be.
Lastly, I want to make this point. One of the reasons that we are hesitant to rush into a warrant is because many U.S. person queries are not done because we believe that an individual is complicit in a crime. If we hear ISIS talking about Jim Himes, it is unlikely that I am complicit in terrorism. It is quite likely that I may be a victim, and the FBI and Jim Himes would like to know that if that is the case.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Arkansas has 5 minutes remaining.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Jackson), the chair of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. JACKSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is a unique and critical tool that enables our intelligence community to gather vital intelligence, protect our national security, and safeguard Americans from terrorist attacks. No other foreign intelligence authority or any other means of collection can replace the speed and agility of section 702.
If this authority expires, we will substantially degrade U.S. national security and our intelligence officers' ability to identify foreign threats in real time.
referred to, in section 702—56, in fact—and this bill builds on that progress by strengthening privacy protections for Americans, while ensuring the tool precisely targets foreign persons and only foreign persons who pose a threat to the United States.
other national security leaders, including Ranking Member Himes, have stated, this 3-year extension is essential to protect our homeland, our warfighters, and U.S. personnel stationed abroad, especially in today's volatile global threat environment.
Mr. Speaker, we must pass this bill. If we do not, we will get something from our colleagues in the Senate that will be far, far inferior, and those who truly care about national security in this body on both sides of the aisle who may be contemplating a “no” vote will regret such a vote.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues on both sides to vote for this bill.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Connecticut has 1 minute remaining.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Tenney).
Ms. TENNEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 1318, the Foreign Intelligence Accountability Act. This legislation will extend FISA section 702 for another 3 years.
This law is an essential national security tool. You don't need any more evidence. Mr. Speaker, the President of the United States, our Commander in Chief, both of us who hail from New York, understand that FISA section 702 is a vital tool that allows the U.S. to gather intelligence on dangerous foreign adversaries.
we have had such tremendous success on the battlefield as we pursue this war in the Middle East.
Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support our military, protect our national security, and vote “yes” on this critically important section.
{time} 1650
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers. I am prepared to close, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the Intelligence Committee for his friendship and partnership, which I value.
are doing here is what we have been doing for almost 20 years, which is finding the balance between an authority that keeps not just us but the world safe and protecting the civil liberties of Americans whose information is incidentally collected just as it is collected when there is a traditional police wiretap.
I wish we had had a more fulsome process. I wish I had been able to work with Ranking Member Raskin to have a more robust package of safeguards, particularly in the context of an administration that has demonstrated day in and day out their lawlessness, but we are where we are, and it is a binary choice. Allowing this authority to expire, which I think we are close to, is not an option.
authority but that we have work to do to continue to protect the civil liberties of Americans and move forward passing this bill with an eye toward what we can do in the coming years to make sure this is a better balanced authority.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. I thank the ranking member, my friend from Connecticut, for his comments.
FISA 702 is a critical foreign intelligence tool. There is no other authority that can replicate the value, speed, and agility of this authority.
702, U.S. person queries and other FISA transparency and accountability measures. These measures have forced meaningful change at the FBI. The bill before us continues the 2024 reforms and includes additional privacy and civil liberty protections and transparency measures.
for
working with me on this effort over the last several months. I thank the members of the House Intelligence Committee, many of whom have spoken today on behalf of this bill, for their oversight on section 702 and other foreign intelligence authorities.
hammering this out who attended the meetings, whose input we heard and whose input we value. I thank them, and I urge a “yes” vote on S. 1318.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
The question is on the third reading of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, this 15- minute vote on passage of S. 1318 will be followed by a 5-minute vote on adoption of S. Con. Res. 33.
Roll No. 142
YEAS—235
Aderholt
Aguilar
Alford
Allen
Amodei (NV)
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Baird
Balderson
Barr
Baumgartner
Bean (FL)
Begich
Bentz
Bera
Bergman
Bice
Biggs (SC)
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bost
Bresnahan
Buchanan
Budzinski
Bynum
Calvert
Cammack
Carey
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Case
Castor (FL)
Ciscomani
Cisneros
Cline
Cloud
Clyde
Cole
Collins
Comer
Conaway
Crank
Crawford
Crenshaw
Cuellar
Davidson
Davis (NC)
De La Cruz
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Donalds
Dunn (FL)
Edwards
Ellzey
Emmer
Estes
Evans (CO)
Ezell
Fallon
Fedorchak
Feenstra
Fine
Finstad
Fischbach
Fitzgerald
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flood
Fong
Foxx
Frankel, Lois
Franklin, Scott
Fry
Fuller
Garbarino
Gill (TX)
Gillen
Gimenez
Golden (ME)
Goldman (TX)
Gonzalez, V.
