Sponsors (3)
The bill trades more predictable, formula-based and locally directed mitigation funding (including a tribal minimum) for greater gubernatorial control and reduced state/local flexibility, which risks leaving some high-performing or small high‑risk communities without needed support.
State governments: replace competitive grants with predictable, formula-based mitigation funding, improving planning and budgeting.
Indian tribal governments: guaranteed minimum of $75 million annually, increasing tribal access to mitigation funds.
Local governments: at least 50% of State allocations must go to the local government carrying out a Governor-recommended project, directing funds to on-the-ground mitigation projects.
Local governments and project applicants: shifts decision authority toward Governors and away from local governments, reducing local control over which projects are funded.
Rural and smaller high-risk communities: formula components (equal share, population, vulnerability) could shift funds away from smaller high-risk communities depending on weighting and vulnerability metrics.
Local governments and project applicants: eliminating competition may disadvantage high-performing local projects that lack state support, reducing merit-based selection.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Replaces competitive predisaster mitigation grants with direct formula allocations to States and Tribes, sets a $75M tribal minimum, and requires States to pass at least 50% to local implementers.
Introduced July 21, 2025 by Shomari C. Figures · Last progress July 21, 2025
Amends the Stafford Act to restructure FEMA’s predisaster hazard mitigation program by replacing competitive grants with direct allocations to States and Tribal governments, changing who recommends projects, setting a tribal minimum, and imposing new suballocation rules for funds. The bill centralizes project recommendation authority with Governors, requires States to pass at least half of allocated mitigation dollars to the local government carrying out a Governor-recommended project, and allows the President limited authority to approve non-recommended projects in extraordinary circumstances. The measure changes how money is divided (one-third equal shares, one-third by population, one-third by critical-infrastructure vulnerability), narrows eligibility conditions for receiving assistance, and clarifies that receiving funds under one predisaster program does not reduce eligibility under the other. These changes alter beneficiary scope, allocation method, State/Tribal entitlements, and cross-program eligibility rules.