Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, Science, Space, and Technology, and Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Last progress May 29, 2025 (8 months ago)
Introduced on May 29, 2025 by Byron Donalds
Creates a whole-of-government U.S. strategy to promote safe, secure, and commercially competitive civil nuclear energy abroad. It directs the Executive Branch to stand up new coordination offices, working groups, financing partnerships, outreach initiatives, and training programs; to support demonstration and export of U.S. small modular reactors (SMRs); and to authorize multiyear funding to carry out those activities. Requires U.S. diplomacy and development finance to prioritize allied and partner nations, to coordinate regulatory, safety, and liability discussions (including with India), and to produce reports and legislative recommendations, while also creating industry-facing programs to accelerate SMR deployment and build a domestic supply chain.
Reformats the provision into subsection (a), adds new duties (including focus on countries increasing cooperation with Russia/China and promoting U.S. nuclear companies abroad), adds new program requirements in subsection (b), and adds an authorization of appropriations in subsection (c).
References the definition of “spent nuclear fuel” from the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 for purposes of describing workshop topics; it does not change that definition.
The President shall consider the feasibility of leveraging existing activities or frameworks or, as necessary, establishing a Center called the Advanced Reactor Coordination and Resource Center to carry out the listed purposes.
Identify qualified organizations and service providers for embarking civil nuclear nations.
Identify qualified organizations and service providers to develop and assemble documents, contracts, and related items required to establish a civil nuclear program.
Identify qualified organizations and service providers to develop a standardized model for the establishment of a civil nuclear program that can be used by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Coordinate with countries participating in the Center and with the Nuclear Exports Working Group established under section 3(b).
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Updated 4 hours ago
Last progress May 19, 2025 (8 months ago)
Who is affected and how:
U.S. nuclear companies, advanced reactor and SMR developers, and their supply chains: likely direct beneficiaries through increased export promotion, demonstration projects, regulatory support, access to government-led financing packages, and targeted R&D and deployment funding; they may gain competitive advantages from U.S. government-backed outreach and standards work.
Allied and partner governments, and countries embarking on civil nuclear programs: will receive technical assistance, training, regulatory cooperation, and potential financing options; they may be encouraged to adopt U.S. reactor designs, safety standards, and procurement terms.
Federal agencies (State, Energy, Commerce, Treasury/DFC, National Security Council, NRC and others): will take on coordination roles, reporting requirements, participation in working groups, and program implementation responsibilities, creating new interagency workload and obligations.
International institutions and regulators (e.g., IAEA): expected partners for training, safeguards, and standards harmonization; may see expanded cooperation and demand for capacity building.
Domestic communities and local economies where SMRs or other nuclear projects are sited: could see job creation and supply-chain investment, but also potential local concerns about safety, environmental impacts, community engagement, and liability arrangements.
U.S. taxpayers and budgetary oversight actors: programs authorize multi-year funding streams and new activities that will require appropriations, oversight, and potentially inspector general reviews; fiscal exposure includes the SMR initiative and the State Department initiative.
Potential benefits:
Potential risks and tradeoffs:
Overall, the legislation shifts U.S. policy toward active promotion of U.S. civil nuclear technology abroad, combining diplomacy, finance, industrial policy, and safety/regulatory assistance to counter strategic competitors and expand export markets.