Gooden
Gottheimer
Graves
Griffith
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Hageman
Hamadeh (AZ)
Harder (CA)
Haridopolos
Harris (NC)
Harshbarger
Hern (OK)
Higgins (LA)
Hill (AR)
Himes
Hinson
Houchin
Houlahan
Hoyer
Hudson
Huizenga
Hunt
Hurd (CO)
Issa
Jack
Jackson (TX)
James
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (SD)
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Joyce (PA)
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kiggans (VA)
Kiley (CA)
Kim
Kustoff
LaHood
LaLota
Landsman
Latta
Lawler
Lee (FL)
Lee (NV)
Letlow
Lucas
Luttrell
Mackenzie
Malliotakis
Maloy
Mann
Mast
McCaul
McClain
McClintock
McCormick
McDonald Rivet
McDowell
McGuire
Messmer
Meuser
Miller (IL)
Miller (OH)
Miller (WV)
Miller-Meeks
Mills
Moolenaar
Moore (AL)
Moore (NC)
Moore (UT)
Moore (WV)
Moran
Moskowitz
Mrvan
Murphy
Nehls
Newhouse
Norcross
Norman
Nunn (IA)
Obernolte
Ogles
Owens
Palmer
Patronis
Perez
Peters
Pfluger
Quigley
Reschenthaler
Riley (NY)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rouzer
Rutherford
Salazar
Scalise
Schmidt
Schneider
Schrier
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Self
Sessions
Sewell
Shreve
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smucker
Sorensen
Soto
Spartz
Stauber
Stefanik
Steil
Steube
Strickland
Strong
Stutzman
Suozzi
Taylor
Tenney
Thompson (PA)
Tiffany
Timmons
Tran
Turner (OH)
Valadao
Van Drew
Van Duyne
Van Epps
Van Orden
Vasquez
Veasey
Wagner
Walberg
Wasserman Schultz
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Westerman
Whitesides
Wied
Williams (TX)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Yakym
Zinke
NAYS—191
Adams
Amo
Ansari
Auchincloss
Balint
Barragan
Barrett
Beatty
Bell
Beyer
Biggs (AZ)
Boebert
Bonamici
Boyle (PA)
Brecheen
Brown
Brownley
Burchett
Burlison
Carbajal
Carson
Carter (LA)
Casar
Casten
Castro (TX)
Chu
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Craig
Crane
Crockett
Crow
Davids (KS)
Davis (IL)
Dean (PA)
DeGette
DeLauro
DelBene
Deluzio
DeSaulnier
Dexter
Dingell
Doggett
Downing
Elfreth
Escobar
Espaillat
Evans (PA)
Fields
Figures
Fletcher
Foster
Foushee
Friedman
Frost
Fulcher
Garamendi
Garcia (CA)
Garcia (IL)
Garcia (TX)
Goldman (NY)
Gomez
Goodlander
Gosar
Gray
Green, Al (TX)
Grijalva
Harrigan
Harris (MD)
Hayes
Horsford
Hoyle (OR)
Huffman
Ivey
Jackson (IL)
Jacobs
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (TX)
Kamlager-Dove
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy (NY)
Kennedy (UT)
Khanna
Knott
Krishnamoorthi
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latimer
Lee (PA)
Leger Fernandez
Levin
Liccardo
Lieu
Lofgren
Luna
Lynch
Mace
Magaziner
Mannion
Massie
Matsui
McBath
McBride
McClain Delaney
McClellan
McCollum
McGarvey
McGovern
McIver
Meeks
Mejia
Menefee
Menendez
Meng
Mfume
Min
Moore (WI)
Morelle
Morrison
Moulton
Mullin
Nadler
Neal
Neguse
Ocasio-Cortez
Olszewski
Omar
Onder
Pallone
Panetta
Pappas
Pelosi
Perry
Pettersen
Pingree
Pocan
Pou
Pressley
Ramirez
Randall
Raskin
Rivas
Rose
Ross
Roy
Ruiz
Rulli
Ryan
Salinas
Sanchez
Scanlon
Schakowsky
Scholten
Scott (VA)
Sherman
Simon
Smith (WA)
Stansbury
Stanton
Stevens
Subramanyam
Sykes
Takano
Thanedar
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Titus
Tlaib
Tokuda
Tonko
Torres (CA)
Torres (NY)
Trahan
Underwood
Vargas
Velazquez
Vindman
Walkinshaw
Waters
Watson Coleman
Williams (GA)
NOT VOTING—4
Kean
Langworthy
Loudermilk
Wilson (FL)
{time} 1725
Ms. WILLIAMS of Georgia and Mr. DOWNING changed their vote from “yea” to “nay.”
Messrs. SOTO and VICENTE GONZALEZ of Texas, Ms. LOIS FRANKEL of Florida, and Mr. WHITESIDES changed their vote from “nay” to “yea.”
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Mr. LANGWORTHY. Mr. Speaker, had I been present, I would have voted YEA on Roll Call No. 142.