The bill aims to make Supreme Court membership and case resolution more predictable and resilient (through fixed nomination schedules, term limits, and temporary substitutes) but does so at the cost of notable constitutional, legitimacy, and continuity risks that could prompt litigation, politicization, and reduced judicial experience.
All Americans see fewer delays and a functioning Supreme Court because temporary substitute justices can be tapped quickly (by transparent, randomized selection) to fill shortfalls without new Senate confirmations.
All Americans get more predictable Supreme Court turnover because nominations follow a fixed schedule (one nomination in the 1st and 3rd post‑election years), reducing surprise timing and uncertainty about Court composition.
Citizens benefit from regular single 18‑year terms for justices, which creates more frequent appointment opportunities and can reduce lifetime ideological entrenchment on the Court.
The appointment-timing rules and limits on how the President can appoint justices could conflict with constitutional appointment powers, creating substantial risk of litigation and institutional disruption.
Unelected, unconfirmed retired justices may be allowed to cast deciding votes on major cases, meaning outcomes could be decided by persons who never received Senate confirmation for those votes.
Using temporary retired-justice appointments risks legal challenges to the legitimacy of Court decisions, creating uncertainty for parties and the broader legal system.
Based on analysis of 3 sections of legislative text.
Establishes single 18-year active terms for Supreme Court justices, a two-nominee schedule per presidential cycle, Senate confirmation deadlines, and a randomized process for retired justices to serve temporarily.
Sets a new system for Supreme Court appointments: justices would serve a single, nonrenewable 18-year active term with two scheduled nominations per presidential four-year cycle, and the Senate would have firm deadlines to act on those nominations. It also creates a transparent, randomized method for selecting retired justices to sit temporarily if the Court lacks its full complement of active justices, and specifies how current justices transition under the new rules upon enactment.
Introduced May 21, 2025 by Hank Johnson · Last progress May 21, 2025