Sponsors (5)
Introduced December 10, 2025 by Mike Flood · Last progress December 10, 2025
The bill gives the FDIC flexibility and transparency tools to limit megabank concentration and protect the Deposit Insurance Fund, but that flexibility raises the risk of higher costs to taxpayers, increases regulatory discretion and uncertainty, and may deter smaller buyers from participating in resolutions.
Financial institutions and depositors: Gives the FDIC flexibility to choose resolution tools that limit further concentration among very large global banks, helping preserve competition and reduce systemic systemic risk to the financial system.
Taxpayers and market participants: Requires a formal rule, a cost cap, purchaser assessments, and timely congressional reporting, increasing transparency and adding fiscal safeguards for the Deposit Insurance Fund.
Taxpayers: Allows the FDIC to select resolution options that could cost the Deposit Insurance Fund more, increasing potential losses ultimately borne by taxpayers.
Small buyers and smaller banks: Requiring assessments or higher costs for non‑G‑SIB purchasers could deter smaller bidders, reducing the pool of buyers and weakening market discipline in failed‑bank resolutions.
Financial institutions and potential bidders: Giving regulators discretion to override the least‑cost rule can be applied inconsistently and create uncertainty for bidders and market participants.
Based on analysis of 2 sections of legislative text.
Permits the FDIC, with Fed and Treasury consultation, to choose a resolution option that is not the least costly to the DIF to limit further concentration in G‑SIBs, subject to caps, assessments, and reporting.
Creates a new "least cost resolution exception" that lets the FDIC choose a bank-failure resolution option that is not the cheapest for the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) when doing so is expected to reduce further concentration in global systemically important banks (G‑SIBs). The FDIC must adopt a rule within one year to limit how much extra DIF cost is allowed, require non‑G‑SIB purchasers to pay an assessment, and report to Congress after using the exception. The change requires agreement by the FDIC and the Federal Reserve, after consulting the Treasury Secretary, that the benefits of limiting G‑SIB concentration outweigh the additional DIF risk. The law defines covered alternatives and G‑SIBs, sets reporting and cost‑calculation rules, and exempts these amendments from a specified existing provision of law.