Sponsors (10)
Official title: Provide for export restrictions on certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment and components therefor, and for other purposes.
Introduced April 13, 2026 by John Peter Ricketts · Last progress April 13, 2026
The bill trades stronger national security and protection of U.S. semiconductor leadership through coordinated export controls for higher costs, compliance burdens, potential supply disruptions, and increased diplomatic and administrative strain.
Taxpayers and the public: the bill tightens and coordinates export and servicing controls to reduce adversaries' access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, lowering the risk that hostile actors acquire technology that could erode U.S. military and intelligence advantages.
Tech workers and U.S. semiconductor businesses: coordinated export controls help slow rivals' ability to field advanced-node chip production, supporting U.S. semiconductor leadership and protecting domestic industry competitiveness.
Federal policymakers and allied governments: the bill promotes diplomatic alignment and uses positive incentives to make allied export controls more sustainable and reduce long-term economic friction for partners that adopt similar measures.
Tech workers, small manufacturers, and consumers: U.S. firms and global fabs may face higher production costs and supply disruptions (slower availability of advanced chips) because of restricted equipment access and servicing.
Exporters, service providers, and firms with foreign ties: the bill creates new licensing, reporting, and compliance obligations that increase legal and administrative costs and operational complexity for businesses.
Taxpayers and businesses: naming or targeting foreign firms and pressuring suppliers could escalate geopolitical tensions and invite retaliatory measures or allied trade frictions that raise costs and complicate global supply chains.
Based on analysis of 3 sections of legislative text.
Requires agencies to identify critical semiconductor equipment/facilities, push allies to adopt countrywide export controls, and directs Commerce to issue regulations restricting exports, servicing, and end‑use to targeted facilities.
Requires federal agencies to identify semiconductor manufacturing equipment and facilities that pose national security risks, report those listings to Congress and the public, and push allied supplier countries to adopt countrywide export controls and denial-based licensing for exports, servicing, and end‑use to those facilities. If allied partners fail to adopt equivalent controls within set deadlines, directs the Commerce Secretary (with State consultation) to issue U.S. regulations extending countrywide controls and comprehensive end‑use/end‑user restrictions on U.S.-origin equipment and related exports and services. Directs near‑term diplomatic engagement, periodic reporting and briefings to Congress, and rapid rulemaking (initial regulations within 150 days and annual updates) to align allied controls on semiconductor production hardware, components, and software considered critical to advanced computing and national security. It also expresses congressional intent that the United States coordinate incentives with allies to encourage adoption of these controls and to deny technological benefits to specified adversary firms and facilities engaged in military‑civil fusion activities.